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PREFACE 
This thesis is the result of a study carried out under the provisionally financed 
'Access to Land for Low Income Groups in the Third World' research programme 
of the Department of Human Geography of the Developing Areas of the Faculty of 
Policy Sciences of the Catholic University of Nijmegen. The terms of reference, 
as formulated in 1984, were to 'cany out a study of the rural problem in 
Paraguay in general, of that of the old central agricultural region, in particular, 
of the recent changes which have occurred there under the influence of 
government policy and other developments, of the present position of the lower 
income groups in the region and of their future prospects'. The emphasis of the 
study lay on the extent to which changes had occurred in the access of small 
farmeis in an old agricultural region (Central Paraguay) to agricultural land as a 
result of government policy (in the form of agricultural colonization). 
• » * 
This preface is merely intended to inform the reader briefly about the subject 
dealt with in the remainder of these pages and to serve as a simple separation 
between the title page and the list of contents. In my opinion, there is little 
value in the addition of high-flown words, since interested readers will not be 
deterred from further study by a short and business-like 'foreword', while the use 
of flowery language is unlikely to induce the 'uninterested' to read further. 
Thus this is not a foreword giving a detailed description of how I gradually 
became interested in Paraguay and how my ideas slowly matured, because it will 
already be clear from the flrst paragraph that the research lasted only four years 
and that it was bom in the brain of others. Nor is it a foreword with a detailed 
description of wild adventures or hardships suffered in the field, because crude 
cowboy and Indian stories would do an injustice to the respect I have gained for 
Paraguay and, moreover, tall stories in general say more about the innocence and 
lack of awareness of the researcher than about the 'strange customs' in that 
distant, exotic country. 
Lastly, the use of a preface to indicate the limitations of the research is 
senseless. Excusing myself in advance for gaps in the contents caused by lack of 
time or an absence of resources gives the mistaken impression that, without 
these limitations, a masterpiece would have been created. Because gaps occur 
after a lapse of time even in the works of a lifetime, and because I wish to 
forestall the unlikely event of my taking a doctoral degree to be a 'historian' 
after many years of research, I have felt obliged to restrict myself as far as 
possible to the terms of reference, so that those readers who are interested in 
background matters should refer to the detailed bibliography appended to this 
study. 
ν 
The advantage of writing a preface afterwards is that it can serve at the same 
time as an 'acknowledgement'. In the ßrst place, I should like to thank all the 
members of the Department of Human Geography of the Developing Areas and 
other colleagues for their encouragement at work and/or their company during 
lunch and in the corridors. It is also perhaps a good moment to recall that my 
interest in the problem of development in general, and in carrying out research, 
in particular, was awakened by the lectures and guidance of the various lecturers 
attached to the Department of Human Geography of the Developing Countries of 
the Stale University of Utrecht. My thanks, lastly, to my parents for everything 
which although a 'matter of course' to them, is more than 'just appreciated' by 
myself. 
It is easier to thank the people who made a specific contribution to the 
realization of this book, such as Guus van Westen, who made critical comments 
on a number of chapters, Mr. J.F.L Coenen, who produced the maps, the staff of 
the drawing office and photographic laboratory of the Catholic University of 
Nijmegen for the production of the figures and photographs, and Emile Gemmeke 
for his assistance in 'technical' matters. My thanks also to fur Schuurman for 
the translation of the summary in Spanish and to Mr. R.R. Symonds, who revised 
the English text. 
Special mention should also be made of all people who helped me in Paraguay or 
took part in the research. My thanks are due to various officers of the 'Instituto 
de Bienestar Rural' and the 'Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería', to several 
staff members of the 'Universidad Católica', those attached to the 'Comité de 
Iglesias' and very many other people, in particular, Ronaldo E. Dietze, Hugo 
Davalas, Hugo R. Oddone, Carlos Alberto González, Mima Vázquez and Cesar 
López. I would like to thank all these people most sincerely. 
Finally, my special thanks to Hugo Mazzoleni and Gladijs Torres of the 
'Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería', who helped me to conduct surveys and 
conquer dirt roads, from whom I learned to patch tyres and who trained me in 
win in 'Guaraní. It was mainly they who lifted a tip of the veil spread over the 
Paraguayan countryside and initiated me into the Paraguayan 'good life'. Then-
friendship and collaboration made (his study possible and contributed, in 
particular, to a most interesting and pleasant stay. During the surveys and long 
wafts we experienced at first hand how the problems of minifundia and latifundia 
were linked with each other. We saw how our 'laws': 'the larger the latifundia, 
the more unfindable the small farmers', and 'the more invisible the small farmer, 
the more pressing his problems', were confirmed many times during our lengthy 
journeys of discovery in the countryside. 
Annelies Zoomers 
Utrecht, 1st July 1988 
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INTRODUCTION 
0.1 By way of introduction 
Imagine a small, crowded island in the middle of the ocean. Surrounded by water 
on all sides, the population is engaged in the production of subsistence and 
commercial crops. The majority of the farmers occupy the land without having 
legal titles. 
As time goes by, the rural economy becomes incapable of absorbing the 
growing number of islanders. Further 'horizontal expansion' is impossible, with the 
consequence that more and more farmers have to share the same area of land. 
Old plots are worked harder and harder and, every year, fragmentation and soil 
degradation become more severe. With the further distribution of the land among 
a growing number of rural families, the competition for living space and the 
complexity of agricultural life increase. The population is struggling for its 
existence, trying to adapt itself to its impoverishing natural environment. 
Gradually, however, the relationship between man and land reaches a point of 
extreme strain, causing rural distress and poverty. The island population is short 
of land and capital, and the opportunities for making a living from simple 
handicrafts and small-scale manufacturing are very limited. Only labour is 
abundant. The farmers are pushed to the shoreline, sometimes even into the 
water, until migration to the mainland is made possible by the construction of a 
bridge. 
This study deals with rural development in the Central Region of Paraguay (Map 
1). But why should a study of Paraguay begin with an imaginary story like this? 
Paraguay is one of the more thinly populated countries of South America, 
surrounded by Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil. It is land-locked. There is no sea and 
therefore no need for a bridge at all. Nevertheless, the island story resembles the 
situation in the Paraguayan countryside in the early 1960s. 
At that time, the majority of the population was concentrated on only a small 
part of the territory, i.e. the area up to about 150 kilometres east of the capital 
of Asunción. Within this region, the individual 'lotes' (parcels, farms) had been 
reduced in size to minifundia, since a growing number of farmers had been forced 
to share the same area of land. Underemployment and rural poverty had increased, 
while soil impoverishment had become extreme. In spite of the growing 
fragmentation of the land and growing population pressure, 'horizontal expansion' 
was almost impossible. Whereas the proportion of the rural population within the 
Central Region without land was increasing, the land in the rest of Paraguay was 
in the hands of the state or a few latifundists and remained thinly populated. The 
Central Region was the island described above and the latifundia were the sea. 
The bridge symbolizes the strategy of agricultural colonization. 
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Paraguay and the Central Region. 
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In 1963, the Paraguayan government started a policy of agricultural colonization, 
a national strategy aimed at populating uninhabited parts of the country and 
transforming uncultivated land into prosperous farms. Colonization presented 
itself to politicians, political parties and the government, as a supreme rhetorical 
device. Among all kinds of economic objectives, agricultural colonization was 
claimed at one and the same time to relieve over-population, give land to the 
landless, improve the tenure situation and the prosperity of the target group, i.e. 
the 'minifundistas' of the Central Region. 'As a panacea for economic and social 
problems the strategy seemed to be almost without rival' (Hulme 1987, p.412). 
While achieving national agricultural growth, agricultural colonization was at 
the same time assumed to be a solution to the problems of the Central Region. 
Minifundism and occupancy were expected to decline as a result of the departure 
of part of the popubtion. State-assisted settlement schemes would make it easier 
for the 'isbnders' to move to eastern Paraguay and become the legal owners of 
brge parcels of fertile bnd. By encouraging the migration of 'minifundistas' from 
the Central Region to eastern Paraguay, the 'bnd problem' (land shortage and 
bndlessness) of the Central Region's popubtion would be automatically eased. The 
obstacles to future development seemed to have been removed. 
After 25 years of colonization policy and with the exhaustion of exploitable bnd 
resources in sight, the time seems appropriate to evaluate the effects of the 
policy for the Central Region. This evaluation will form the central theme of this 
study. We shall show that, despite the state-sponsored settlement schemes and a 
considerable spontaneous colonization movement, the Central Region remains 
congested as before. A brge proportion of the popubtion is still concentrated in 
the immedbte surroundings of Asunción, most of them living on small parcels 
without legal titles. Where 'minifundistas' have migrated to other parts of the 
country, many of them have not improved their situation. 
0.2 A framework for evaluating colonization policy 
Many of the studies which have been made on the failure of the colonization 
process in Paraguay have focussed on the inadequate preparation (site and settler 
selection) or the insufficiency of technological, economic and social assistance to 
the colonists. Factors like inadequate pbnning, bck of money or even corruption 
are held responsible for the disappointing results (Alegre Ortiz 1977; Berthold 
1977; Ziehe 1979; Ваег & Birch 1984). 
Other studies (Garcb 1981; Kleinpenning 1983, 1984 C) have stressed the fact 
that national-economic purposes have been more important than the social 
objective of helping the rural poor. In these studies it is argued that only a few 
of the wide variety of original objectives have been achieved, mainly national-
economic ones like raising the value of aggregate agricultural production and 
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increasing national security by peopling empty parts of the country. Settlement 
schemes are said to have given priority to increased agricultural production rather 
than to improving the prosperity of the needy population, so that important social 
objectives have been neglected. 
Even more skeptical are those writers who emphasize that agricultural 
colonization, rather than having any developmental purpose at all, has had only 
political value (Comité de Iglesias 1982 В; Conferencia Episcopal Paraguaya 1983). 
Land settlement schemes, they argue, have merely been used to divert attention 
from other fundamental questions like land reform, which would have been much 
more difficult to discuss. As Hulme (1987, p.423) states: 'land settlement schemes 
are very tidy, compared to interventions in a complex 'in situ' situation'. In other 
words, the strategy of agricultural colonization seemed to provide a means of 
solving the problems of the Central Region without having to take political 
measures within this congested area itself. In this view, settlement schemes are a 
most effective means of suggesting that something is being done without actually 
having to start a land reform programme within the problem area itself. 
The evaluation of the effects of agricultural colonization is a difficult and 
multidimensional task. The final judgement about its success or failure will vary 
with the viewpoint that is taken. Nevertheless, agricultural colonization is often 
described in general terms of having been successful or not. Supporters of this 
policy will not surprisingly be inclined to mention only the positive side of 
agricultural colonization, as opposed to its opponents who will point out that 
objectives have not been reached, pressing problems still remain, turnover of 
settlers is high and staff members are disillusioned. This kind of oversimplified 
final evaluation, however, hardly fits the facts of complex reality. In fact, 
agricultural colonization may be a success and a disaster at the same time. More 
specifically, settlement schemes may be successful in terms of raising agricultural 
production and exports, while at the same time their results may be characterized 
as highly disappointing from the point of view of the quality of life of the 
colonists and the conservation of the natural environment. Health and nutritional 
problems may characterize the life of most of the settlers, and erosion or other 
forms of environmental degradation may be widespread. A well-conducted 
evaluation should therefore never end in a single, one-sided conclusion, but should 
take into account the wide variety of economic, social and cultural factors. Since 
the answer to the question of whether agricultural colonization is successful or 
not ultimately depends on the aspect which is being considered, conclusions should 
specify the various dimensions concerned. 
According to Casagrande, Thompson and Young (1964), a theoretical distinction 
can be made between agricultural colonization as a 'structural' and as an 
'individual' process. In a structural sense, the concept refers to 'all processes 
whereby an already established socio-cultural (or economic) system is extended, 
replicated or reintegrated'. At the individual level, however, colonization is a 
'creative process', i.e. an act of pioneering: 'Colonists must accommodate 
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themselves to a new ecological situation, and to novel socio-political and economic 
arrangements' (Casagrande et al. 1964, p.282). This distinction makes clear that, 
besides the different aspects of the colonization process, the scale of analysis 
should also be taken into account when the effects of agricultural colonization 
are reviewed. Evaluations have to be made at various levels and empirical (non-
assumptive) connections established between the various levels of analysis, which 
are then brought together in a vertical sense. More specifically, this implies that 
the macro-spatial dimensions of agricultural colonization have to be studied with 
an awareness of their implications at the household level and vice versa. Only if 
we know the implications of colonization at the various levels of analysis, can we 
draw sound conclusions about the effects of colonization. 
The above distinction again shows that, because of its multilevel character, 
the effects of colonization can never be described in clear-cut terms. At the 
national level, the effects may seem to be positive because of their contribution 
to agricultural growth and the reduction in spatial inequalities. At the household 
level, however, the conclusion may be that colonists are still living in sub-
standard conditions. Depending on the level of evaluation, agricultural colonization 
can be referred to either in terms of 'frontiers of wealth' or 'frontiers of misery7. 
In order to take these different dimensions into account, agricultural colonization 
has to be analyzed at various levels: down from the macro-level to the level of 
individual households and individuals, or the other way around. 
Moreover, the effects of agricultural colonization will not everywhere be uniform 
and unambiguous. Because of differences in the socio-economic and geographical 
characteristics of space, the necessity, possibilities and developmental impact of 
colonization will vary considerably from place to place. As long as this spatial 
diversity exists, it is not possible to label the results of the policy as entirely 
positive or negative. 
The effects of agricultural colonization will also vary according to the various 
groups concerned, even in the hypothetical case of conditions being spatially 
homogeneous. Some evaluations, however, take very little account of class 
structure or 'vertical' differentiation. Settlement blocks are represented as 
homogeneous entities, as if all settlers and settler families live in similar 
conditions. Their farm size, land quality, access to inputs, capital and labour are 
treated as being equal, while their family is also assumed to be homogeneous 
(Hulmel987,p.424). 
Finally, the time of the evaluation will also determine whether the results of 
colonization are regarded as positive or negative. Since the intended effects of 
colonization need some time to materialize, conclusions will depend very much on 
the period over which the effects are analyzed. Evaluations of settlement projects 
within three to five years of their implementation will lead to quite different 
findings from evaluations carried out after a period of 25 years or more. 
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The identification of causal relationships between colonization policy and all kinds 
of processes of socio-economic change in and outside the pioneer areas 
constitutes a quite different problem. When the results of colonization seem to be 
in accordance with the intended objectives, colonization policy is likely to be 
labelled successful. Not all the forms of socio-economic change in the rural areas 
concerned, however, can be automatically attributed to colonization policy. Other 
forces may also have been at work. This means, for example, that rural-rural 
migration is not necessarily a direct result of colonization stimuli, but may be a 
spontaneous response to unfavourable socio-economic and political conditions in 
the area of origin. 
The opposite is also true: a colonization policy is often said to have failed 
when the expected results do not materialize. The strategy (in general) is called 
in question, instead of other factors being held responsible. It may be that the 
desired effects failed to materialize not because of wrong policy measures or 
operational imperfections, but because of unfavourable economic or political 
circumstances during the time of execution. Instead of suggesting a relationship 
between colonization policy and socio-economic change in the rural areas 
concerned, cause-effect relationships should be tested adequately. 
One should, obviously, also be aware of unintended side-effects, including those 
which may occur quite unexpectedly outside the direct field of view. Even when 
none of the intended objectives of colonization seem to have been realized, the 
policy may have had some positive impact by being responsible for unintended and 
apparently unrelated phenomena. 
Much remains to be clarified about the direct, indirect, deliberate and 
undeliberate effects of agricultural colonization. According to Di Fillipo (1975, 
p.48), a deeper understanding of the internal cohesion of (inter-related) multilevel 
causes and consequences is needed. As he says: '..con el objeto de plantear 
políticas deliberadas de redistribución espacial de la población, resulta útil conocer 
los efectos deliberados o indeliberados, directos o indirectos, que sobre dicha 
esfera de interés derivan de diferentes acciones concretas formulados por los 
focos del poder político y económico..'. 
Many studies dealing with the impact of agricultural colonization, pay attention 
only to the frontier area, i.e. the colonists' place of destination, and neglect the 
congested 'area of origin'. It is often taken for granted, for example, without 
testing the assumption, that the colonization policy has more or less automatically 
solved the problem of congestion in the older agricultural areas. Without an 
insight into the local situation in the area of origin, however, it is rather 
premature to assume that outmigration will cause socio-economic changes and 
improve the situation of the rural poor, and a balanced assessment of the 
developments is not possible. A better understanding of the developments in the 
colonists' area of origin is needed, not only in order to be able to measure the 
'decongestive' impact of agricultural colonization, but also to assess the other 
resulte of the policy. Even if life at the frontier is miserable for most of the 
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pioneers, colonization may not be a complete failure if beneficial changes have 
occurred in the longer-inhabited agricultural regions from which the colonists 
came. It also may be that life in the frontier areas is hard, but that it was worse 
in the areas of origin. These and other aspects may be completely overlooked if 
the frontier area and the area of origin are not both included in the analysis. 
Otherwise there is a risk that evaluations will be incomplete. 
When comparing developments on 'both sides' one has, incidentally, to be aware 
of several limitations, one of which is 'incomparability of contexf. The socio-
economic and geographic context of pioneer areas and of long-settled agricultural 
regions may be quite different. As a consequence, these areas will be 
characterized by different phenomena and processes, or by similar ones which 
have to be interpreted in different ways and may have different effects. A policy 
aimed at 'road improvemenf as a means of raising the farm incomes of the rural 
population, for example, may be effective in isolated frontier areas, but will have 
less impact in less remote zones, especially in areas where the majority of the 
population are engaged in non-farming activities. In this connection, indicators 
which may be valid in the context of the 'area of origin' do not necessarily apply 
in the 'frontier situation' and vice versa. The use of 'farm income' as an indicator 
for the household's level of prosperity, for example, may still have relevance in 
zones where off-farm employment is absent, but will be of less value in 
economically more diversified areas. 
A second limitation which has to be taken into account when comparing areas 
of colonization with the older 'core', is the 'incomparability of population'. Where 
the level of prosperity is found to be higher in the colonization area than in the 
colonists' area of origin, for example, this is not necessarily to be ascribed to the 
policy of agricultural colonization. Part of the difference may be explained by the 
fact that the inhabitants of the 'area of origin' exhibit completely different 
socio-economic, demographic and other characteristics from the inhabitants of the 
colonization areas, especially as the former group consists of people who have 
decided to stay, whereas the latter group is formed of persons who decided to 
leave and start a new life as pioneers, some of them even coming from abroad. 
When, for example, colonists are found to be younger, have larger families or 
more motivated to work hard, the higher income level obtained in colonization 
areas may be a reflection of these 'population characteristics', rather than the 
result of the 'better opportunities' available in the areas of colonization. 
A third factor, making comparison even more complicated, is the 
'incomparability of time'. Differences in time may become relevant when, for 
example, the level of prosperity and living conditions in the frontier area are 
compared with the situation in the area of origin before departure. With the lapse 
of time, individuals and households will enter new life cycles as a result of which 
more family labour may become available, while other developments may also take 
place and lead to rising incomes, without this necessarily being the result of the 
developmental effects of agricultural colonization at all. This illustrates again that 
one should always take care not to draw incorrect or premature conclusions. 
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To sum up, the complexity of reality makes very high demands on the framework 
of evaluation. In order to gain a good insight into the real effects of agricultural 
colonization, not only must account be taken of differences in scale, spatial 
context, population and time, but it is equally or even more important to study 
the effects of the colonization process from both sides. The evaluation should 
look not only at the newly developed frontiers, but also consider the effects of 
the colonization process on the areas of origin. 
03 The aim and outline of this study 
Although much attention has been given to the study of colonization in Paraguay 
since the 1960s, some key issues, such as the question of whether settlement 
schemes would be able to relief congestion and help to develop the Central 
Region have been more or less neglected as themes of research. It was assumed 
that agricultural colonization would automatically relieve population pressure, 
improve farm size and the tenure situation as well as increase rural prosperity 
among the 'minifundistas' and 'ocupantes', as it was expected that the new 
opportunities offered by opening up the under-exploited eastern zone of the 
country for colonization would be seized mainly by peasants without suffícient 
land and lacking legal property titles. Their departure from the Central Region 
would result in a decrease in minifundism and informal occupation and thus 
improve the conditions for further development in their area of origin. In the 
absence of sufficient knowledge of the socio-economic implications of spatial 
concentration, the effects of congestion on the survival strategies of the 
'minifundistas' in the Central Region and the exact implications of the lack of 
property titles for 'ocupantes', rural development was simply expected to take 
place. 
The aim of the present study is to determine to what extent the policy of 
agricultural colonization has alleviated the situation in Paraguay's 'old agricultural 
core'. Have large numbers of peasants from the Central Region actually settled in 
the new areas of colonization and has their departure diminished population 
pressure and the lack of land? Have the 'minifundistas' who stayed behind indeed 
been able to obtain larger ferms? And has the expectation that living conditions 
of occupiers would improve when they obtained legal property rights been 
realized? Or has there been little fundamental change in the survival strategies 
and prosperity of the rural population of the Central Region? Another relevant 
question is that of to what extent the colonists have really been able to improve 
their situation. 
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The central problem of our study will therefore be: to what extent has the 
strategy of agricultural colonization relieved congestion in the Central Region of 
Paraguay and alleviated the plight of the rural poor? 
In other words: has the construction of the 'bridge' really solved the rural 
problems of the 'island' and brought prosperity to those who decided to settle on 
the 'mainland', or has poverty remained the condition of the 'stayers' and of 
those who have started a new life as pioneers? 
The research questions can be summarized as follows: 
1: At the national level of analysis (Paraguay): 
(a) What were the characteristics of Paraguay's rural population in the 
early 1960s, (b) how has agricultural colonization been used to improve its 
situation and, (c) insofar as changes have occurred, to what extent can the 
strategy of agricultural colonization be held responsible? 
2: At the regional level of analysis (the Central Region): 
(a) How did rural congestion manifest itself in the different areas of the 
Central Region, (b) what were the responses of the region's population and 
(c) to what extent has the opportunity for agricultural colonization 
influenced these responses or been part of them? 
3: At the local level of analysis (the rural households): 
A. (a) What are the survival strategies of the 'minifundistas' in the Central 
Region and why did they stay, (b) how far is the size of their farms an 
obstacle to agricultural modernization and (c) to what extent will their 
income levels be raised by giving them access to more land? 
B. (a) What are the characteristics of the 'ocupantes' in the Central Region 
and why have they not applied for property titles to the land, (b) how far 
is the tenure situation an obstacle to agricultural modernization and (c) to 
what extent will their income level (and 'security7 as users of land) be 
increased by land legalization? 
C. (a) What are the characteristics of the farmers who have left the Central 
Region and moved to one of the pioneering areas, (b) how far have they 
improved their 'access to the land' (farm size, tenure situation) and (c) 
what have been the effects in terms of agricultural modernization and 
prosperity? 
To answer these questions, our analysis will start at the national level, and then 
move down to the regional and household levels. 
Chapter 1 will focus on the rural problems of Paraguay as a whole in the 
period before 1963, the year in which a new Agrarian Statute came into force, 
the 'Instituto de Bienestar Rural' was established and a start was on implementing 
the policy of agricultural colonization. We shall describe the objectives and the 
implementation of this policy and then consider its effects from a national point 
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of view. It will be shown that changes in rural Paraguay are mainly the result of 
spontaneous processes and only partly a direct result of the policy of 
agricultural colonization. 
In Chapter 2, the unit of analysis will not be Paraguay as a whole, but the 
Central Region. It will be shown that this relatively densely populated rural 
'island' is not a homogeneous area at all, but shows remarkable intra-regional 
differences in the severity and form of its rural problems. Moreover, there are 
differences in reaction to the problems: in some areas the population has tried to 
compensate for the growing fragmentation of the land by intensifying land use 
('vertical expansion' or 'vertical response'), whereas, in other places, they have 
started to look for supplementary sources of (non-agricultural) income ('diagonal 
response'). Merely when vertical or diagonal responses were impossible or 
unattractive, has the peasant population migrated ('horizontal response'), but only 
some of them have seized the opportunity of colonization and moved to one of 
the pioneer areas located outside the Central Region. Taking into account the 
different ways in which the problems manifest themselves and the different 
responses of the population, the Central Region has been divided into two zones, 
each of them with its own geographical, socio-economic and demographic structure 
and opportunities for dealing with the increasing scarcity of land. 
Even where there are similar socio-economic structures, however, and they 
have changed in a similar way, different kinds of process may be at work and not 
all groups of the population will be equally able to improve their situation. In 
order to obtain a better insight into the differentiation of the population, it will 
also be necessary to study the phenomena at the local level. In Chapter 3, 
therefore, the unit of analysis will be the rural household. In order to identify 
the ways in which different human groups have managed to adapt themselves to 
the growing land scarcity and other problems, we shall concentrate on the 
farmers with less than 5 hectares of land and, more specifically, on the survival 
strategies of these 'minifundistas'. It will be shown that the families who are still 
trying to make a living from farming do not use the land in the same way as 
those who have decided to supplement their income from non-agricultural 
sources. Whereas access to the land is still very important for the former group, 
it has lost much of its relevance for the latter. It will further be shown that 
rather than being a reflection of farm size, the standard of living of most 
'minifundistas' is nowadays determined by a whole set of different survival 
strategies. In many cases, the assumed causal relationship between farm size, 
gaining a living from the land and level of rural income no longer exists. 
Theories of agrarian change and rural development often emphasize the role of 
land tenure conditions. By differentiating between the various types of tenure 
existing in the Central Region, it will be shown in Chapter 4 that the positive 
changes in the tenure situation (land legalization), do not invariably result in 
increased security, improved agricultural returns and higher levels of prosperity; 
neither land use nor rural income may therefore be expected to improve 
automatically as a result of the legalization of occupation. Rather than being a 
reflection of the existence or non-existence of property titles, land use and 
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agricultural income appear to be conditioned by the ability to invest money in the 
land, i.e. by the kind of survival strategy pursued. Thus the causal relationship 
between tenure situation, security and agricultural production appears not to be as 
obvious as is often assumed. 
In Chapter 5, attention is directed to the colonization process and the area of 
colonization. What kind of rural families and individuals in the Central Region 
decided to leave and from what kind of rural areas did they come? It will be 
shown that the impact of their departure on congestion has been very small and 
that very few of the colonists have been able to transform their improved access 
to the land in the frontier areas into higher incomes. Colonization has resulted in 
the 'transformation of a free and public good (state land) into a scarce and 
divisible commodity7, while leaving the real problems untouched (Hulme 1987, 
pp.419-423). 
Finally, some conclusions will be formulated in Chapter 6. Agricultural 
colonization has done little to improve the situation in the Central Region of 
Paraguay, nor has it greatly helped to increase the prosperity of those who have 
left. It will be argued that the policy of agricultural colonization has brought 
about spatial change, but that little of the desired socio-economic development 
has materialized. Instead of bringing progress and prosperity to the countryside, 
agricultural colonization has exported old problems to new spots. 
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Chapter 1 
CHARACTERISTICS AND RESULTS OF THE COLONIZATION POLICY 
1.1 The background to agricultural colonization 
1.1.0 Introduction 
With an area of 406,752 square kilometres and a little over 3 million inhabitants 
in 1987, Paraguay is one of the smaller and least populated countries of South 
America. 
At the time that the Paraguayan government decided to pursue a policy of 
agricultural colonization (1963), the rural population accounted for 64.4% of all 
Paraguayans and the agricultural sector employed 52.3% of the economically active 
population (Dirección General 1962). Paraguay was regarded as a predominantly 
agricultural country, although only a small part of the national territory was used 
for agricultural purposes. 
According to the agricultural census of 1956, the area used for agriculture 
took up only 16,816,619 hectares or 41% of the national territory. More than 11% 
of this area was fallow land, however, and no less than 85% was used for forest 
exploitation and cattle ranching. This meant that agricultural crops covered less 
than 4% (613,675 hectares) of the land. With only 484,070 hectares being 
effectively used for crop production, the cultivated area served mainly for 
growing subsistence crops. 
Manioc, also called 'the bread of the country7, contributed no less than 39% of 
the aggregate volume of agricultural production in 1956, but covered only 15% of 
the area under crops. Most of the manioc was produced for domestic consumption 
and future growth prospects were restricted by the inelasticity of domestic 
demand. 
Other important subsistence crops were maize, beans and groundnuts, which 
together accounted for 15% of the total volume of agricultural crops and covered 
no less than 49% of the national crop farming area. Because of soil 
impoverishment, however, the production of beans and groundnuts had gradually 
declined, while the production of maize was increasingly restrained by the limited 
domestic demand. 
More possibilities for future growth and commercialization seemed to be 
offered by sugar cane, cereal, fruit and rice. Sugar cane production, which in 
1956 represented 35% of the total volume of crop output, was expected to increase 
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by further expansion of the area under cultivation (only 4% in 1956) and the 
improvement of the marketing conditions. The growth prospects for the production 
of cereal, fruit and rice depended mainly on future price trends and the 
possibilities of further mechanization. In 1956, however, production of these 
crops accounted for only 1% of the aggregate bulk of crop produce and covered 
4% of the area under cultivation. 
Cotton and tobacco were Paraguay's most important export crops, covering 15% 
of the total cultivated area in 1956, but representing only 3% of the total volume 
of national agricultural production. The export of these products, however, hardly 
guaranteed a reliable inflow of foreign currency, since exports fluctuated from 
year to year, under the influence of changing weather and market conditions. 
The fact that the ten crops mentioned above represented 93% of the national 
crop output and occupied 87% of the cultivated area in 1956 clearly illustrates 
that Paraguay's agricultural production was still very little diversified in the 
early 1960s. Its marginal performance is indicated by the fact that crop farming 
contributed only 36% to the GNP in 1956. Although the volume of production 
increased by 2.2% per annum between 1956 and 1963, production per hectare 
decreased from 116 to 112 US dollars. 
In order to stimulate development and improve the situation of the agricultural 
sector, the Paraguayan government assumed that it was necessary to change not 
only the geographical distribution of the country's population, but also rural 
property and occupancy relationships. In other words, the fact that a large part 
of the national territory outside the Central Region was still almost uninhabited 
and exploited extensively, if at all, together with the extremely skewed 
distribution of the land, which gave rise to mini and latifundism, and the 
unfavourable tenure situation (absence of property titles) were held responsible 
for the stagnation of the country's agricultural sector. Most alarming was the 
situation in the area near Asunción, where a considerable part of the Central 
Region's rural population was concentrated on very small farms, most of them 
not even having official property titles. 
In order to diminish population pressure in this area and stimulate national 
agricultural development at the same time, the Paraguayan government opted for a 
policy of further colonization. Before discussing the objectives of the colonization 
policy and its implementation (1.2), we shall first try to elucidate the causes of 
the situation which existed in the Paraguayan countryside in the early 1960s. 
1.1.1 The unequal distribution of the population 
With the river Paraguay as the principal line of division, Paraguay can be divided 
into two large natural regions with very different characteristics. The western 
part (the Chaco) represents 60% of the national territory and consists of a plain 
with an average height of about 130 metres above sea level and in which semi-
arid climatic conditions prevail and most soils are unsuited for crop production. In 
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the eastern part of Paraguay climatic and soil conditions are much more 
favourable. This is the area where almost all Paraguayans and economic activities 
are to be found. The process of population concentration had already started here 
in the sixteenth century when the first Spanish immigrants settled in Asunción 
and its surroundings. At that time, the Chaco was more or less uninhabited, 
except for the Indian tribes who lived in simple temporary camps and practised a 
'palaeolitic' economy of collecting, hunting and fishing and some temporary 
agriculture. Most of the autochthonous inhabitants living from farming were to be 
found in the eastern part of Paraguay. They concentrated in small hamlets of 200 
to 300 inhabitants ('aldeas'), where they lived in 'grandes casas comunales' 
(Secretaría Técnica de Planificación 1980 B, p.l24). The newly arrived colonists 
rapidly established socio-cultural alliances with the Indians of these 'aldeas' in 
eastern Paraguay. 
Colonization, nevertheless, proceeded slowly and remained restricted. The 
Spaniards were hardly interested in colonizing this part of their colonial empire, 
because there were no important mineral reserves to be found and the density of 
the population was very low. Moreover, the colonization process was repeatedly 
interrupted and hindered by the attacks of hostile Indians from the western part 
of the colony ('Chaqueños') or by those of the Brazilian Ijandeirantes' hunting for 
slaves. Many newly established settlements ('fundaciones') were consequently laid 
in ruins in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, although the Jesuits, who had 
brought together a large part of the Indian population in so-called 'reducciones', 
succeeded in resisting the various attacks over a long period1. Because of the 
lack of interest in further colonization and the fact that the occupation of the 
territory was characterized by ups and downs, the majority of the colonists and 
their descendants remained concentrated in the area not far from Asunción. This 
distribution pattern did not change fundamentally after 1811, the year in which 
Paraguay became an independent country2. Thus most of the land of Paraguay 
remained uninhabited or occupied only by small groups of nomadic and semi-
sedentary Indians. 
During the war against the Triple Alliance' of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay 
(1865-1870), Paraguay not only lost a considerable part of its territory but also 
more than half of its population. As a consequence, the need and ability to 
occupy the empty parts of the national territory decreased even further. In the 
1880s and following years a large part of the national domain was sold by the 
Paraguayan government to foreign capitalists and a small Paraguayan élite in 
order to raise capital needed to pay off the enormous war debts. As a result, 
many extensively exploited latifundia came into existence, including some of 
several millions of hectares (1.1.2). Some of them were situated in the Central 
Region, but most were established in the scarcely populated eastern departments 
and in the Chaco. These latifundia obviously reduced the scope for 'outward 
colonization' for the majority of the population who were still concentrated in the 
area surrounding Asunción. The area of state-owned land ('tierra fiscal') on which 
Paraguayans could settle became scarce. The Chaco War with Bolivia (1932-1935) 
led to a considerable increase in the area of state-owned land, but conditions for 
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founding new agricultural settlements in the semi-arid Chaco were far from ideal 
and the war again reduced the country's population. 
Other factors responsible for the small population were the emigration of 
Paraguayans to Argentina and Brazil3 as a result of the highly instable political 
situation in the late 1940s, when Paraguay was suffering a civil war, and the 
repression since 1954 under the Stroessner regime. The counter-flow of immigrants 
remained very insignificant. Small groups of Japanese immigrants founded several 
colonies in eastern Paraguay in the 1950s and 'Mennonites' started to settle in 
the Chaco as early as 1926. This was in addition to industrialists engaged in 
tannin extraction and cattle ranchers who had arrived in this area in the period 
after the war against the Triple Alliance, but their total numbers were small. 
Apart from these, because internal migration flows were rather small and mainly 
directed to Asunción, there were no other developments which might have 
changed the uneven pattern of population distribution (Map 2). 
Between 1950 and I960, the rate of population growth in the Central Region 
amounted to 2.6% per annum. Population density rapidly increased, whereas the 
area of cultivated land in the Central Region remained more or less stable. In 
1962 no less than 45.5% of the national population was confined to the 'Zona 
Central' (departments of Cordillera, Guaira, Caazapá, Paraguari and Central), 
which has an area of 29,460 square kilometres and comprises only 7.2% of the 
total national territory (Kleinpenning 1987 A, p.209). No less than 57% of 
Paraguay's rural population was to be found here (Dirección General 1962), 
whereas the area under crops (326,860 hectares in 1956) covered only 11% of the 
Central Region (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 1961). 
The majority of this rural population lived in small, spatially dispersed 
localities, 'compañías' or 'vecindades rurales'. Family heads had to subdivide their 
property among their heirs. Because of the subdivision of their parcels, a 
growing number of farmers had to share the same area of farmland. Population 
growth put a direct pressure on the agricultural sector, so that rural poverty 
further increased with each new generation growing up in the region. The 
monopolization of the land by the latifundia in the rest of Paraguay (1.1.2) largely 
explains why the population did not move out. 
1.1.2 The unequal distribution of the land 
Because of the low population density until the end of the 19th century the 
Paraguayan population of European origin was never hindered from using as much 
land as it needed for agricultural production. There was little competition, even 
after 1824-1825, when most of the land was declared state property by Dr. 
Francia, Paraguay's first dictator. The vast majority of the farmere continued to 
have access to sufficient land for making a living from agriculture, some of them 
as private owners but most of them as tenants or simple occupiers of state land. 
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Map 2: 
Distribution of the population in the early 1960s. 
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As has already been stated, this rather favourable situation changed after the war 
against the Triple Alliance', since large areas of state land were sold to foreign 
and Paraguayan capitalists in the 1880s, in order to 'replenish the coffers of the 
government left empty by the war* (Arnold 1971, p.64). The 'Indian tradition' of 
the free and undivided land (which also existed among the non-Indian population) 
was broken. 
Within a few years, almost all the state land in the eastern and western parts 
of Paraguay came in the hands of Argentines or other groups of foreign 
capitalists and a few Paraguayan investors, most of whom bought extremely large 
tracts of land . As was stated above, large estates developed mainly in the still 
thinly inhabited or even empty parts of the eastern zone and in the Chaco, i.e. 
outside the more densely populated Central Region. In eastern Paraguay, at the 
beginning of this century, 11 buyers of properties larger than 100,000 hectares 
had become the owners of no less than 5,548,448 hectares of the national 
territory. Additionally, 1,119 buyers with estates between 1,875 and 100,000 
hectares had obtained a total area of 9,961,319 hectares. Both groups together 
covered a total area of 15,509,767 hectares. In addition, 60 individuals and 
enterprises obtained nearly the whole of the Paraguayan Chaco (Kleinpenning 
1984 B, p.165). In the words of an Argentinean statesman in 1938: The 
Paraguayans are the owners of under 5% of the territory of their own country, 
the lowest percentage in the world' (Pastore 1972, p.336). 
With this rapid introduction of latifundism the majority of the farmers 
concentrated in the area near Asunción had no other choice but to split up their 
land to accommodate population growth, leading to further minifundism. According 
to the census of 1956 (Table 1), 45.9% of the farms had to make do with 5 
hectares or less and, together, these covered only 1% of the total farm area. 
Because an area of 5 hectares was considered to be the necessary minimum, 
the census figures clearly illustrate that the majority of the Paraguayan rural 
population had access to insufficient land to guarantee their daily subsistence. 
According to Breitenbach (1973, p.5): '..5 hectáreas es la unidad más pequeña en la 
cual un agricultor paraguayo puede mantener una familia promedio de 6 personas, 
adecuadamente empleando los métodos de agricultura tradicional..'. 
Most pressing was the situation in the Central Region where minifundia made up 
54.2% of the farms and covered 5.7% of the area (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Ganadería 1961). As a consequence, the parcels of the small farmers in this area 
had to be exploited as intensively as possible, whereas the big latifundia which 
surrounded them remained largely under-used. 
Consequent on the population growth, the subsequent subdivision of the land 
by inheritance, and the impoverishment of the land, minifundism gave rise to 
growing problems. 
Minifundism in the Central Region resulted in part from the relatively high 
population density associated with the concentration of 'latifundios' in eastern 
Paraguay and the Chaco, but another factor of importance was the skewed 
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Table 1: 
Distribution of Paraguayan farm holdings by size, 1956. 
Size c l a s s e s 
0-5 ha 
5-10 ha 
10-100 ha 
100-1,000 ha 
1,000-20,000 ha 
20,000 and over 
Paraguay 
Number of 
farms 
68,714 
34,949 
41,011 
3,391 
1,404 
145 
149,614 
% 
45.9 
23.4 
27.4 
2.3 
0.9 
0.1 
100.0 
Area 
ha 
162,706.9 
230.207.7 
841,081.9 
997,762.4 
5,801,868.5 
8,782,991.4 
16,816,618,8 
% 
1.0 
1.4 
5.0 
6.0 
34.5 
52.1 
100.0 
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia, 1961. 
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Distribution of Paraguayan farm holdings by size, 1956. 
distribution of the land within the area itself. There was, in fact, no real 
population pressure, because there were still large areas of idle land, even in the 
most populated parts. Arnold (1971, p.90) accordingly states: '..If we suppose that 
the law was changed to limit any owner to 1,000 hectares and that all of the 
surplus over 1,000 hectares was subject to expropriation and distribution, then 
595,200 hectares would be available for distribution, enough for nearly 30,000 
families at 20 hectares per family, all within the minifundia area..'. 
Most of the 'minifundistas' had to cope not only with insufficient land and soil 
degradation, but their situation was aggravated by the unfavourable tenure 
situation. In many cases, minifundism and the absence of property rights went 
hand in hand. 
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1.1.3 The unfavourable tenure situation 
During the colonial period, the majority of the Spaniards and their descendants 
occupied larger or smaller pieces of land without acquiring official property titles. 
Others lost their documents. After Paraguay became an independent state, its first 
dictator. Dr. Francia, decided that those Paraguayans who were unable to show 
property documents would no longer be considered as legal owners. As a result, 
the whole Chaco and more than half of the land in eastern Paraguay fell into the 
hands of the state. In his determination to make Paraguay a sovereign nation, 
Francia also practised a policy of extreme isolationism. There was hardly any 
international trade, national demand was restricted and agriculture therefore 
mainly served to satisfy domestic needs. Agricultural products had little 
commercial value and there was no need to acquire property rights, another 
reason being that land was still abundant. Most Paraguayans were therefore not 
seriously disadvantaged by Francia's measures. They did not try to obtain 
documents, but simply continued to use the land (most of which had now passed 
into the hands of the state) as they were accustomed to do before, some of them 
paying rent to the state, while many others did not. 
Under presidents Carlos Antonio López, who ruled from 1844 until his death in 
1862, and his son Solano López (1862-1870), even more land was taken over by 
the state, but there were no significant changes in practice. Land use continued 
to be seen as an obvious, not to say natural, right, transmitted from one 
generation to the next. 
With the alienation of large tracts of state land in the 1880s and the following 
years, however, individual property became much more widespread. The majority of 
the Paraguayans who had survived the war against the Triple Alliance - mainly 
women and children who occupied land in the vicinity of Asunción and whose 
immediate task was to produce food - had insufficient capital to become full 
owners of the land they worked and were therefore unable to safeguard their 
holdings adequately against the expansion of the large privately owned latifundia. 
Most of them had no choice but to continue to exploit the land informally, as 
before. In contrast to the preceding period, when informal rights were quite 
common and generally respected, property deeds became normal documents, so that 
those who lacked such official documents to prove their rights became 'ocupantes 
informales'. This was the case with most farmers of the Central Region. 
In this century, insufficient measures were taken to change the unfavourable 
situation. Where the Paraguayan government has tried to transfer land into the 
hands of the masses of the population^, most of these efforts have not been 
successful because of political in-fighting and lack of sufficient finance for the 
implementation of the laws. 
As a result, only 26.3% of all Paraguayan fanners had become full land-owners 
by 1956, in the sense of having definitive titles to all their land. Additionally, 
6.2% of the farmers had obtained only 'provisional titles', while 6.6% had 
definitive or provisional titles to a part of their land; they still used the rest as 
tenants or as occupiers. Together, however, these different categories of owners 
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monopolized no less than 82.8% of the area covered by the census, which means 
that their holdings were relatively large in comparison with those of the tenants 
or occupiers. Tenants who had rented their land made up 12.3% of the total 
number of farms, covering 7.2% of the total farm area. No less than 48.6% of the 
farmers did not have any legal rights at all. They simply used the land illegally, 
or at least, 'informally' and had to make do with only 10.0% of the total farm 
area. 
Table 2: 
Distribution of Paraguayan farm holdings by legal status of the 
cultivator, 1956. 
Tenure status 
Single tenancy: 
Owners with 
-definitive right 
-provisional right 
Tenants 
Occupiers 
Number of 
Farms 
abs 
39,418 
9,232 
10,761 
65,863 
% 
26.3 
6.2 
7.2 
44.0 
Area 
ha 
abs 
12,005,573 
455.035 
1,019,678 
1,545,373 
% 
71.4 
2.7 
6.1 
9.2 
Combined tenancy: 
Owners with 
predominantly 
-definitive right 8,251 5.5 1.391,394 8.3 
-provisional right 1,713 1.1 62,699 0.4 
Predominantly 
tenants 7,596 5.1 186,075 1.1 
Predominantly 
occupiers 6,780 4.6 150,793 0.8 
Total 149,614 100.0 16,816,620 100.0 
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia, 1961 
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Smqle tenancy 
• Owners wjth definitive rights 
0 Owners with provisional rights 
О Tenants 
• Occupiers 
Combined tenancy 
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In the early 1960s, the phenomenon of illegal or informal occupation was no 
longer restricted to the Central Region, but also existed in the other parts of the 
country. Because of increasing demographic pressure, a growing number of farmers 
had after all decided to leave the relatively densely populated Central Region and 
had spontaneously occupied parts of the state land and of privately owned 
latifundia outside the 'Zona Central'. 
1.1.4 The inadequate methods of production 
The pronounced differences in farm size (latifundia as against minifundia) and in 
tenure situation (full owners as against 'ocupantes') obviously had an effect on 
land use and production methods. 
Most - legally owned - 'latifundios' were extensively used for cattle ranching 
and /or forest exploitation, whereas the majority of the 'minifundios' (often 
worked by 'ocupantes') had to be exploited as intensively as possible and were 
generally used for the production of food crops like manioc or maize, often in 
combination with small-scale animal husbandry (pigs, chicken). The primary goal of 
most 'minifundistas' was to satisfy daily needs. Cotton was the most important 
cash crop. 
The over-exploitation of the 'minifundios' for several generations had greatly 
diminished natural soil fertility, but fertilizers were hardly applied, while other 
methods to improve or conserve the quality of the land remained inadequate. As a 
consequence, most of the parcels had become impoverished, with productivity 
being low to very low. 
Not only production per hectare, but also production per capita was extremely 
modest, since most of the 'minifundistas' had been unable to mechanize and 
modernize farm production. They had to rely entirely on human energy and animal 
power and also lacked the necessary capital to invest in other inputs which 
could have improved farm output. Most 'minifundistas' made use only of family 
labour, but during the peaks of the harvest or other periods in which much labour 
was needed, they could rely on the help given within the framework of the 
'minga', the traditional (cooperative) system of mutual unpaid help among 
neighbours. 
The majority of the small farmers were more or less underemployed, most of them 
working less than 6 months per year, mainly from July to October. During the 
agricultural off-season unemployment was widespread, because of the scarcity of 
supplementary sources of income. 
Because of the low farm output and the lack of other sources, rural incomes 
were very low and most of the 'minifundistas' had to live at a subsistence level. 
They were hardly integrated into the monetary economy and many of them were 
permanently in debt. Most problematical was the situation of the 'ocupantes', who 
were excluded from official credit facilities, because of the absence of legal 
property rights to the land. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1956, only 20% 
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of the Paraguayan farmers had access to the official credits provided by the 
'Banco Nacional de Fomento' (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 1961), 
whereas the large majority had to make use of informal credits supplied by local 
shopkeepers, who loaned the money in exchange for a share in the agricultural 
production. The power of most of these 'acopiadores' is explained by their 
monopoly in controlling the marketing of cash crops like cotton. Since the 
'minifundistas' could not make use of other channels for marketing their products 
and also lacked the means to store the harvest, they had no choice but to accept 
the prices offered by the 'acopiadores'. Many of these middlemen had become the 
pivot of the village economy. 
To conclude the first section of this chapter, it may be said that the stagnation 
which characterized the agricultural sector in the early 1960s was the result of 
several problems. The unequal distribution of the land and of the people was 
responsible both for under-exploitation and congestion. Whereas the Chaco and the 
eastern departments of Paraguay could be called 'a land without people', the 
Central Region was inhabited by 'people without land'. 
In order to stimulate the introduction of modem farming methods, the growth 
of agricultural production and the rise of rural prosperity, the view of the 
Paraguayan government was that 'minifundistas' should be provided with larger 
parcels, while the 'ocupantes' should become the legal owners of their land. 
Inadequate farm size and informal tenancy were seen as the major obstacles to a 
more rational and intensive use of the land and labour. 
A policy of further colonization seemed to offer the best chance of achieving 
these aims. By taking into exploitation the large areas of unexploited or 
extensively exploited land which were still available, 'minifundistas' and occupiers 
would spread over the country and automatically relieve the population pressure in 
the Central Region. Both those who stayed behind and the colonists settling in 
the pioneer areas would have the opportunity to become the legal owners of 
larger areas of land. The improved farm size structure and tenure situation in 
both the decongested and newly occupied areas were expected to facilitate the 
introduction of new crops and modem methods of production, which would, in 
turn, increase prosperity. In other words, the policy of further colonization was 
expected to have positive results, both on agricultural production and in creating 
prosperity. The colonization policy was therefore seen as a means of ending the 
under-exploitation of land and of human capital at the same time, obviating the 
need to cany out a land reform which would negatively affect the interests of 
the land-owning classes. 
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1.2 The implementation of the policy of further colonization 
1.2.0 Introduction 
In 1963 a new Agrarian Statute was formulated (Law 854), which created the basis 
for the Paraguayan government to transform the agrarian structure of the 
country. The 'Instituto de Bienestar Rural' (Institute of Rural Welfare), created in 
the same year by Law 852, became responsible for the realization of the rural 
development policy. As an autonomous institution, in communication with the 
Executive Power through the 'Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería', its task 
became: 'to transform the agrarian structure of the countryside and to incorporate 
the rural population effectively into the economic and social development of the 
nation by means of legal solutions which make possible the increasing elimination 
of the latifundism and the minifundism and their replacement with a just system 
of ownership, tenure and land exploitation. These legal solutions must further the 
fair division of land, as well as the adequate organization of credit, production 
and marketing, so that the farmers receive every help in achieving economic 
security, as a guarantee of their freedom and dignity and as a basis of social 
welfare7 (Law 852, section 2. In: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 1981). 
These goals had to be achieved through the 'programa de colonización y 
migración intema' (1.2.1), the 'programa de reparcelación' (1.2.2) and the 
'programa de titulización' (1.2.3), respectively. In addition, the 'programa de 
promoción' was designed to consolidate the new situation and improve the 
methods of production (1.2.4). In this section we shall focus attention on the 
implementation of these different goals of action and on the results achieved. 
1.2.1 Changing the distribution of population 
In order to achieve a more equal distribution of population, the IBR began 
establishing agricultural colonies in eastern Paraguay in 1963, while at the same 
time implementing migration programmes intended to relieve population pressure in 
the Central Region. 
Before the IBR could start its colonization programmes, it had to acquire large 
areas of land. The laws which formulated the Agrarian Statute and created the 
IBR gave it the authority and power to acquire land by various means: outright 
purchase (or exchange) of privately owned land, negotiated sales (or exchange), 
application to the government for the use of state land ('tierra fiscal'), 
expropriation of private lands when sales by agreement proved to be impossible 
and donations, principally from private organizations. 
23 
Table 3: 
Land acquired for colonization by the IBR, 1963-1984. 
Acquired area of land in thousands of hectares: 
Pur- Ex- Expro- Dona- State 
Period chase change priation tion land Other Total % 
1963-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981-84 
259 
317 
226 
212 
118 
29 
160 
136 
134 
49 
37 
58 
108 
115 
4 
-
-
I l l 
20 
1 
1,047 
1,551 
623 
319 
212 
-
511 
-
-
-
1,372 
2,597 
1,204 
800 
384 
22 
41 
19 
12 
6 
Total 1,132 508 322 132 3,752 511 6,357 
% 18 8 5 2 59 8 100 
Source: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, Memoria 1984. 
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Figure 3: 
Land acquired for colonization by the IBR, 1963-1984. 
Between 1963 and 1984, the IBR acquired over 6 million hectares of land, 63% of 
it before 1970. In recent years, the acquisition of new land has slowed down, as 
'empty areas' have become increasingly scarce. 
Table 3 shows that no less than 59% of the incorporated area fell into the 
category of 'tierra fiscal' and 18% has been acquired from private owners who 
wished to sell their land. The fact that the IBR has obtained very little land by 
expropriation or exchange (5% and 8%, respectively) clearly illustrates that it has 
never seriously tried to redistribute the land in the long-occupied areas by land 
reform measures. In practice, land within the Central Region has been 
redistributed only when private owners of Occupied land' were prepared to sell it 
to the 'ocupantes'. Of much greater importance than this kind of 'internal 
colonization', however, was the foundation of colonies in the as yet uninhabited 
parts of the departments situated to the east of the Central Region. 
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Initially, IBR activities concentrated on the area not far from the Central Region, 
where spontaneous colonists had already settled before the official colonization 
programmes started. The IBR incorporated this informally occupied (state) land 
and created 31 colonies, with 9,568 'lotes' (parcels) and 201,000 hectares of land, 
in the departments of Caazapá, Caaguazú and San Pedro. 
A more active colonization policy on not yet occupied land was made possible 
after the eastward extension of the road system under the auspices of the 
'Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones'. Along the newly built roads, the 
IBR designed rectilinear settlement schemes as a basis for the colonization of the 
land (see Chapter 5). 
One of the first areas opened up by road construction was the land situated in 
the departments of Caaguazú and Alto Paraná on both sides of the 'Ruta 7', 
running from Coronel Oviedo to Puerto Presidente Stroessner (Map 3). This area, 
enlarged with the new department of Canendiyú, which formed part of the 
departments of Caaguazú and Alto Paraná until 1973, gradually developed into one 
of the most important axes of colonization, the 'Eje Este' (eastern axis)". 
After 1973, along the new road connecting Asunción with the city of 
Encamación, the frontier of colonization moved down to the departments of 
Itapúa, Misiones and Ñeembucú, which came to be known as the 'Eje Sur' 
(southern axis). A third axis of colonization ('Eje Norte') developed from 1966 
onwards in the departments of San Pedro, Amambay and Concepción, which was 
connected by the road running north from Coronel Oviedo and the new link 
between Pedro Juan Caballero and Concepción (Kleinpenning 1987 A, pp.128-129). 
From 1963 to 1985, the IBR is reported to have opened up more than 7,572,000 
hectares of land at 519 different places . The fact that the colonized area appears 
to be larger than the area officially acquired by the IBR (Table 3) is explained by 
the 'inheritance of land' from the 'Instituto de Reforma' (IRA), the colonization 
office which preceded the 'Instituto de Bienestar Rural'. 
A large part of the colonization process took place in the period 1963-1970, 
when no less than 53% of the colonies with 48% of the colonized area, came into 
existence. The 'Eje Norte' and the 'Eje Sur* have become the most important 
colonization zones, since no less than 54% of the colonies have been founded 
along these axes. The 'Eje Este' accounts for only 15% of the total number of 
colonies. With regard to colonization within the Central Region (21% of the total 
number of colonies), the large majority of the colonies were established during 
the first years by private owners on 'already occupied land'. 
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Table 4: 
Location of official colonies recognized by the IBR, 1963-1984. 
L o c a t i o n 
Eastern Paraguay: 
Eje este 1) 
Eje n o r t e 2) 
Eje sur 3) 
Western Paraguay 
C e n t r a l Region 
Unknown 
T o t a l number 
of c o l o n i e s 
Hectares (χ 1000) 
% 
Number of 
p a r c e l s 
% 
1963-70 
30 
82 
65 
18 
73 
7 
275 
3.620 
48% 
29,386 
47X 
1971-75 
53% 
6 
16 
37 
13 
1 
15 
2 
84 
504 
7% 
134 
10% 
1976-80 
16% 
1 
16 
14 
23 
38 
7 
13 
1 
96 
,073 
15% 
.875 
27% 
1981-84 
18% 
2 
9 
20 
6 
15 
12 
9 
2 
64 
376 
30% 
,707 
16% 
T o t a l 
80 
148 
131 
38 
110 
12 
13% 519 
7,572 
100% 
62,102 
100% 
% 
15% 
29% 
25% 
7% 
21% 
2% 
100% 
1) Caaguazú, Alto Paraná, Canendiyú. 
2) San Pedro, Amambay, Concepción. 
3) Itapúa, Misiones. Neembucú. 
Source: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, Memoria 1984. 
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Figure 4: 
Location of official colonies recognized by the IBR, 1963-1984. 
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The number of colonies founded in the still very thinly populated western part 
of Paraguay (the Chaco) has been very small, because of the rather unfavourable 
natural conditions. In terms of area, however, the colonization process in the 
Chaco may be labelled as 'quite importanf, since it has led mainly to the 
establishment of cattle ranching colonies ('colonias ganaderas') with 'lotes' of no 
less than 8,000 hectares each (see 1.2.2). Colonization is now accelerating in the 
Chaco, because of the growing scarcity of land in the eastern part of Paraguay. 
Since 1981, the IBR is said to have created 3 colonies with an area of more than 
1,580,000 hectares8 (Instituto de Bienestar Rural, Memoria 1984). 
МарЗ: 
Main settlement zones in eastern Paraguay, ca. 1980. 
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In order to stimulate people to leave the congested Central Region and settle in 
one of the colonization areas, the IBR drew up a 'programa de migración'. This 
programme, known as the 'Proyecto de Migración Interna y Repatriación', was 
intended to ease the decision of leaving the small and often impoverished 
minifundia in the Central Region. Beneficiaries of the programme were small 
farmere in the Central Region, but also emigrants (mainly living in Argentina) who 
wished to return to Paraguay and start a new life as pioneers. 
The colonists were recruited by peripatetic administrators of the IBR. Those 
persons who wished to benefit from the colonization programme (mainly young 
males) were organized in groups of about 30 individuals and transported to the 
areas of colonization, where they had to cut the forest and prepare the land for 
cultivation. Each of them worked his 'own' parcel, and the IBR took care of food 
and shelter. After six months, the parcels were assumed to be ready for 
exploitation and the IBR organized a second transportation, this time to bring 
over the family members who had stayed behind. With the help of family labour, 
the house had to be built and the land brought into cultivation. 
Table 5: 
Results of the 'Proyecto de Migración Interna y Repatriación', 
1963-1980. 
1963-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
Total 
Internal migration: 
Heads of Family 
household members 
3,843 
2,928 
4,258 
11,029 
19,487 
14,128 
7,308 
40,923 
Repatriation: 
Heads of Family 
household members 
4,014 
1,447 
2,177 
7,638 
18,657 
3,630 
6,073 
28,360 
Total 
number 
46,001 
22,133 
19,816 
87,950 
Source: Ins t i tu to de Bienestar Rural, Memoria 1984. 
Between 1963 and 1980,18,667 families with 87.950 persons migrated or repatriated 
under the regime of the migration programme. This gives an average family size 
of about 5 persons. 59% of them originated from the Central Region". 
The number of 'independenf colonists, i.e. those who migrated spontaneously 
without the intervention of the IBR, is considerably larger, however, as may be 
concluded from the fact that no less than 62,102 'lotes' had been taken into 
exploitation up to 1984 (Table 4). The impact of the official programme was 
therefore relatively limited. In fact, the majority of the colonists did not settle 
on plots with sizes and shapes previously established by the IBR and situated 
within rectilinear settlement schemes, but acted independently, according to their 
own standards and capabilities. Since 1970, in particular, the number of 'official 
colonists' has declined in favour of the 'spontaneous settlers'. To the extent that 
the IBR is still trying to relocate fanners in the areas of colonization (Alto 
Paraná), recruitment has recently shifted from the Central Region to the 
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department of Caaguazú (Instituto de Bienestar Rural, Memoria 1986, unpublished). 
1.2.2 Improving the distribution of land 
Along with stimulating a more balanced distribution of the population over the 
national territory, the IBR also had the task of improving the distribution of the 
land. In order to achieve this aim, it not only set in train the colonization 
process, but also had to ensure that the 'lotes' in the pioneer areas would be 
large enough to guarantee the establishment of rational enterprises. 
Under the provisions of the Agrarian Statute, the minimum and maximum size 
of the 'lotes' depended on the type of colonies established. In the so-called 'crop 
and general farming colonies' ('colonias agrícola-granjeras'), which were supposed 
to concentrate on crop farming, dairy production, pig, bee and poultry raising and 
small rural industry, the minimum size had to be 20 hectares. In colonies 
designated for the production of crops in combination with cattle ranching and 
forest exploitation ('colonias agrícola-forestales'), however, the land had to be 
distributed in 'lotes' not smaller than 50 hectares. Finally, in the colonies 
concentrating wholly on cattle production ('colonias ganaderas') the minimum size 
varied from 300 to 1 $00 hectares in the eastern region, and from 1,500 to 8,000 
hectares in the Chaco (Law 854, section 44-50. In: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 
1981)10. 
Within the urban and semi-urban parts of the colonies, reserved for the 
location of public buildings, future growth of the urban centre and the production 
of horticultural products, the size of the 'lotes' varied between 0.5 and 2 hectares 
(Law 854, section 53. In: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 1981). 
Colonists in the colonies for 'arable and small livestock farming' and in those 
for 'arable farming and foresby were not allowed to become owners of more than 
100 hectares, depending upon the number of children and labour and production 
capacity, while in the 'colonias ganaderas' the ownership of more than one 'lote' 
was prohibited (Law 854, section 66-67. In: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 1981). 
Besides being created with the aim of improving rural property relationships by 
means of colonization programmes, the IBR was given the aim of replacing 
latifundism and minifundism in the long-occupied rural areas with a just system of 
property ownership ('programa de reparcelación'). It was therefore laid down in 
the Agrarian Statute that the IBR could expropriate and redistribute properties of 
more than 20,000 hectares in the western region and of more than 10,000 hectares 
in the more densely populated and more fertile eastern part of Paraguay, 
provided that these estates were 'not rationally exploited'. By 'not rationally 
exploited' is meant that the total permanent investments (in roads, wells, fences, 
buildings etc.) made on the estate amount to less than 50% of the fiscal land 
value. Such estates were regarded as 'latifundios' (Law 854, section 4. In: 
Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 1981). In addition, even 'rationally used' latifundia 
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could be expropriated, provided that the land was suited for colonization and its 
expropriation necessary for the solution of 'collective problems'^ . 
In order to achieve a more rational exploitation of the land, the Agrarian 
Statute also authorized the IBR to expropriate minifundia of less than 2 hectares 
in the urban and semi-urban zones and of less than 7 hectares in the rural areas, 
with the purpose of combining them into larger parcels. The size of the newly 
formed 'lotes' would depend on the density of the population, the production 
capacity of the land and their possibilities for intensive use (Law 854, section 10. 
In: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 1981)12. 
As has been shown above, however, the IBR has expropriated hardly any land. 
Instead of engaging in time and money consuming procedures of expropriation or 
exchange of land, it has preferred to concentrate on the distribution of 
unexploited or extensively used land. Rather than carrying out a land reform 
within the Central Region, it has preferred to follow the line of least resistance, 
i.e. of offering small farmers access to more and new land in the country's 
periphery. 
1.2.3 Improving the tenure situation 
It was assumed that the objective of improving the tenure situation would 
automatically be achieved as soon as the 'ocupantes' of the Central Region settled 
in the agricultural colonies established in the newly opened-up pioneer areas. 
Additionally, the 'stayers' in the long-occupied areas would be eligible for land 
titles. 
With respect to those who settled in the areas of colonization, the 
administrators of the IBR would be responsible for the consolidation of the 
colonization process by enabling colonists to obtain property titles to their land 
('programa de titulización'). It was decided that, after the first year of 
cultivation, colonists could take the necessary steps to become owners. By lodging 
their birth certificates and a certificate of irreproachable conduct with the 
administrator of the IBR and filling out an official application (with data on civil 
status, occupation and family size), the colonists were to be considered for an 
official title to the land. After verification, the application was to be forwarded 
to the IBR office in Asunción, where it would be registered. The IBR settled the 
pr ice^ and the size of the annual instalments to be paid over a period of 5 
years. In special cases, however, this period could be extended to a maximum of 
15 years. After he had started to make his payments to the administrator of the 
colony, the colonist would receive a provisional title to his land, and, after full 
payment, he was supposed to receive his definitive title, which had to be entered 
in the 'Registro de Propiedad' in Asunción (see Chapter 4). 
Not all Paraguayans were regarded as potential applicants for the 'lotes 
coloniales' in the Agrarian Statute. Only men and women aged 18 years and over 
who were engaged in agriculture or could give formal proof of their intention to 
become farmers and did not yet own 50 hectares of arable land (or 300 hectares 
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in eastern Paraguay or 1,500 hectares in the Chaco, if they wished to obtain a 
'lote ganadero') could apply for a 'lote'. Other beneficiaries were: rural co-
operatives, qualified agricultural scientists and veterinarians, and rural dwellers 
who had completed their military service and had followed an intensive 
agricultural course during that period (Law 854, section 14. In: Instituto de 
Bienestar Rural, 1981). Free land titles were granted to heads of families with 
seven or more minor children and to disabled veterans of the Chaco war. Both 
groups had the right to receive up to 20 and 40 hectares of land, respectively. 
Schools and churches could also be granted land free of charge (Law 854, section 
91-92. In: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 1981). 
The occupiers of privately or state-owned land who were concentrated outside the 
areas of official colonization, could also become the legal owner of the farm they 
worked, provided that they occupied the land 'peacefully and in good faith' for at 
least 20 years (Law 622 de Colonizaciones y Urbanizaciones de Hecho, 1960, and 
Law 854, 1963, section 135-136). This group of occupiers, known as 'ocupantes de 
hecho', had to go to the office of the IBR in Asunción in order to have their 
rights of occupancy officially recognized. After approval of the occupiers' 
application for property rights and price-setting by the IBR, the 'ocupante' had to 
start to pay for the land and pass through the same procedures as the colonists 
in the areas of official colonization. Not only the length of occupation, but also 
the size of the farm and the family, the productivity of the land and the level of 
education were taken into consideration when allocating land titles. Where several 
farmers applied for the same 'lote', the first 'ocupantes', former tenants and 
share-croppers enjoyed priority in the acquisition of the land (Law 854, section 
80,132. In: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 1981). 
Besides being responsible for carrying out the 'programa de titulización', the IBR 
also had the task of mediating in land conflicts and controlling rent agreements. 
The Agrarian Statute laid down, for example, that tenants should pay a rental not 
higher than 12% of the fiscal land value and share-croppers a share of the 
harvest of not more than 20% (Law 854, section 124, 131. In: Instituto de 
Bienestar Rural, 1981). 
1.2.4 Improving methods of production 
The IBR was responsible for the consolidation of the colonization process by 
stimulating agricultural growth and diversification and providing colonies with the 
infrastructure needed to achieve this aim. 
Although agricultural growth was expected to result automatically from the 
further horizontal expansion of the cultivated area, the improved farm size and 
the more favourable tenure situation, the IBR was still held responsible for the 
active promotion of new methods of production and the introduction of new crops. 
It has executed a 'programa de promoción', intended to raise the production of 
31 
traditional export crops like cotton or tobacco and to stimulate the introduction 
of new (export) crops such as soya, sorghum and maize. The IBR also had to 
provide the colonists with sufficient technical, social and economic assistance to 
facilitate agricultural modernization. In doing so, attention was focused mainly on 
the medium-sized and larger farms in the areas of official colonization. 
Besides advisory services, the IBR was responsible for the promotion of the 
adequate storage and conservation of the harvest (by constructing silos and 
warehouses), and the improvement of the infrastructure for the transportation and 
marketing of the produce. 
Besides the necessary infrastructural provisions for the growth, diversification 
and commercialization of agriculture, each colony with more than 50 families was 
also to have a police station and post office, a school and a health centre (Law 
854, section 119. In: Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 1981)14. These were to be 
provided in order to encourage economic activity and raise the standard of living. 
1.3 Evaluation of the colonization policy 
1.3.0 Introduction: positive and negative views 
As was argued in the Introduction, the conclusion as to whether agricultural 
colonization is a success or a failure depends on the level of analysis and the 
aspects on which the evaluation concentrates. 
Assessors who wish to prove the success of agricultural colonization policy will be 
inclined to emphasize that it has led to a better integration of the national 
territory, a more balanced distribution of the population, the partial or complete 
elimination of latifundism, an increase in the number of medium-sized farms, the 
transformation of informal 'ocupantes' into legal owners and an increase in the 
volume of agricultural production. In other words, they will stress the spatial-
economic success of colonization by comparing the distribution of population, the 
rural property relationships, the tenure situation and the level of agricultural 
production, which have come into existence through the realization of the 
colonization programme with the situation existing before. 
The national population has indeed become less unequally distributed over the 
territory with the creation of hundreds of colonies in eastern Paraguay. The share 
of the Central Region in the national population has decreased from 46% in 1962 
to 38% in 1982, complemented by an accelerated growth of the population in the 
other departments of eastern Paraguay. 
Similar conclusions may be drawn in respect of the distribution of the land. 
Between 1956 and 1981, the total number of agricultural enterprises increased by 
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62% (from 149,614 to 241,652); 92,038 new farms came into being, many of them 
with an area of between 20 and 50 hectares. 
With regard to the tenure situation, the positive assessors can point to the 
large number of legal property titles distributed since 1963, which has resulted in 
a rapid growth of legal owners. Between 1956 and 1981, the number of owners 
with definitive or provisional titles to the land increased by 160%, from 58,614 to 
152,170 (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 1961,1985). 
Table 6: 
Population distribution in Paraguay, 1962-1982. 
1962 % 1982 
Asunción 
Central Region 
Eastern departments 
Western departments 
(Chaco) 
288,882 
827,748 
628,344 
74,129 
16 
46 
35 
3 
457,210 
1,144,760 
1,378,910 
54,480 
15 
38 
45 
2 
Paraguay 1,819,103 100 3,035,360 100 
Source: Dirección General 1962-1982 
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With respect to the level of agricultural production, the colonization policy can 
also be regarded as a success. The cultivated area and agricultural production 
have increased considerably, thanks to the large number of new farms. Between 
1956 and 1981, the area used for agriculture grew by almost 38%, from 16 million 
to nearly 22 million hectares. The area under crops even increased by 2,045,000 
hectares or 333%, from 614,000 to 2,659,000 hectares (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Ganadería 1961,1985). 
The occupation of large areas of new land not only facilitated the growth of 
production, but also the introduction of new crops. Soya production expanded 
enormously: from only 161 hectares in 1956 to almost 400,000 hectares in 1981. 
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Over the same period, manioc production increased by 151%, while its area 
expanded at the same rate, from 71,000 to 179,000 hectares. In addition, from 
1956 to 1981, the area under cotton increased by 270%, from 66,000 to 244,000 
hectares, the area under maize from 178,000 to 267,000 hectares or 50%, and the 
area under sugar cane by 153%, from 19,000 to 48,000 hectares (Ministerio de 
Agricultura y Ganadería 1961,1985). 
These five crops together accounted for over 80% of the volume of agricultural 
production in 1981. The eastern departments of Itapúa, Caaguazú, Alto Paraná, San 
Pedro and Canendiyú, all located on the frontier of colonization, were the most 
important production areas (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 1961,1985). 
The negative assessors, however, will be inclined to emphasize the persistent 
concentration of population in the Central Region, the persistence of minifundism 
in this region (and its rise in the areas of pioneer settlement), the large number 
of 'ocupantes' who are still waiting for titles to their land and the fact that 
agricultural production has remained as unbalanced as before. They will also stress 
the lack of infrastructural facilities in most of the colonization areas and the fact 
that most colonists still live in poor conditions. 
In spite of the departure of a considerable number of fanners to start a new life 
as pioneers, no less than 38% of the national population was still living in the 
Central Region in 1982, i.e. on 7% of the national territory. The region's 
population increased by over 38% between 1962 and 1982, while the population 
density increased from 28.1 to 38.9 inhabitants per square kilometre. 
With respect to the persistence of both latifundism and minifundism and the 
resultant skewed distribution of the land, the negative assessors point to the fact 
that the IBR has expropriated hardly any estates which could be regarded as 
'latifundios' under the Agrarian Statute. In spite of the modest increase in the 
share of medium-sized holdings, the distribution of farms by size classes has, in 
fact, remained basically the same. Neither the share of latifundia nor that of the 
minifundia has changed appreciably. 
Between 1956 and 1981, the number of agricultural holdings of 1,000 hectares 
and over increased from 1,549 to 2,289, or by 48%, while the number of farms 
with 20,000 hectares and over increased from 145 to 147. In other words, in spite 
of the considerable colonization activities, the agricultural holdings of 1,000 
hectares and over, which represented only 1% of the total number of holdings, 
still occupied no less than 78% of the total farm area in 1981 (as against 87% in 
1956). 
In spite of the powers of the IBR to split up latifundia, almost no land has 
been redistributed in practice. This is not surprising, since the definition of 
'latifundios' was so vague that most rural properties could easily escape 
expropriation. Moreover, most of the latifundists had sufficient power to prevent 
this happening. The statement that, in the period up to 1976, the IBR 
expropriated 45 'latifundios' with a total area of 4,3 million hectares in the 
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departments of Concepción, Caaguazú, Alto Paraná, San Pedro, Itapúa and 
Amambay (García 1981, p.105), is misleading, because most of these properties 
were sold voluntarily by the owners and almost no forced land sales have taken 
place. 
Because of the persistence of latifundism, it is not surprising that minifundism 
has also continued at the same high level. In spite of the IBR's powers to 
amalgamate minifundia, the situation has hardly improved in practice. The number 
of holdings of less than 5 hectares, which made up 45.9% of all holdings and 
covered 1% of the total farmland in 1956 (see Table 1), still represented 33.1% of 
the total number and covered 0.8% of the total farm area in 1981. Their number 
grew from 68,714 to 82,376, or by about 20%, whereas the holdings in the size 
class of 5-10 hectares increased by as much as 42% (from 34,949 to 49,511). 
Farms of less than 10 hectares, which accounted for 53% of all agricultural 
holdings in 1981, had to make do with only 2% of the land (Ministerio de 
Agricultura y Ganadería, 1985). The holdings without land numbered 3,463 in 1956, 
but in 1981 there were already 14,855. 
The situation continued to be most alarming in the Central Region, where 
holdings of under 5 hectares, which made up 54.2% of all holdings and covered 
5.7% of the farmland in 1956, represented 53.2% of the total number and covered 
5.1% of the region's farm area in 1981 (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, 
1961,1985). 
Besides emphasizing that the IBR has neglected its duty to improve the skewed 
distribution of the land, the negative assessors may also argue that colonization 
has exported the old problems of minifundism and latifundism to the pioneer 
areas. 
Agricultural colonization made possible the establishment of new latifundia, 
because it was difficult to keep the process of land acquisition in the pioneer 
areas within legal bounds. A certain group of colonists has consequently been able 
to obtain very large areas of land by acquiring more 'lotes' than legally 
permitted. These land acquisitions often went together with the rapid expansion of 
extensive, space-consuming and capitalist forms of land use. A small number of 
large export-oriented enterprises, mainly specializing in the production of soya 
and cereal, began to dominate the areas of colonization by gradually taking over 
part of the land of the smaller fanners. As a consequence of the unequal 
competition between both groups of land users and the recent arrival of land 
speculators, processes of land concentration have intruded into most of the 'ejes 
de colonización'. 
In this connection, the negative assessors will emphasize the fact that, instead 
of relieving population pressure in the 'Zona Central', colonization has attracted 
large numbers of Brazilian colonists, who have settled mainly in the eastern 
border departments. Between 1956 and 1981, the number of farms managed by 
Brazilians increased from 636 to 9,311, the large majority of these being 
concentrated in the department of Alto Paraná (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Ganadería 1961,1985). The large-scale Brazilian immigration is said to have forced 
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Paraguayan colonists to leave their land or at least to have caused considerably 
increased competition among Brazilians and Paraguayans, because of the fact that 
most Brazilian immigrants have more capital and are familiar with better methods 
of exploitation (Celade 1978, p.43). The sale of extensive areas of farmland to 
Brazilian farmere has accelerated the process of progressive elimination of the 
Paraguayan 'campesino' (Yates 1981, p.106). 
In addition to the 'old' minifundia in the Central Region which resulted mainly 
from 'presión sucesorial', new minifundia have made their appearance at the 
frontiers of colonization, not only because of the rapid transference of small 
pieces of land, but because the majority of the colonists have insufficient labour 
and capital to bring large areas under cultivation. Consequently, most colonists 
exploit only parts of their 'lote' of 20 hectares (Rivarola 1982, p.l4). 
Negative assessors will further stress the fact that colonization policy cannot be 
regarded as successful with respect to the methods of production and land use, 
either. Both the farmers in the Central Region and many of those in the areas of 
colonization still apply the same traditional methods. Where colonists have raised 
the level of farm production, this was mainly the result of the high fertility of 
the land during the first years of exploitation. Consequently, the success will be 
temporary. Poor methods of soil conservation and insufficient crop rotation will 
sooner or later have their negative effects on productivity. In addition, most 
colonists are still predominantly subsistence farmers, despite the intention of 
consolidating the process of agricultural colonization by providing the new 
settlements with the necessary means to improve production, storage and 
marketing of the produce. To sum up, it may be said that, although the colonists 
have obtained access to larger areas of land, this has not resulted in real changes 
in land use or production methods (Rivarola 1982, р.іб). Since the IBR had 
insufficient financial means at its disposal, little investment was made in settling 
the colonists and supporting them with a 'programa de consolidación', so that 
colonization has created 'frontiers of misery7 rather than 'frontiers of 
developmenf. Although many subsistence fannere have left the Central Region to 
become pioneers, their economic status has not changed appreciably (Gillespie 
1983, p.365). 
In spite of the 'programa de colonización' and the 'programa de reparcelación' 
(to facilitate the redistribution of land) latifundism and the process of 
'minifundization' have not come to an end, rural property relationships have not 
improved appreciably and only some of the farms can be labelled as 'rational 
enterprises'. 
Furthermore, despite some positive effects of the 'programa de titulización', 
those assessors who wish to stress the disappointing results of the rural 
development policy will use the argument that, after 25 years of agricultural 
colonization, the phenomenon of informal occupation still exists. While the area 
used by 'ocupantes' decreased from 1,696,166 hectares to about 1,009,000 hectares, 
or by 41%, between 1956 and 1981, the number of farmere who had to live 
completely or partly from 'occupied land' increased from 72,643 to 83,457, or by 
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15%. This means that a growing number of 'squatters' had to make do with a 
smaller area of land. 
The tenancy situation has, in fact, hardly improved. Not only have the 
majority of the 'ocupantes' in the Central Region not yet applied for property 
rights, but many colonists still lack a title to their land. Most of them were 
unable to pay the instalments, but it sometimes also happened that the money 
disappeared into the pockets of corrupt IBR administrators. Moreover, the same 
'lote' was sometimes allocated to different colonists at the same time, making the 
land title invalid. Last, but not least, a considerable time elapsed before the 
colonists received the official documents, sometimes to the extent that the 
'solicitante' had already died before he saw his papers. 
Both groups of assessors are right, because the question of whether the verdict 
should be positive or negative depends on the specific aspect being considered. 
Both groups, however, fall into the error of paying insufficient attention to the 
question of causality. They illustrate the success or failure of the colonization 
process simply by pointing to the changed geographical distribution of population 
(1.2.1), the distribution of the land (1.2.2) or the tenure situation (1.2.3), without 
knowing exactly whether these changes have really been caused by the policy of 
agricultural colonization. In other words, all kinds of positive or negative 
developments are too easily associated with government policy without the 
underlying processes having been sufficiently analyzed. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall try to find out whether it was the 
policy of agricqltural colonization or other, autonomous, processes which were 
responsible for changes in the pattern of population distribution (1.3.1), rural 
property relationships (1.3.2) and the tenancy situation (1.3.3). We shall also 
explore whether or not the IBR kept strictly to the programme. In other words, 
where the farmers have become the legal owners of (larger areas of) land, did 
they actually belong to the intended target group of the Agrarian Statute? 
In order to answer these questions, we made use of the information provided 
by the application forms filled out by those farmers who wished to become the 
legal owners of the land. These forms, stored in the archives of the IBR in 
Asunción, give details of civil status, family size and economic activity of the 
applicants. Birth certificates give additional information about their age and place 
of birth. 
On the basis of an a-select sample of 1,210 farmers who had officially applied 
for property titles for land all over Paraguay from 1963 up to 1985, we shall try 
to answer the following questions: 
1: How many farmers applied for property rights outside the congested Central 
Region (which was assumed to become decongested through agricultural 
colonization)? 
2: How far have farmers who wished to become the legal owner of their land 
applied for titles to medium-sized parcels (instead of minifundia or latifundia 
which were supposed to be eliminated by agricultural colonization)? 
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3: To what extent is the official recognition of land rights and security of title 
to be expected to influence agricultural modernization and rural prosperity, 
taking into account the characteristics of the persons applying for property 
titles? 
1.3.1 Changing the distribution of population 
The policy of stimulating agricultural colonization is often said to be responsible 
for the changes in the geographical distribution of the population which have 
taken place since the early 1960s. People have spread over the land because of 
the establishment of a large number of agricultural colonies in eastern Paraguay. 
But, if the opportunities for agricultural colonization have indeed encouraged the 
migration of a considerable number of rural poor from the Central Region to the 
frontiers of colonization, then most of the farmers who have applied for property 
titles on land in the agricultural colonies should have previously lived in the 
Central Region. 
In order to determine the real contribution of agricultural colonization to the 
changes in geographical population distribution and, more particularly, to the 
decongestion of the Central Region, we compared the place of birth with the 
location of the land of which the farmers wished to become the legal owners 
('area of application'). 
Table 7 shows that no less than 643 persons, or 53% of the applicants for 
property rights, were bom in the Central Region, but that only 36% of them 
applied for land outside this area. No less than 414 applicants from the Central 
Region, or 64%, applied for land titles within this congested part of Paraguay. 
Instead of deciding to move to one of the pioneer zones, many inhabitants of the 
Central Region have preferred to stay and replace their status of 'ocupante' with 
that of legal owner in the region itself. 
Since it seems likely that those who were successful in acquiring a legal title 
to their farm will be less inclined to leave their place of residence, it may be 
concluded that their successful attempts will negatively affect future outmigration. 
Rather than contributing to a process of decongestion, the 'programa de 
titulización' seems to have provided more security to those who have preferred to 
stay, thus maintaining the existing population pressure. 
With respect to the Paraguayan farmers who applied for land outside the 
congested Central Region, Table 7 shows that the majority of them were bom in 
the area where the land is situated, e.g. on the colonization frontier. With regard 
to the 'Eje Norte' and the 'Eje Sur', in particular, a considerable part of the 
applications came from farmers who had been bom in the area (75 and 82%, 
respectively), while in the area of the 'Eje Este', this was still true for 58% of 
the 206 applicants. These high proportions of applications for land in the area of 
birth again illustrate the limited 'redbtributive impacf of the government policy. 
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The fact that most of the farmers who applied for land outside the Central 
Region were bom on the same spot in the areas of colonization incidentally also 
makes it clear that most of them belonged to the 'second generation'. Instead of 
having migrated within the framework of officially guided colonization 
programmes, it seems that many of the applicants are the children of parents who 
settled spontaneously in earlier times, i.e. parents who settled without the 
intervention of the IBR and without immediately applying for land titles after the 
second year of exploitation, as laid down in the official procedures of the IBR. 
Only after many years of occupation, have the children or even grandchildren of 
these 'ocupantes' become interested in applying for a legal title to the land. 
Table 7: 
Location of the land and place of birth of persons to whom 
property titles have been granted, 1963-1985. 
Birth area of Area of Date of application: 
the applicant: application: 
Total Total 
number number 1963-75 1976-85 
Central Reg 
Eje Este 
Eje Norte 
Eje Sur 
Western Par 
Unknown 
Paraguay 
ion 643 
535« 
120 
10* 
252 
21% 
151 
12% 
aguay 40 
3% 
4 
IX 
1,210 
100% 
«58% 
«75% 
«82% 
«56% 
64%» 414 
34% 
206 
17% 
335 
28% 
184 
15% 
71 
6% 
0 
0% 
1,210 (100%) 
100% 
184 
41% 
67 
15% 
103 
23% 
60 
13% 
38 
8% 
0 
0% 
452 
100% 
44% 
33% 
31% 
33% 
54% 
(38%) 
230 
30% 
139 
18% 
232 
31% 
124 
16% 
33 
5% 
0 
0% 
758 
100% 
56% 
67% 
69% 
67% 
46% 
(62%) 
Source: IBR sample data. 
The predominance of spontaneous migration and the 'retarded' application for 
legal ownership rights explain why the data on applications hardly reflect the 
course of official colonization. In spite of the fact that 69% of the colonies were 
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created before 1975 (see Table Λ, 1.2.1), only 38% of the applications for land 
titles dated back to that time. Although, according to the official regulations, 
colonists have to apply for their land title after two years of occupation, the 
majority of the colonists have remained 'ocupante' over a much longer time. This 
is most clearly illustrated by the figures for the 'Eje Norte', i.e. one of the most 
important axes of colonization, covering 28% of the total number of applications. 
As we have seen, the colonization process along this axis had already started in 
the early 1960s, but most of the applications for land titles (69%) were submitted 
in the period 1976-1985. 
Table 4 showed that no less than 40% of the agricultural colonies were to be 
found in the 'Eje Este' and 'Eje Sur'. Nevertheless, only 17% and 15%, 
respectively, of the applicants for land titles related to these zones. The small 
number of applications for land titles, even from the oldest area of colonization 
('Eje Este'), again indicates that often many years may elapse between 
'occupation' and 'application'. Only in the 'Eje Sur' may the relatively small 
number of applications be caused by the fact that this area is one of the 
youngest zones of colonization and that the majority of the colonists are not yet 
in the situation to start paying for their land. This explanation is of less value, 
however, when applied to Paraguay's oldest axes of colonization, which have been 
occupied since longer periods of time. 
To sum up, it may be said that the policy of agricultural colonization has made 
only a limited contribution to relieving congestion in Paraguay's Central Region. 
Although the IBR has opened up new areas and therefore stimulated farmers to 
move from the 'Zona Central', in practice a large proportion of its inhabitants 
have decided to acquire title security within the Central Region itself, while only 
relatively small numbers of those who have decided to leave the area were 
encouraged to do so by the official colonization programmes; many of them settled 
spontaneously without being registered as official colonists, and many of them (or 
their children) are trying to acquire a title to their land only after many years of 
informal occupation. 
This means that, in fact, there is no direct relation between the official policy 
measures and recent changes in population distribution. Rather than being the 
result of a policy of supervised colonization, Paraguay's less unbalanced 
population distribution has been the outcome of spontaneous population 
movements. It is not the officially supported colonization programmes, but rural 
congestion in combination with the opening up of new areas by road-building, 
which may be regarded as the most important incentives in encouraging or 
facilitating migration. Instead of having actively set in train migration flows, the 
IBR has rather 'followed' and consolidated spontaneous trends, so that the direct 
'redistributive impacf of its measures has been small. 
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1.3.2 Improving the distribution of land 
Other objectives of the colonization policy, besides a less unbalanced distribution 
of the population, were to achieve a fairer distribution of the land by eliminating 
latifundism and minifundism and to stimulate the rational exploitation of the 
land. These goals also formed part of the task of the IBR (see 1.2.2). 
Under the Agrarian Statute, farms in the urban or semi-urban zones were to 
have an area of at least 2 hectares, while those in the rural areas were not to be 
smaller than 7 hectares. In the newly established agricultural colonies specializing 
in crop fanning, the 'lotes' distributed among the colonists were not to have an 
area of less than 20 hectares and farmers living in these colonies were not 
allowed to acquire more than 100 hectares. 
In this section we shall focus on the question of whether the policy in 
practice has been in accordance with these criteria. Has the IBR actually 
contributed to a more just distribution of rural property? To answer this question 
it is necessary to know how far the objective of improving rural property 
relationships is reflected in the allocation of land titles by the IBR over the 
course of time. 
Table β: 
Size d i s t r i b u t i o n of the land to which property t i t l e s have been 
granted, 1963-1985. 
Size class 
less than 1 
1-4.9 ha 
5-9.9 ha 
10-14.9 ha 
15-19.9 ha 
20-24.9 ha 
25-49.9 ha 
50-850.9 ha 
851 ha and < 
Total 
ha 
jver 
1963-
abs 
30 
46 
83 
76 
55 
82 
43 
30 
7 
452 
Number о 
•1975 
% 
7 
10 
18 
17 
12 
18 
10 
7 
1 
100 
f property 
1975-
abs 
63 
142 
117 
185 
68 
101 
52 
26 
4 
758 
titles 
1985 
% 
8 
19 
15 
25 
9 
13 
7 
3 
1 
100 
grant 
1 
ed: 
1963-
abs 
93 
188 
200 
261 
123 
183 
95 
56 
11 
,210 
•1985 
% 
7 
16 
17 
22 
10 
15 
8 
4 
1 
100 
Source: IBR sample data. 
The average size of the parcels included in our sample was 70 hectares, but 
individual sizes ranged from less than 1 hectare to over 850 hectares. We may 
therefore conclude that, instead of improving the distribution of the land, the IBR 
has actively contributed to the creation of minifundia and latifundia by granting 
land titles to extremely small and extremely large holdings. 
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Table 8 shows that 23% of the titles granted in the period 1963-1985 concerned 
'lotes' of less than 5 hectares. It also shows that there has been a remarkable 
increase in the granting of titles to minifundia (farms of less than 5 hectares) in 
recent years, since this category represented only 17% of the total number of 
titles during the period 1963-1975, while the proportion was no less than 27% in 
the following years. The increasing share of small parcels clearly illustrates that 
land has become much scarcer. 
To the extent that title deeds have been granted to extremely small plots of 
land (less than 1 hectare), 38% of these relate to land situated in the Central 
Region where the average size of the 'lotes' was only 11.7 hectares. The 
remaining 62% of the parcels of less than 1 hectare were located in the 
colonization areas outside the 'Zona Central', mainly in the area of the 'Eje Sur' 
(24%) which is eastern Paraguay's most recent colonization zone. 
With regard to the allocation of titles to large holdings, i.e. those of 50 
hectares and over. Table 8 shows that most title deeds were granted in the period 
1963-1975. No less than 35% of all applications for titles to Chaco land related to 
plots of 50 hectares and over, whereas the proportion was less than 4% in 
eastern Paraguay. The majority of the very large parcels of 851 hectares and over 
are also to be found in the thinly inhabited Chaco, where land is still relatively 
abundant. According to our sample data, the IBR even granted titles to holdings 
of 40,000, 98,000 and 153,000 hectares in this area before 1976. Since then, the 
granting of titles to extremely large 'latifundios' has become rare. 
The largest category of applications granted, however, still related to medium-
sized parcels, i.e. 5 to 20 hectares, which represented 49% of the total number. 
The fact that these parcels were smaller than the officially established minimum 
size of 20 hectares not only illustrates the divergence between official criteria 
and the results in practice, but also indicates that the majority of the applicants 
probably did not settle in one of the agricultural colonies of the IBR, but 
occupied the land spontaneously without the previous intervention of the IBR 
(1.3.1). 
Apart from the predominantly spontaneous character of the colonization, there 
are other reasons why many parcels do not meet the official size criteria. One 
important reason is that some of the colonists who had acquired 'lotes' of the 
official minimum size afterwards decided to dispose of part of their land in order 
to gain some income from the improvements they had made on it and to obtain 
the capital needed to pay off the remaining area or to buy the inputs. In doing 
this, they enabled other farmers to cultivate areas larger than the official size, 
while at the same time stimulating 'minifundization'. 
Table 8 further shows that, in the period 1963-1975, 28% of the land titles 
granted related to 'lotes' of 20 to 50 hectares, i.e. those which meet the official 
criteria. In the following years this share fell down 20%, which again illustrates 
that land has become scarcer. Whereas the average area of the 'lotes' to which 
farmers acquired a legal title was 41 hectares in the period 1976-1985, it was over 
90 hectares in the years before. 
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To sum up, the rural development policy cannot be said to have contributed to 
the better distribution of the land. Instead of having actively eliminated 
latifundism and minifundism, the IBR has consolidated the unequal distribution of 
the land by granting title deeds on parcels which were either too small for 
rational exploitation or were extremely large. 
1.3.3 Improving the tenure situation 
Special attention will be paid in this section to the question of whether the rural 
development policy of the IBR has reached the target population, i.e. those 
farmers who needed land as well as property rights in order to be able to 
modernize their farms and improve their level of prosperity. In other words, what 
kind of rural families have benefitted from the 'programa de titulización' and to 
what extent can land legalization, in fact, be expected to result in better 
opportunities for higher agricultural returns, given the characteristics of the 
beneficiaries? 
In order to answer these questions, it seems relevant to consider the 
characteristics of the families applying for property rights, such as occupation of 
the head of the household, age of the applicant and family size. 
Table 9: 
Economic activities of the persons to whom property titles have 
been granted, 1ΘΘ3-1Θ85. 
Persons living 1963-1975 1976-1985 1963-1985 
mainly from abs % abs % abs % 
Farming 
Manual work 
Specialized jobs 
Other activities 
Unknown 
411 
19 
9 
0 
13 
91 
4 
2 
0 
3 
669 
48 
29 
2 
10 
88 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1,080 
67 
38 
2 
23 
89 
6 
3 
0 
2 
Total 452 100 758 100 1,210 100 
Source: IBR sample data. 
In the view of the IBR, the improved security of tenure of the land worked by 
farmers would stimulate its rational exploitation. The figures in Table 9, however, 
show that this assumption is not as obvious as appears at first sight. It shows 
that many titles have also been granted to persons who are not engaged in 
farming or only incidentally so. The category of persons living from manual work 
comprises traders, builders, butchers, tailors, car drivers and mechanics, while the 
category of persons with specialized jobs includes industrial entrepreneurs, 
agronomists and military personnel. Many of them do not even live in the 
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countryside and can by no means be regarded as belonging to the target 
population as defined in the Agrarian Statute. 
Rather than having the intention of going on to use their land for agricultural 
production or becoming farmers, these people have probably started a legalization 
procedure for the purpose of land speculation. We have even found book keepers, 
physicians, teachers and a pilot among the group of applicants. Ouring the period 
1976-1985, in particular, a relatively large number of non-farmers succeeded in 
acquiring legal property titles. The granting of land titles to these persons will 
clearly not result in the achievement of more intensive land use, agricultural 
modernization, and higher farm incomes. 
Table 9 nevertheless shows, however, that no less than 89% of the persons who 
have received title deeds did belong to the category of farmers, i.e. to the 'target 
population'1**. Despite the fact that many of them have become the owners of 
only relatively small pieces of land, the acquisition of full property rights may 
have provided them with better opportunities to use their land more rationally 
and make larger investments in it. They are no longer in danger of losing their 
land and, because of their land title, they are eligible in principle for official 
credit supplied by the 'Banco Nacional de Fomento' or other agencies. They may 
even become interested in introducing new crops and improved methods of 
production. The extent to which this will really happen, however, depends on 
things such as age and family size, so these characteristics have also been studied 
(see also Chapter 4). 
Table 10: 
Age distribution of the persons to whom property titles have been 
granted, 1963-1985. 
Age group 
Under 19 years 
20-29 years 
30-39 years 
40-49 years 
50-59 years 
60-99 years 
Unknown 
Total 
Average age 
1963-
abs 
17 
37 
107 
120 
96 
69 
6 
452 
43 
•1975 
% 
4 
8 
24 
27 
21 
15 
1 
100 
1976-
abs 
4 
85 
177 
180 
113 
197 
2 
758 
48 
•1985 
% 
1 
11 
23 
24 
15 
26 
0 
100 
1963-
abs 
21 
122 
284 
300 
209 
266 
8 
1,210 
46 
•1985 
% 
2 
10 
24 
25 
17 
22 
0 
100 
Source: IBR sample data. 
The majority of applicants for legal property titles appear to be relatively old. 
Whereas the average age before 1976 was still 43 years, it had already risen to 48 
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in the ensuing period. 48 year old farmers may be expected to be less inclined to 
modernization than younger ones, irrespective of their legal status as agricultural 
producers. 
The fact that most of the farmers acquire title deeds relatively late also means 
that the improvements in the sphere of land legalization will probably be only 
temporary. Many 'titulares' will die relatively soon, with the consequence that 
their heirs will again become 'ocupantes', unless they take the necessary steps in 
Asunción to make official arrangements for the 'herencia' (see Chapter 4). Under 
the present law, each generation has to repeat the legalization procedure, 
otherwise they become 'ocupante familiar'. Older farmers in particular, for 
example, the group older than 50 years, who represent no less than 39% of the 
sample population, run the risk that their title will have to be transferred to 
their children relatively soon. Only those who are much younger have a relatively 
long period in which to benefit from the acquisition of title deeds. They may be 
able to raise agricultural production by obtaining official credits and carrying out 
modernization and even to raise the level of farm income to such an extent that 
their heirs will have sufficient money to make the necessary arrangements for 
inheritance. 
The IBR sample data show that the farmers of the Central Region, in 
particular, were relatively old at the time they acquired their title deeds. Their 
average age was 49 years, whereas the farmers who acquired titles to the land in 
the colonization zones were on average younger than 40 when they did so. This 
means that the 'developmental impacf of land legalization in the Central Region, 
in particular, will probably be smaller than expected. 
Table 11: 
Size d is t r ibu t ion of the famil ies of persons to whom property 
t i t l e s have been gran ted , 1963-1985. 
Family size 
1 person 
2-5 persons 
6-10 persons 
11 persons and over 
Unknown 
Total 
Average size 
1963-
abs 
54 
124 
201 
52 
21 
452 
6 
-1975 
% 
12 
27 
44 
12 
5 
100 
Number of fi 
1976-
abs 
91 
271 
282 
101 
13 
758 
6 
imi li es: 
-1985 
% 
12 
36 
37 
13 
2 
100 
1963-
abs 
145 
395 
483 
153 
34 
1,210 
6 
•1985 
% 
12 
34 
41 
13 
0 
100 
Source: IBR sample da t a . 
Another relevant factor is family size, which influences the extent to which the 
land will probably be subdivided. Table 11 shows that the average size of the 
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families included in the sample is 6 persons, which means, that within one 
generation, many farms run the risk of being split up into five parts. This 
subdivision will obviously negatively affect the possibilities of agricultural 
modernization and rural development, since many parcels will become too small for 
rational exploitation. Instead of having come to an end, the process of 
'minifundization' will probably continue, nullifying the positive effects of the 
legalization process within a relatively short period of time. 
A more detailed analysis of the sample data shows that the largest families are 
to be found in the Central Region, where the plots of land are already relatively 
small. The further subdivision of the land may mean that, in this part of 
Paraguay, in particular, the positive impact of the legalization procedures will be 
limited and temporary. 
1.3.4 Conclusions 
It is not difficult to criticize or to praise the policy of colonization pursued in 
Paraguay since 1963. Those who wish to show that it has been successful will 
emphasize the less unbalanced geographical distribution of population, the increase 
in the number of medium-sized farms and the large number of land titles granted 
to 'ocupantes'. Those who wish to disparage the results, however, will try to 
prove that they are correct by using similar arguments in a negative sense. They 
will argue that, despite the policy of agricultural colonization, Paraguay's Central 
Region is as densely populated as before, latifundism and minifundism have 
persisted and the majority of the farmers with less than 5 hectares are still 
'ocupante'. 
Irrespective of the question of whether the verdict should be a negative or a 
positive one, the problem remains of to what extent government policy has been 
responsible for the changes which have taken place. Do causal relations indeed 
exist between the changes in population distribution and rural property or 
occupation relationships on the one hand, and government policy on the other, or 
have other, autonomous processes been at work? 
With regard to the geographical redistribution of population, we found that a 
high proportion of the farmers who had applied for land titles have become the 
legal owner of land in their area of birth, which is situated within the Central 
Region. Instead of migrating to one of the less congested areas of Paraguay, in 
order to benefit as pioneers from the 'programa de titulización', many of them 
have preferred to become the legal owners of land which had already been 
occupied generations ago in the rural core area of Paraguay. To the extent that 
farmers from the Central Region have moved to one of the areas of colonization, 
most of them have settled spontaneously, without the intervention of the IBR, and 
outside one of the officially established agricultural colonies. Colonization has, in 
fact, only partly proceeded according to the official plans. The conclusion that 
agricultural colonization policy is responsible for the process of migration is 
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therefore only partially true. Rather than having caused considerable migration 
flows, the policy has grown out of the already existing spontaneous population 
movement, which has in turn been stimulated by road building. 
One should also be cautious in concluding that rural development policy has 
directly contributed to a less unbalanced distribution of the land. As we have 
tried to point out, the process of land redistribution has hardly taken place in 
accordance with the officially established criteria. In spite of the clear-cut 
regulations laid down in the Agrarian Statute concerning maximum and minimum 
sizes, land titles have been granted to extremely small as well as to very large 
holdings. Instead of bringing about a reduction in minifundism and latifundism, 
government agencies have co-operated in consolidating the skewed distribution of 
rural property. 
Finally, we concluded that the legalization programme will not automatically 
lead to agricultural modernization, as was expected by the IBR, not only because 
many land titles have been granted to non-farmers, but also because many farmers 
who have received title deeds are relatively old, have many heirs, and have 
become owners of small parcels. Taking into account the characteristics of the 
beneficiaries, the positive impact of legalization will be largely temporary, if there 
is any positive impact at all. 
Besides the results of the policy at the national level, it is relevant to know what 
have been the effects at the regional level, i.e. on Paraguay's Central Region, 
especially as the policy of agricultural colonization was intended as a safety 
valve for the congested 'Zona Central' and as an instrument for improving the 
rural property and occupation relationships in this problem area. After 25 years of 
colonization, however, the Central Region is as densely populated as before and, 
besides being relatively over-populated, it is still characterized by minifundism and 
informal occupancy. 
These disappointing results of the rural development policy can be partly 
explained by its rather deficient implementation. The IBR took insufficient account 
of the fact that the acquisition of titles to extremely small parcels in the Central 
Region would result in the slowing down of outmigration and the consolidation of 
minifundism. Moreover, the IBR did not take sufficient account of the target 
population which was supposed to benefit from the rural development policy, with 
the result that, in practice. Outsiders' also received property rights to the land. 
Another explanation may be that the IBR wrongly started from the idea that 
'outmigration' would be the best means of achieving 'decongestion' of the Central 
Region. This raises the question of whether Paraguayan government agencies have 
been sufficiently aware of the many dimensions and spatial variations of the 
problem of over-population. Finally, the success or failure of a policy of 
decongestion is also related to the way in which the problem manifests itself 
locally and to the conditions under which the population groups concerned have 
to take decisions. 
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In the following chapter, particular attention will be paid to the problem of 
congestion in the Central Region. It will point out that this 'congested island' is 
characterized by considerable intra-regional differences, with the consequence that 
the responses of the different population groups to development measures will not 
necessarily be uniform. Instead of being simply a spatially uniform problem of 
relative over-population, rural congestion is more complicated. The encouragement 
of outmigration consequently need not necessarily be the best solution to the 
problem of congestion. 
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Chapter 2 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONGESTED CENTRAL REGION 
2.1 Identifying the problem of rural congestion 
2.1.0 Introduction 
At the highest level of aggregation, the Central Region seems to be a 
homogeneous area which is distinguished from the remainder of Paraguay mainly 
by the problem of 'rural congestion'. Rural congestion can be defined in different 
ways. The most common assumption is that it is caused by the discrepancy 
between the area of land which is available in a particular area and the size of 
its rural population. According to this view 'rural congestion' and 'rural 
population pressure' are identical, both resulting from imbalances between land 
resources and rural population size. 
These imbalances may be caused, however, either by an absolute or a relative 
shortage of land: in densely populated areas population pressure may stem from an 
absolute scarcity, but in other areas the problem of congestion arises primarily 
from the unequal distribution of the land resources and is therefore the result of 
relative scarcity. Examples of the latter situation can be found in regions with 
many latifundia which leave little land for the majority of the farmers, most of 
whom have to make do with minifundia. Whereas, in areas with a more equal 
distribution of the land resources, population density may be high without causing 
serious problems of congestion, thinly inhabited regions with latifundia may 
rapidly become 'over-populated'. 
The effects of rural congestion will depend partly on the rural property and 
occupation relationships and, more specifically, on the legal status of the users of 
the land. Those who are legal land-owners are generally assumed to be in 
relatively favourable circumstances, because the increasing scarcity of land will 
not immediately endanger their existence. They may even be able to take 
advantage of rising land prices when selling part or all of their property. Informal 
occupiers, however, may run the risk of being expelled from the land they work 
when population pressure reaches a certain point and of being forced to move to 
less densely populated areas. 
As mentioned previously, the objective of the rural development policy pursued in 
Paraguay since 1963 was to solve the problems of the Central Region by (1) 
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stimulating the departure of part of the population, (2) redistributing the land 
into rational enterprises and (3) distributing property titles to the land. 
Assuming that rural congestion is caused by rural population pressure and that 
its effects are aggravated by unequal land distribution and an unfavourable tenure 
situation, the question arises of to what extent the various rural development 
programmes have been implemented to meet the spatially differentiated needs of 
the Central Region. Has the IBR, in fact, been aware of the different kinds of 
action needed to solve the problems in the various subregions of the 'Zona 
Central'? In other words: 
1: has the IBR, in fact, concentrated its migration programmes on the most 
densely populated areas? 
2: has the redistribution of the land taken place primarily occurred in areas with 
many latifundia? 
3: have land titles indeed been granted primarily to farmers in areas with the 
highest number of occupiers? 
In this chapter we shall investigate to what extent the IBR has taken spatial 
variations in the Central Region's basic problems into account. 
Rural population pressure, unequal land distribution and an unfavourable tenure 
situation are obviously not the only factors which give rise to rural poverty and 
the need for political action by the IBR. The question of whether the policy of 
agricultural colonization has been successful in improving the rural situation in 
the Central Region has to be studied in close relation with the spontaneous 
responses of the population, who may have found its own solution to the problem 
of congestion and rural poverty. These responses are of course determined by the 
opportunities existing at the local level. 
Part of the farming population may be able to react to the growing land 
fragmentation by intensifying agricultural land use, while other families have no 
choice but to try to tap supplementary sources of income. The process of 
agricultural intensification may be labelled as a 'vertical response', whereas the 
diversification of livelihood by looking for extra (on and off-farm) incomes may 
be characterized as a 'diagonal response'. In areas where local opportunities are 
unfavourable for both types of response, rural congestion will soon result in part 
of the population being forced to make a 'horizontal response', meaning that the 
only way for it to improve its level of prosperity is to move to areas with 
better prospects. 
When studied in greater detail, the Central Region is found to be far from 
homogeneous. In fact, considerable differences exist within the 'oval area with 
an axis of about 90 miles around Asunción' (Arnold 1971, p.85), so that various 
functionally differentiated sub-areas can be identified. 
One of the first determinants of intra-regional differentiation are the local 
characteristics of the Central Region's natural environment. With regard to its 
surface forms, the Central Region is characterized by rolling hills, alternating 
with low mountain ranges, tablelands, terraces, plains and small valleys. Altitudes 
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range from 100 to 250 metres. The area is drained by about 300 natural streams 
('arroyos'), which bring their water to the Rio Paraguay, and there are numerous 
springs and lagoons and even a rather large lake (Lago de Ypacaraí). Part of the 
lowland is poorly drained. The region's subtropical climate may be described as 
sub-humid and continental. The winter is relatively cold and dry, whereas the 
summer months are hot and rainy. In certain areas some frost may occur in the 
period from May to September. The average annual rainfall is about 1,500 mm, 
the annual mean temperature is 22.5" C, there is an average of 84 days of rain 
per annum and 1.8 days with frost (Frètes Ventre & Asociados 1979, pp.1-10). 
The soils of the Central Region may be divided into two broad categories, 
namely, highland soils originating from the decomposition of sandstone, granite 
and other crystalline rocks, and lowland or plain soils formed by sedimentation 
and often situated on an impermeable clay hardpan. Although suffering from a low 
natural content of phosphate and a deficiency of zinc, sulphur and magnesium, the 
carrying capacity of the soils in the higher areas is relatively favourable. Because 
of the poor drainage and regular floods, the lowland soils are used mainly as 
natural pastures, which are grazed extensively (Arnold 1971, pp.9-11). This means 
that only the highland soils can be adequately used for 'intensive' crop farming 
and that the best potential for increasing agricultural production per hectare 
('vertical response') is to be found in the higher parts of the Central Region. 
Besides soil quality, however, other local factors will obviously influence the 
farmers' responses to growing population pressure and land fragmentation. Whereas 
the intensification of agricultural production makes specific demands on facilities 
such as credit and extension services, the opportunities for 'diagonal responses' 
will depend, among other things, on labour demands in the off-farm sector. 
Finally, 'horizontal responses' will be determined mainly by the availability of 
'new7 resources elsewhere. 
In this chapter, we shall try to determine (1) to what extent the rural problems 
of the Central Region display spatial differences, (2) to what extent policy 
responses have related to these spatial differences and (3) what have been the 
alternative responses of the farmers to the growing population pressure and the 
growing necessity for land fragmentation. Our analysis will focus on the 
department level and be limited to purely quantitative indicators. Chapters 3 and 4 
will deal with socio-economic aspects at the household level. 
For the purpose of this study, 'rural congestion' is defined as a situation in 
which the individual's access to the land is restricted by high farm density and/or 
unequal distribution of the land, with insecurity of land tenure being considered 
as an aggravating factor. 
In order to determine the level of congestion per department, attention will be 
paid to differences in farm density (2.1.1), the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of the land (2.1.2) and the characteristics of the tenure situation 
(2.1.3) existing within the Central Region. 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the persistence of rural congestion by 
showing that the policy of agricultural colonization has taken insufficient account 
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of the spatial differences in the rural problem within the congested area and the 
differentiated responses of the population to the problems arising from congestion. 
The IBR's policy of achieving decongestion and rural development through 
migration, land redistribution and land legalization has consequently been 
effective only in a few subregions of the Central Region. 
2.1.1 Rural congestion resulting from high farm density 
Although we are aware of all the demerits of reducing a complex, 
multidimensional problem to simple statistical measures, the easiest way to obtain 
a first impression of the spatial pattern of rural congestion within the Central 
Region is by looking at the differences in farm-land ratios, i.e. the average area 
of agricultural land available per agricultural unit. 
The Central Region covers an area of almost 3 million hectares or 7% of the 
national territory, distributed among five departments of different size. The 
smallest departments - those of Central and Guaira - together represent only 21% 
of the Central Region, the departments of Paraguari and Cordillera cover no less 
than 47% of the area, while Caazapá, with almost one million hectares (or 32% of 
the total area), is the largest administrative unit. 
In 1956, 1,959,424 hectares, or 67% of the total area of the Central Region, 
were used for agricultural production in the broadest sense of the word1. Since 
the total number of farms amounted to 87,077 in the same year, their average size 
was 22 hectares. A closer inspection of the farm-land ratios in the individual 
departments, however, reveals that the situation was much more unfavourable in 
the smallest departments than in the larger ones. In 1956 the average area per 
farm in the departments of Central and Guaira amounted to only 9 and 13 
hectares, respectively. With only 21% of the Central Region's area and 16% of the 
region's farm area, both departments contained no less than 33% of the total 
number of agricultural holdings. 
In the medium-sized departments of Cordillera and Paraguari the farm-land 
ratio was more favourable, because the average area of land per agricultural unit 
was 22 and 28 hectares, respectively. Although they comprised 60% of the Central 
Region's farmland, only 54% of the farms were situated in these two departments. 
The most favourable situation existed in the department of Caazapá, where the 
average area of farmland per agricultural enterprise in 1956 still amounted to 42 
hectares. This means that 13% of the Central Region's farms disposed of no less 
than 24% of the region's total farm area. These figures, of course, do not give 
any impression of the real distribution of the land among the farms, but this 
aspect will receive further attention in section 2.1.2. 
In 1981 the situation had not changed fundamentally. The problem of rural 
congestion related to farm density persisted mainly in the departments of Central 
and Guaira. Although the average farm area in these departments had increased by 
3 hectares, the farm density remained relatively high, so that the average farm 
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size was still lower than in the other departments. Table 12 shows that the 
improved farm-land ratio in the two departments resulted from different causes. 
In Central the number of agricultural enterprises had decreased, whereas in Guaira 
the 'decongestion' was primarily the result of the expansion of the farm area by 
over 88,000 hectares. 
Table 12: 
Average farm area in the Central Region, 1956 and 1981. 
1956 
Department 
Cordillera 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Paraguari 
Central 
Total area: 
ha 
494,800 
384,600 
949,600 
870,500 
246,500 
X 
17 
13 
32 
30 
8 
Farm area: 
ha 
494,356 
165.294 
472,736 
682,404 
144,634 
% 
25 
8 
24 
35 
8 
Number 
farms: 
abs 
22,681 
12,298 
11,235 
24,709 
16,154 
of 
% 
26 
14 
13 
28 
19 
Aver 
pe 
age area 
r farm: 
ha 
22 
13 
42 
28 
9 
Central 
Region 2,946.000 100 1,959,424 100 87,077 100 22 
Paraguay 40,675,200 16,816,618 149,614 
1981 
Department Total area: Farm area: Number of Average area 
farms: per farm: 
ha X ha X abs X ha 
Cordillera 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Paraguari 
Central 
494,800 
302.200 
949,600 
870,500 
246,500 
17 
11* 
33 
30 
9 
303.747 
253,605 
536,632 
620,309 
163,048 
16 
14 
29 
33 
8 
19,857 
16,218 
15,426 
26,436 
13,292 
22 
18 
17 
29 
14 
15 
16 
35 
23 
12 
Central 
Region 2,863,600 100 1,877,341 100 91,229 100 21 
Paraguay 40,675,200 21,940,530 241,652 
* The boundaries of this department were changed in 1972. 
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 1961, 1985. 
Dirección General 1962, 1982. 
53 
In the other departments, however, the situation has become less favourable. 
Table 12 shows that, over the period 1956-1981, the area per agricultural 
enterprise in Cordillera and Paraguan decreased by 7 and 5 hectares, respectively, 
as a result of a decline in the total area of farmland and, as far as the latter 
department is concerned, because of a growth in the number of farms. In the 
department of Caazapá the growth of population and farms went together with an 
increase of about 64,000 hectares in the area available for agriculture, but since 
this was only a modest expansion the average area per farm dropped from 42 to 
35 hectares. In comparison with the other departments, however, this is still a 
relatively high average. 
2.1.2 Rural congestion resulting from unequal distribution of the 
land 
The congestion which characterizes the Central Region as a whole is also 
illustrated by the high proportion of minifundia. In 1956 no less than 75% of the 
agricultural enterprises had less than 5 hectares of crop land2 (see Table 13). In 
the most densely populated departments of Central and Guaira, in particular, many 
holdings had been subdivided in the course of time, so that no less than 79 and 
76%, respectively, had an crop area of less than 5 hectares in 1956. The extreme 
fragmentation of the land in both departments and the relative over-
representation of 'farms without land' may be explained by the presence of 
Asunción (department of Central) and the city of Villarica (Guaira), in the 
surroundings of which agricultural land is being used intensively as well as being 
subdivided into urban plots. In both departments the existence of extreme 
minifundism has to be related to the relatively high population density rather than 
to the unequal distribution of the land. This may be concluded from the fact that 
only 8 and 6%, respectively, of the total farm area were in holdings larger than 
10,000 hectares, as shown in Table 14. 
In the other, less densely populated departments, however, it was primarily the 
unequal distribution of the land which was the main cause of minifundism. In 1956 
no less than 32%, 29% and 53%, respectively, of the farmland in the departments 
of Cordillera, Paraguari and Caazapá was in holdings of 10,000 hectares and over, 
whereas the holdings with less than 5 hectares of crop land represented no less 
than 77%, 72% and 75% of the total number of farms and these made up only a 
fraction of the total farm area'. In other words, while minifundism in the 
densely populated departments is primarily the result of absolute scarcity of land, 
caused by high farm density, in the departments with many latifundia, it is the 
result of a relative scarcity arising from the simple fact that, because of these 
latifundia, large areas of land are monopolized by a small section of the rural 
population. 
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Table 13: 
The distribution of crop land over the Central Region, 1956 and 
1981. 
1956 
Departments: 
Central Cordi- Guai- Caaza- Para- Central 
Region llera rá zapa guari 
Size class ha % % % % % % 
Without land 
5 ha or less 
5-10 ha 
10-20 ha 
20-50 ha 
1,249 
65,579 
16,085 
3,448 
600 
50 ha and over 116 
Central 
Region 
87,077 
1 
75 
18 
4 
1 
1 
100 22, 
1 
77* 
16 
4 
1 
1 
,681 
100 
12, 
2* 
76* 
18 
4 
0 
0 
,298 
100 
11 
1 
75 
21* 
3 
0 
0 
,235 
100 
24, 
1 
72 
22* 
4 
1 
0 
,709 
100 
2* 
79* 
16 
3 
0 
0 
16,154 
100 
1981 
Size class 
Without land 
5 ha or less 
5-10 ha 
10-20 ha 
20-50 ha 
Central 
Region 
ha 
7,307 
57,187 
18,661 
6,385 
1,411 
50 ha and over 278 
Central 
Region 
91,229 
% 
в 
63 
20 
7 
2 
0 
100 
Cordi­
li 
19, 
lera 
% 
7 
67* 
18 
6 
2 
0 
857 
100 
Departments: 
Guai­
ra 
16, 
% 
3 
59 
26* 
9* 
2 
1* 
,218 
100 
c¡ äaza-
zapa 
15, 
% 
2 
56 
28* 
11* 
2 
1* 
,426 
100 
Para-
guarí 
26, 
% 
6 
65* 
21* 
6 
1 
1* 
,436 
100 
Central 
% 
26* 
61* 
8 
3 
1 
1* 
13,292 
100 
* relative overconcentration in comparison with the situation in 
the Central Region 
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia 1961, 1985. 
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Table 14: 
Area covered by farms of 10,000 ha and over per department in the 
Central Region, 1956 and 1981. 
1956 
Departments 
Cordillera 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Paraguari 
Central 
Central Region 
Total area 
ha 
159, 
10, 
249, 
195, 
12, 
626, 
,421 
,225 
,926 
,292 
,000 
,864 
% 0 f 
total area 
per department 
32 
3 
26 
22 
5 
21 
% of 
farm 
per ι 
total 
area 
department 
32 
6 
53 
29 
8 
32 
1981 
Departments 
Cordillera 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Paraguari 
Central 
Central Region 
Total area 
ha 
51, 
16, 
106, 
75, 
73, 
324, 
,753 
,497 
,900 
,615 
,390 
,155 
% 0 
tot 
per 
f 
al area 
department 
10 
5 
11 
9 
30 
11 
% of 
farm 
per 
total 
area 
department 
17 
7 
20 
12 
45 
17 
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 1961, 1985. 
If we focus our attention on the present situation in the departments of 
Cordillera, Paraguari and Caazapá, however, we see that, between 1956 and 1981, 
the farm size distribution became less skewed. It appears that, probably in part 
because of the colonization programme (see 2.2.2), the area in the hands of 
holdings of 10,000 hectares and over has declined by 370,371 hectares (see Table 
14), so that the relative land scarcity has diminished somewhat. This is illustrated 
by the fact that, between 1956 and 1981, the share of farms with less than 5 
hectares of crop land fell to 67%, 65% and 56%, respectively. 
The opposite trend occurred in the departments of Central and Guaira, where 
the situation became more unfavourable, since the area in the hands of holdings 
of 10,000 hectares and over increased by 61,390 and 6,272 hectares, respectively, 
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during the period 1956-1981. This trend of increasing land concentration partially 
cancelled out the positive effects of the improved farm-land ratio. In other words, 
while the average farm size has improved because of a more favourable ratio 
between the area of farmland and the number of farms, the distribution of the 
land by size classes has deteriorated. Nevertheless, in both departments, the share 
of farms with less than 5 hectares of crop land fell to 61% and 59%, respectively, 
in 1981. 
To sum up, in spite of the slowly improving farm-land ratio in the departments of 
Central and Guaira and the declining importance of latifundia in the departments 
of Paraguarí, Caazapá and Cordillera, minifundism continues to be widespread in 
the whole Central Region. 63% of the farms still had less than 5 hectares of crop 
land in 1981. 
2.1.3 Rural congestion and the tenure situation 
Irrespective of whether minifundism is primarily the result of high farm density 
(which is the situation in the departments of Guaira and Central) or of the 
unequal distribution of the land (as in the departments of Paraguarí, Cordillera 
and Caazapá), the effects of rural congestion depend very much on the local 
tenure situation. 
The tenancy problem will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4, but, for 
the purpose of this chapter we shall start from the commonly accepted idea that 
it is particularly farmers without titles to their land who will be forced to leave 
their land with growing land scarcity, whereas the position of those who own 
their land will, in principle, remain unthreatened. As already stated above, the 
latter group may even benefit considerably from the rising land prices when they 
sell their property. Moreover, even if they are forced to divide their farms, their 
position will remain relatively strong, because the status of owner will give them 
access to official credit and enable them to compensate for subdivision with 
intensification of production (see 2.3.1). 
That the Central Region was characterized by a rather insecure tenure situation is 
illustrated by the fact that, in 1956, only 41% of the farmers were full or 
provisional owners of most of their land, whereas the tenants (including share-
croppers) made up only 15% of the fanning population. This means that no less 
than 44% of the farmers occupied all or most of their land informally or even 
illegally. 
The situation was the most favourable in the department of Central, because 
55% and 19% of the farmers, respectively, owned or rented their land. We may 
therefore assume that, in this department, the high farm density and the relative 
scarcity caused by the unequal distribution of the land will not have resulted 
immediately in the expulsion of a large number of farmers. In spite of the 
growing competition for land, most families living from agriculture will have been 
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able to retain access to their 'lotes', even though some of the latter had to be 
divided. 
Table 15: 
The legal status of farmers in the Central Region, 1956 and 1981. 
1956 
Departments: 
Central Cordi- Guai- Caaza- Para- Central 
Region llera rá zapa guarí 
Legal status ha % % % % % % 
Full owner 
Provisional 
owner 
Tenant 
Occupier 
Central 
Region 
30,883 
5,193 
12,897 
38,104 
87,077 
35 
6 
15 
44 
100 22 
35 
7* 
14 
44 
,681 
100 
12 
28 
9* 
14 
49* 
,298 
100 
11 
29 
6 
6 
60* 
,235 
100 
24, 
31 
5 
18* 
46* 
,709 
100 
52* 
3 
19* 
26 
16.154 
100 
1981 
Legal status 
Full owner 
Provisional 
owner 
Tenant 
Occupier 
Central 
Region 
Central 
Region 
ha 
42,790 
16,587 
16,774 
30,938 
107,0891 
% 
40 
15 
16 
29 
100 
Coi 
lb 
22 
rai-
era 
% 
49* 
13 
15 
23 
,915 
100 
Departments: 
Guai- Caaza-
rá 
18 
% 
28 
18* 
15 
39* 
,738 
100 
zai 
18 
за 
% 
26 
21* 
19* 
34* 
,327 
100 
Para-
guari 
% 
32, 
35 
15 
17* 
33* 
,518 
100 
Central 
% 
68* 
11 
10 
11 
14,591 
100 
* Relative overconcentration in comparison with the situation in 
the Central Region 
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 1961, 1985. 
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In the other departments, however, the situation was less favourable. In 1956, 
60%, 49%, 46% and 44%, respectively, of the farmers in the departments of 
Caazapá, Guaira, Paraguarí and Cordillera (including the full occupiers) did not 
have legal titles to most of their land. Here, increasing rural congestion may have 
more easily been accompanied by an increasing risk of expulsion of the 
'ocupantes'. 
The tenure situation in the Central Region as a whole has improved in the course 
of time. The proportion of informal 'ocupantes' among the total number of 
farmers decreased from 44% in 1956 to 29% in 1981, while the group of 
provisional) land-owners was further strengthened at the same time*'. 
In the direct surroundings of Asunción (departments of Central and Cordillera), 
a relatively large number of 'ocupantes' were able to improve, in particular, their 
legal status. In 1981, 79% and 62%, respectively, of the farmers in these 
departments had become the full or provisional owners of their land or most of it. 
This progress in legalization may be the result of urban growth, which 
increasingly forced the inhabitants in the rural-urban fringe of Asunción to apply 
for legal land titles in order to defend themselves against land speculators, but it 
may also be related to the 'take over' of land by urban residents. These 
questions will be dealt with in Chapter 4. 
The situation has hardly improved in the more distant parts of the Central 
Region, however. As in the early 1960s, most of the farmers still use the land 
without having title deeds. As soon as congestion becomes more severe in these 
departments, a relatively high proportion of the farmers may be exposed to the 
risk of expulsion. 
2.1.4 Conclusions 
Rural congestion in Paraguay's Central Region is not a spatially uniform problem. 
Depending on the area, it may stem mainly from high farm density or unequal 
distribution of the land, frequently combined with unfavourable tenure conditions. 
In the departments which were originally mainly characterized by high farm 
density, but had few latifundia, relative scarcity became more severe in the period 
1956-1981, because of increasing concentration of land in the hands of 
latifundists. In those departments which already had to cope in 1956 with 
congestion problems caused by latifundism, land scarcity increased mainly through 
the growth of population. Thus, the nature and intensity of the Central Region's 
rural problems have changed depending on the geographical location, but in 
general the severity of the problem has not diminished appreciably. Only in the 
area directly surrounding Asunción has tenure security improved. 
In order to illustrate further the severity of the rural problem as a whole and its 
regional differentiation, we have translated the data relating to farm-land ratios, 
land distribution by size classes and tenure situation into relative scores. We 
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gave 5 points to the department with the highest farm density in 1956 (Central), 
and went down to 1 point for Caazapá with the lowest density in that year. The 
same was done with the variable of land distribution: 5 points were given to the 
department with the highest level of minifundism (Central) and only 1 point to 
the department at the other end of the continuum (Paraguan). We treated the 
tenure situation in a similar way, giving only 1 point to the department of 
Central and 5 to that of Caazapá with the highest concentration of 'ocupantes', 
i.e. the lowest title security. 
The combination of the three scores serves to summarize the total rural 
problem. In Map 4 the size of the circles illustrates the severity of the problem, 
while the three sectors of each circle represent the relative contribution to the 
problem of high farm density, relative land scarcity arising from the unbalanced 
distribution of the land, and the unfavourable tenure situation. The rural problem 
is assumed to be at its maximum in the departments with the highest total score. 
Similar calculations were made for the situation in 1981. 
Table 16: 
Indicators of the severity of the rural problem in the Central 
Region and its departments, 1956 and 1981. 
Department 
Cordillera 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Paraguari 
Central 
Farm 
dens: 
1956 
3 
4 
1 
2 
5 
Relative score with 
ity 
1981 
4 
3 
1 
2 
5 
Mini-
fundism 
1956 
4 
3 
2 
1 
5 
1981 
5 
2 
1 
4 
3 
respect to: 
Title 
insecurity 
1956 
2 
4 
5 
3 
1 
1981 
2 
5 
4 
3 
1 
Total 
1956 
9 
11 
8 
6 
11 
1981 
11 
10 
6 
9 
9 
Source: Relative scores based on Tables 12-15. 
Table 16 and Map 4 clearly show that both the intensity and the nature of the 
Central Region's rural problem vary per department. In 1956, the relatively small 
departments of Central and Guaira were the areas with the severests problems. 
The former department was characterized mainly by a combination of low average 
farm sizes and a skewed distribution of farmland, leading to widespread 
minifundism, while in the latter department the unfavourable tenure situation also 
contributed to the relatively high score. The problems in the other departments 
were less severe, although in 1956 the tenure situation was rather unfavourable, 
especially in Caazapá. 
The spatial pattern had changed somewhat in 1981, but the general situation was 
basically the same. The only appreciable difference was that the departments of 
Central and Guaira had become less congested, but this was mainly because of the 
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deterioration of the situation in the departments of Cordillera and Paraguari. In 
Caazapá, except for a slight improvement in the tenure situation, the severity of 
the problem had hardly changed. Thus the different parts of the Central Region 
were still characterized by the same problems in 1981 as in 1956: high farm 
density reflected in low average farm sizes; minifundism as against latifundism, 
and large numbers of informal occupiers. 
resulting from high 
farm density 
resulting from unequal 
distnbufion of the land 
Map 4: 
Indicators of the severity of the rural problem in the Central Region and its 
departments, 1956 and 1981. 
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2.2 The response of the policy to the rural problem 
2.2.0 Introduction 
The success or failure of rural development policy cannot of course be proved by 
the use of a few very simple indicators and all kinds of objections can be made 
to the way in which we have simplified an extremely complicated problem by 
using a set of relative scores. We only wished to show, however, that the 
Central Region is not a homogeneous 'island of congestion'. In fact, several 
dimensions must be distinguished, each of which shows its own trend and regional 
differentiation. 
The IBR formulated three kinds of strategy in order to deal with the Central 
Region's rural problems: a migration programme aimed at reducing population 
pressure and farm density, a programme of land redistribution for improving farm 
size structure, and a legalization programme for improving the tenure situation. In 
this section we shall try to explain the persistence of high farm and population 
density, minifundism and occupancy by examining the way in which the IBR has 
carried out these programmes and the extent to which it has taken into account 
the spatial differentiation of the rural problem. 
Three questions may be asked: has the migration programme been concentrated 
on the departments with the highest farm and rural population density? Has the 
programme of local land redistribution been concentrated on areas where the rural 
problem was primarily caused by the existence of latifundism and, finally, to what 
extent has the 'programa de titulización' mainly benefitted people in the 
departments with highly unfavourable tenure conditions? 
2.2.1 Farm density and the migration programme 
Because the departments of Central and Guaira were the most densely populated 
parts of the Central Region, the IBR might have been expected to concentrate its 
migration programme on those areas. When it formulated its policy, however, it 
made no distinction between the different departments. This means that, in 
principle, the primary goal of the IBR was to relieve population pressure (and 
farm density) in the Central Region as a whole. Nevertheless, when carrying out 
the programme, the IBR administrators who had the task of stimulating migration 
by recruiting colonists, concentrated most of their activities on the immediate 
vicinity of Asunción, i.e. the easily accessible villages situated in the departments 
of Central and Cordillera. In the more distant areas of the Central Region the 
IBR allowed people mainly to take their own decisions. 
Since the early 1970s, the IBR has stopped the active recruitment of colonists, 
even in the departments of Central and Cordillera. This again illustrates that the 
migration programme has been used primarily to set in train the migration process 
and means that further action by the IBR has been limited. In fact, the flow of 
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spontaneous migrants from the more distant areas of the Central Region has been 
much larger than the number of people migrating under IBR supervision. It may be 
said, therefore, that instead of being guided by the principle of necessity, the IBR 
has been guided primarily by the ease with which it could achieve results. The 
decision to move has hardly depended on the migration programme, but 
outmigration has been largely the result of spontaneous and individual action. 
2.2.2 Latifundism and internal colonization 
The second question to be answered is to what extent the programme of land 
redistribution and further colonization of land within the Central Region (internal 
colonization) have been concentrated on the departments with the most 
unfavourable farm size structure. 
Table 17: 
Area and number of agricultural colonies founded within the 
Central Region, 1963-1984. 
Department 1963-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-84 Total Number 
ha ha ha ha ha abs 
Guaira 26,267 17,800 1,500 0 45,567 17 
Caazapá 77,602 4,039 38,372 9,500 129,513 23 
Paraguari 63,958 14,759 3,936 4,714 87,367 38 
Cordillera 10,754 402 3,142 69 14,367 20 
Central 7,001 0 10 0 7,011 12 
Central 
Region 
Number of 
'lotes' 
Number of 
locations 
185,582 
6,037 
73 
37,000 
1,080 
15 
46,960 
1,847 
13 
14,283 
907 
9 
283,825 
9,871 
110 
110 
Source: Ins t i tu to de Bienestar Rural, Memorias 1963-1985. 
Table 17 shows that, between 1963 and 1984, the IBR colonized 283,825 hectares 
of land, no less than 81% of which was situated in the departments of Paraguari, 
Cordillera and Caazapá. The IBR opened up 231,247 hectares of land in these 
departments by establishing agricultural colonies at 81 different locations. As a 
result, 9%, 45% and 51%, respectively, of the area in the departments of 
Cordillera, Paraguari and Caazapá, formerly belonging to large holdings of 10,000 
hectares and over (Table 14), became available for subdivision into smaller plots 
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for the purpose of local colonization. There was almost no colonization, however, 
in the small, but already densely populated departments of Central and Guaira, 
since there was little land available for this purpose. The IBR did not even try to 
improve the situation in these most densely populated areas by amalgamating 
minifundia into larger holdings. 
Although it may be concluded that the IBR has indeed concentrated on areas 
where unused cultivable land was still available and that its colonization poUcy 
has been geographically related to the incidence of latifundia, the redistribution 
of land has, in practice, hardly improved the rural situation in the departments 
concerned. Most of the latifundia land on which 'colonization' took place was 
already used by 'ocupantes', so that all that happened, in fact, was that 
'ocupación de hecho' was legalized. Rather than contributing to the division of 
unused land into smaller plots and increasing the area of effectively exploited 
land, the IBR's intervention in the Central Region has mainly led to the 
transformation of already occupied land into 'lotes coloniales' (i.e. parcels within 
officially recognized agricultural colonies)". Moreover, it must be added that there 
has been an marked slowing down of internal colonization activities especially 
since 1970, as no less than 73% of the parcels were allotted in the 1960s. 
2.2.3 Unfavourable tenure situation and the legalization 
programme 
Lastly, the question has to be considered of whether the IBR has spent its energy 
for improving the tenure situation primarily in the areas with the highest share 
of 'ocupantes', namely, the departments of Guaira, Paraguari and Caazapá. 
The IBR keeps no registration of numbers of land titles allocated per 
department, but Table 14 has already shown that the legalization programme has 
been most beneficial in practice in the immediate environs of Asunción 
(departments of Central and Cordillera), where the tenure situation was already 
relatively favourable in the early 1960s. Apart from their situation within the 
sphere of rapid urban expansion, another explanation for the more favourable 
state of affairs in these departments is the proximity to the IBR office in 
Asunción, where 'future owners' are required to fill out an official application 
form. 
The persistence of occupancy in the more distant areas is, therefore, to be 
explained by the somewhat passive attitude of the IBR towards stimulating 
'ocupantes' to become the legal owners of their land. The IBR did not select 
subregions within the 'Zona Central' for improving the tenure situation by direct 
government action. In order to acquire title deeds, even in the departments of 
Paraguari, Guaira and Caazapá, which are rather remote from the administrative 
centre, the farmers themselves had to take the initiative. The impact of the 
legalization programme has consequently been relatively small in the more distant 
departments, in spite of the fact that these had the largest share of 'ocupantes'. 
It may be said, therefore, that, like the migration programme, the 'programa de 
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titulización' has hardly been inspired by the 'needs' of the population, but 
primarily influenced by the distance from the IBR office. 
2.2.4 Conclusions 
The fact that the policy of rural development has taken insufficient account of 
spatial differences in the Central Region's rural problems has contributed to the 
persistence of these problems. If the IBR had tried to carry out its different 
programmes as far as possible in accordance with local needs, the results of the 
policy would have been more satisfactory. 
2.3 The responses of the population to the rural problem 
2.3.0 Introduction 
Where the problems related to high rural population density, unequal distribution 
of the land and unfavourable tenure situation are insufficiently alleviated by 
government intervention, people may be forced to adopt all kinds of survival 
strategies. There are likely to be spatial differences both in the rural problems 
themselves and the action taken by the IBR, as well as in the responses of the 
rural population. The adverse effects of the rural problems will therefore not 
necessarily be everywhere the same. 
As has been argued earlier, the responses of the population are conditioned by 
local circumstances. Depending upon its characteristics, each area has a different 
potential for intensifying rural land use (1), or for supplementing farm income 
with on and off-farm employment (2). Where agricultural intensification is difficult 
and employment opportunities are almost absent, farmers will be inclined to 
migrate to less densely populated areas in order to try to start new lives as 
pioneers (3). 
The opportunities for 'vertical', 'diagonal' and 'horizontal' responses also vary 
from place to place within Paraguay's Central Region. In this section, we shall 
therefore try to determine the different potential of each department in relation 
to the respective responses. In other words, we shall try to discover which 
departments seem to offer the best opportunities for 'vertical responses' or 
agricultural intensification (the introduction of new crops and modem methods of 
exploitation), where are the best opportunities for on and off-farm employment 
('diagonal response') and in what areas is the rural population forced to migrate 
('horizontal response'). 
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2.3.1 The vertical response: agricultural intensification 
Insofar as farmers of the various departments have started to specialize in 
growing more remunerative crops, the majority of them are to be found in the 
immediate surroundings of Asunción, especially in the departments of Central and 
Cordillera7. By making use of the proximity to the capital's market, some of the 
rural households here have specialized in labour and capital-intensive 'truck' crops 
which guarantee them high yields per hectare. They are no longer producing 
mainly for their own needs, but have become part of Paraguay's relatively capital-
intensive, modem and specialized commercial agricultural sector. Their farms are 
small, but nevertheless rewarding because of the advanced and capital-intensive 
methods of production and the relatively sophisticated way in which marketing is 
organized. According to Rivarola (1982, p.60): '..es notoria la aparición de 
pequeños productores con modelos productivos más avanzados, tanto en términos 
de tecnología, organización predial o asociativa y uso intensivo de capital, tal 
como es el caso de los horticultores..'. 
One of the most remunerative crops is the tomato, which may give yields of 
over 20,000 kilos per hectare and accounted for 91% of the Central Region's value 
of horticultural products in 1981. Other crops are sweet potatoes, watermelons and 
calabashes. Between 1956 and 1981, the share of the departments Central and 
Cordillera in the regional production of watermelons and calabashes increased by 
48% and 367%, respectively, while the area used for their production remained 
almost the same. Sweet potato production decreased by 54%, but production per 
hectare of this crop has increased appreciably. In addition, bananas, rice, tobacco 
(mainly in Cordillera) as well as melons, pineapples and strawberries (mainly in 
Central) have also been used for obtaining higher agricultural outputs per 
hectare". 
Another important example of 'vertical response' in the vicinity of Asunción is 
dairy farming, which is also to be found mainly in Central and Cordillera. In 1981 
both departments counted almost 9,000 dairy farms producing about 100,000 litres 
of milk per day. 
The fact that the most intensive forms of agricultural land use are to be found in 
the vicinity of Asunción has to be explained by several factors. Because 
horticultural products are perishable and have to be marketed within less than 
one day, this prevents many farmers in the more distant areas from growing these 
crops. Cold storage facilities and refrigerated lorries are in short supply in the 
Central Region and the quality of the roads is very low. There are only two main 
highways, connecting Asunción with Ciudad Presidente Stroessnerand Encamación, 
and most of the remaining network consists of badly paved roads and cart tracks. 
Away from the immediate vicinity of Asunción rural all-weather roads hardly 
exist, so that most links are virtually closed when it rains. 
The deficient road network and the absence of alternative axes of 
transportation' is, in practice, a major obstacle to the ready marketing of all 
kinds of agricultural surpluses, but other factors have abo restricted the 
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possibilities of a 'vertical response'. In spite of the fact that, even on very small 
farms, fruit (bananas, pineapples, strawberries) and horticultural products 
(tomatoes, pepper and vegetables), for example, offer good prospects for intensive 
agricultural production because of their high yields per unit of labour and land, 
only a small proportion of farmers have concentrated on this type of farming. 
Apart from the lack of money needed for inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides etc.) 
and other socio-economic constraints, there is a very limited demand. 
Because of the small population and its low level of prosperity, the national 
market for high return crops is very limited. Many Paraguayans still produce their 
own food and those who have to buy it prefer cheap staple foods instead of more 
expensive products like vegetables and fruit. Moreover, export possibilities are 
limited, since Paraguay is a land-locked country, which means that goods have to 
be transported either by land or by river over long distances to ports in 
Argentina or Brazil before they can be shipped to Europe or other parts of the 
world. In other words, the unfavourable geographical location and the inherent 
necessity of transshipment place Paraguay in a disadvantageous competitive 
position in comparison with other countries producing and exporting the same 
commodities (Philips & Borsdorf 1976). 
Moreover, the neighbouring countries try to defend themselves against 
Paraguayan competition by keeping their borders closed. Argentina, for example, is 
willing to buy Paraguayan tomatoes during only a few months of the year at 
highly fluctuating prices, which hardly guarantee a stable income to the 
Paraguayan producers. Furthermore, producing for export means that crops have 
to meet international quality standards, so that first class crop varieties and 
modem farming methods have to be used. Without modem production techniques 
and the technical assistance needed for their introduction, increasing agricultural 
exports are not to be expected. The valorization and diversification of agricultural 
exports are further curtailed by the relatively high degree of industrialization in 
the neighbouring countries, which makes it difficult for Paraguay to compete 
successfully with the diversified and highly profitable agricultural processing 
industries of Brazil and Argentina. 
Taking these circumstances into account, it is not surprising that, especially in 
the most isolated areas of the Central Region (Paraguarí, Caazapá and Guaira), 
farmers have been little motivated to intensify agricultural land use. 'Vertical 
response' has remained unattractive, with the consequence that these areas are 
still characterized by a one-sided concentration on the production of cheap staple 
foods (mainly manioc, maize) or cotton. 
The limited possibilities for intensification explain why, for the Central Region as 
a whole, the volume of agricultural production per department is mainly a 
reflection of the area under cultivation. The departments with the largest farm 
area (Paraguarí and Cordillera) therefore make the largest contribution to the 
production of cotton, manioc, maize and groundnuts. To the extent that 
production has increased in recent years (as in Caazapá), this is mainly the result 
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of an expansion of the farm area and much less of agricultural modernization and 
resultant higher yields per hectare. The production volume of the smallest 
departments (Guaira and Central) is relatively small and stagnating, because of 
their limited area and the exhaustion of unexploited land reserves. 
There is very little intra-regional specialization within the most bolated areas of 
the Central Region, except for sugar cane production which is mainly 
concentrated in the department of Guaira. In former times, most of the 
'azucareras' were established here, making the department the largest producer of 
sugar cane . 
The differences between the individual departments are also very small as far 
as the methods of production are concerned. As mentioned earlier, these methods 
are still highly traditional. There has been almost no mechanization or other 
capitalization, so that capitalistic production relations have remained absent from 
most parts of the Central Region. This has led Galeano to speak of the survival 
of natural and pre-capitalistic 'reductos de subsistencia' (in: Rivarola 1982, p.178). 
The Central Region's share of national agricultural production has rapidly 
decreased in the course of time. In 1956, the 'Zona Central' still accounted for 
79% of the national sugar production, 56% of the country's cotton and manioc 
harvest, 58% of the national groundnut production and 48% of the total maize 
production. With the opening up of large colonization areas in the eastern part of 
the country, however, the Central Region's share of these crop» has fallen to 
75%, 23%, 29%, 19% and 21%, respectively. 
Obviously, it will be very difficult to introduce new crops or increase yields of 
the traditional ones. This is especially true of the most remote areas where the 
tenure situation is still very unfavourable. As long as the departments of 
Paraguarf, Caazapá and Guaira have the highest concentration of 'ocupantes', the 
majority of the fanners will remain meligible for official credit to help them to 
make the necessary investments in their land, and many of them will have little 
motivation to do so because of their insecure position. 
Given the fact that it is far from easy to improve production methods and 
intensify land use, especially in the more distant parts of the Central Region, 
most farmers have tried to 'adapf their way of living within the limits of 
existing structures. An example of 'adaptation without change' are the traditional 
institutions like the 'minga', whereby neighbours help each other in carrying out 
work on the land, thus reducing the costs of hired labour. Because they have only 
very small plots of land, people are willing to work the land for others, even 
though they are paid only in meals. Such a system will develop less rapidly in 
areas where farmers have sufficient land to be fully employed during the whole 
year. 
Another example is the fact that, within the Central Region, most of the 
cattle graze at liberty, instead of on privately held parcels. The majority of 
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farmers simply have insufficient land to keep animals on pastures of their own 
and are consequently forced to let them graze along the roads. 
These forms of adaptation cannot of course solve the problem of increasing 
land fragmentation in the long run. Sooner or later, the moment will come when 
farmers will be forced to supplement their farm income with other sources in 
order to compensate the adverse effects of growing 'minifundization'. This 
strategy may be described as 'diagonal response'. 
2.3.2 The diagonal response: on and off-farm activities 
The possibilities for finding off-farm employment are relatively scarce in the 
Central Region. Real industrialization has not yet taken place in Paraguay, mainly 
because of lack of capital and technological knowledge and the very limited 
domestic market. According to the calculations of the 'Ministerio de Industria y 
Comercio', there were only 2,568 industrial enterprises in the Central Region in 
1979, which together employed 10,575 persons, giving 4.1 employees on average. 
The majority of industrial enterprises are to be found in the department of 
Central and parts of Cordillera, which have the advantage of being situated in the 
vicinity of the capital and have become increasingly incorporated into its 
immediate sphere of influence. This is especially true of centres like San 
Lorenzo, Villa Elisa and Roque Alonso, which have become suburbs of Asunción. 
The level of industrialization is still very low, however, even in the area of 
the capital and its immediate surroundings. The only large-scale enterprises are 
two mills located in Capiatá and Villeta engaged in cotton ginning and the 
production of vegetable oils for export. Except for these large industries, 
industrial enterprises are relatively small and mainly specialized in small-scale 
production of simple hand-made items (leather, wooden products and textiles) for 
low-income groups. Another type of cottage industry is that of building materials, 
mainly small brickworks, the so-called 'olerías'. More than 68% of all industrial 
enterprises of the Central Region which specialize in the production of textiles, 
leather products, woodcraft or building materials are concentrated in the 
departments of Central and Cordillera. 
Insofar as industrial enterprises have developed outside the area surrounding 
Asunción most of them are small and primarily related to the agricultural sector. 
In Guaira, for example, the dominant type of manufacturing is the processing of 
sugar and alcoholic beverages for the national and international markets. In the 
relatively isolated departments of Paraguari and Caazapá, however, there is hardly 
any manufacturing activity at all, with the exception of some 'cottage industry' 
which is wholly dependent on family labour. In the most remote areas of the 
Central Region, in particular, therefore, off-farm employment opportunities are 
very limited. This means that, in those very areas where the possibilities for 
agricultural intensification are relatively unfavourable, the rural population also 
has insufficient opportunities for compensating low farm incomes with 'diagonal 
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responses', especially since very few measures have so far been taken by the 
Paraguayan government to increase employment in the secondary or tertiary 
sectors in these areas. 
Table 18: 
Industrial enterprises in the Central Region and its departments, 
1979. 
Departments: Central 
Cen- Cordi- Guai- Caazapá & Region: 
trai llera ri Paraguarí 
Branches abs % abs % abe % abs % abs X 
manufacturing 
(inc. weaving) 
-Leather 
manufacturing 
-Wood 
working 
-Pottery 
jewellery 
-Food 
processing 
-Brick & stone 
production 
-Metal proces-
sing & machiner 
-Meat 
processing 
-Alcoholic 
beverages 
-Tobacco 
processing 
-Other 
industries 
855 
208 
178 
111 
73 
Θ5 
53 
У 
22 
8 
9 
108 
51 
12 
11 
7 
4 
4 
3 
1 
0 
1 
6 
29 
β 
51 
0 
17 
0 
5 
0 
2 
0 
7 
25 
5 
44 
0 
15 
0 
4 
0 
2 
0 
5 
441 
88 
71 
5 
19 
19 
12 
2 
11 
0 
34 
63 
13 
10 
1 
2 
2 
2 
0 
2 
0 
5 
31 
8 
8 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
4 
3 
53 
14 
14 
2 
2 
3 
2 
0 
0 
5 
5 
1356 
310 
308 
117 
110 
86 
71 
24 
21 
13 
152 
53 
12 
12 
4 
4 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
6 
Central Region 1,690 100 117 100 702 100 59 100 2,568 100 
Labour force 8,172 314 2,000 89 10,575 
Source: Based on calculations from the Directorio Industrial, 
Ministerio de Industria y Comercio, 1979. 
Because of this unfavourable situation, many fanners have been forced to 'adapf 
by starting all kinds of economic side-activities on their farms ('actividades 
prediales'). Some of them try to supplement the inadequate farm and off-farm 
income by processing crops into starch, vegetable oils or other products, while 
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others have started to sell animak, eggs and milk, or have become engaged in the 
production of home-made artesanal goods, sometimes only during the agricultural 
off-season. Statistical data on these kinds of activities are very scarce, but field 
work in various parts of the Central Region has enabled us to gather further 
details. These will be presented in Chapter 3. 
Photograph 1: 
Small brickworks in the Central Region 
2.3.3 The horizontal response: migration to less congested areas 
The policy of agricultural colonization pursued by the Paraguayan government 
since 1963 was based on the idea that the rural problems of the Central Region 
could be solved only by stimulating part of its population to leave. Migration was, 
in other words, regarded as the most efficacious instrument for reducing rural 
congestion. Nevertheless, except for the early years, mainly in the area 
surrounding Asunción, the IBR has taken very few direct measures to stimulate 
this migration systematically. The majority of the migrants have, in fact, left 
without the intervention of the IBR. 
Now that we have shown in the preceding section that the best opportunities 
for vertical and diagonal responses are to be found in the areas at a short 
distance from Asunción, it is not surprising that it was particularly the 
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inhabitants of the more remote areas who decided on the 'horizontal response'. In 
the departments of Caazapá and Paraguari, in particular, with their limited 
potential for agricultural intensification and on and off-farm employment, growing 
rural congestion has forced many farmers to leave their land and move to less 
congested areas, especially since the tenure situation in those departments was 
unfavourable. 
Photograph 2: 
Examples of off-farm activities: informal selling activities in Asunción 
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A first variant of 'horizontal response' is seasonal migration, e.g. of farmers 
moving to other areas in order to help with the harvest during several months of 
the year. The most important example of seasonal migration within the Central 
Region is that of farmers moving from Caazapá to Guaira in order to find 
temporary employment in cutting sugar cane. Where seasonal migrants have tried 
to find temporary work outside the Central Region (e.g. in colonization areas or 
abroad in Argentina), most of them originate from the department of Faraguari. 
The fact that temporary migration flows have hardly developed in Guaira, 
Cordillera and Central cannot be explained rationally, but seems to be mainly a 
matter of tradition. 
Much more important is the second variant, i.e. permanent outmigration. There 
is, unfortunately, little exact information about the volume of this type of 
migration, but figures of population growth may give some indication. The figures 
presented in Table 19 suggest that 'horizontal responses' were characteristic of 
the departments of Faraguari, Cordillera and Caazapá , in particular, since 
population in these departments hardly increased in the period 1962-1982. 
Especially since 1972 an increasing proportion of the inhabitants seems to have 
left these departments. Faraguari lost more than 8,600 persons, while population 
growth in Cordillera and Caazapá amounted to only 0% and 6%, respectively, in 
the period 1972-1982. This was in contrast to the departments of Guaira and 
Central where population growth has remained high up to the present time. 
Table 19: 
Population growth per department of the Central Region, 
1962-1982. 
Department Population in : % Growth between 
1962 1972 1982 1962 - 1972 - 1982 
Central 
Cordillera 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Paraguarí 
229,073 
188,313 
114,949 
92,401 
203,012 
310,390 
194,218 
124.799 
103,139 
211,977 
493,500 
194,450 
143,430 
110,050 
203,330 
36 
3 
9 
12 
4 
59 
0 
15 
6 
-3 
Total 827,748 944,523 1,144,760 14 21 
Source: Dirección General 1962, 1972, 1982. 
2.3.4 Conclusions 
The policy of agricultural colonization, which has been pursued by the Paraguayan 
government since 1963, is based on the assumption that outmigration is one of the 
most effective instruments for reducing the problem of rural congestion. The 
government started from the idea that the rural problems were primarily caused 
by high rural population density. As has been shown, however, congestion may 
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also result from the unequal distribution of land, while its adverse effects may be 
aggravated by unfavourable tenure conditions. The extent to which each of this 
forces is at work will vary regionally. 
Where the IBR has taken direct measures to assist the Central Region, it seems to 
have been insufficiently aware of the various aspects of the rural problem and its 
regional differentiation. Consequently, the migration programme has not primarily 
been used to stimulate outmigration from areas with the highest population 
densities. Instead of being an important phenomenon in the most densely 
populated areas, i.e. the immediate surroundings of Asunción, outmigration has 
been relatively high in the less densely inhabited departments of Paraguari and 
Caazapá, where the farm density was still relatively low. 
This has to be explained by the fact that the opportunities for intensification 
of agricultural production and for finding supplementary sources of income have 
been relatively small in these areas. It was particularly farmers living in areas 
with insufficient opportunities for 'vertical' or 'diagonal' responses who were 
inclined to move to other areas . This means that outmigration has been a 
spontaneous response, rather than a direct result of policy measures. Rather than 
being the result of population pressure or government measures, the decision of 
farmers to leave or stay largely depended on the local opportunities to 
compensate for further fragmentation of the available farmland by agricultural 
intensification or tapping other sources of income. 
In other words, not only did the IBR pay insufficient attention to the different 
aspects of the rural problem and its regional differentiation when formulating the 
development programmes' , but it took insufficient account of the various 
spontaneous responses of the Central Region's rural population. These two factors 
largely explain the failure of policy measures and the persistence of congestion in 
the most densely populated parts of the Central Region. 
With respect to the objective of alleviating the Central Region's problem through 
land redistribution, it has to be admitted that the IBR has indeed concentrated its 
efforts on the departments where latifundia monopolized a considerable part of 
the land suited for agriculture. In practice, however, the redistribution measures 
have hardly improved the situation, because most of the land concerned was not 
lying unexploited but had already been occupied 'illegally7 or at least 'informally' 
before it was integrated into officially established agricultural colonies. 
Finally, the legalization programme of the IBR has also hardly alleviated the rural 
problem, because most of the farmers who acquired property titles lived in areas 
where the tenure situation was already more favourable, i.e. the area near the 
capital of Asunción. In the areas with the highest proportion of 'ocupantes', 
however, the tenure situation has hardly improved since the early 1960s. 
Apart from being influenced by local conditions such as distances to urban 
centres, decisions on the question of how to react to the problems caused by 
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rural congestion will also depend on the socio-economic situation of the individual 
families. In order to gain a better understanding of the part played by family 
characteristics, the next chapter will concentrate on the household level. 
Particular attention will be paid to the 'minifundistas', i.e. the farmers with less 
than 5 hectares, since it may be expected that this group, in particular, has to 
cope with all kinds of survival problems, whereas few of those who have larger 
holdings will be forced to undertake agricultural intensification, seek additional on 
and off-farm incomes or resort to seasonal or permanent migration. 
Photograph 3: 
Example of on-farm activities: wattle-work 
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Chapters 
MINIFUNDISM, SURVIVAL STRATEGIES AND RURAL PROSPERITY 
STUDIED AT THE INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLD LEVEL 
3.1 Introduction 
Policies of agricultural colonization often start from the idea that rural 
congestion, minifundism and rural poverty go hand in hand. Minifundism is seen as 
a direct consequence of the problem of rural congestion, and insufficient farm 
size is regarded as one of the most important obstacles to agricultural 
modernization, and hence one of the fundamental causes of rural poverty. The 
introduction of modem and more productive crops and farming methods on only a 
few hectares is not expected to be sufficiently remunerative. 
The IBR assumed that its primary goal in transforming the Central Region's 
backward agricultural economy and achieving rural development should be to 
improve the unfavourable rural property relationships. It put forward the view 
that a policy of further colonization would be one of the most adequate 
instruments for achieving this objective. 
When it prepared its plan, the IBR started from two implicit assumptions. The 
first one was that insufficient farm size was the major problem of most 
'minifundistas', especially as, at the same time, the opportunities of finding 
supplementary sources of income were very limited. This meant that the opening 
up of 'empty areas' would be followed almost automatically by the departure of 
those who had insufficient land and hoped to be able to establish larger farms in 
one of the pioneer areas. In other words, the possibilities of agricultural 
colonization would immediately set in train a considerable migration flow 
consisting of the poorest segments of the population. The second assumption was 
that there was a close relationship between farm size, agricultural modernization 
and rural income level, so that agricultural modernization and higher levels of 
rural prosperity would logically follow from the creation of larger holdings. 
In practice, however, the developmental impact of outmigration and colonization 
has been very disappointing. Many 'minifundistas' have preferred to stay on their 
small and impoverished parcels instead of moving to one of the pioneer areas, so 
that the problem of minifundism in the Central Region has remained more or less 
the same. Moreover, the positive effects of improved farm size have failed to 
materialize, as the establishment of larger holdings failed to result in the 
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introduction of new crops or modem methods of production and many farmers 
continued to live in poverty. 
In this chapter, we shall try to answer the question why, in spite of 25 years of 
colonization policy, the majority of 'minifundistas' have not chosen to settle on 
larger parcels in one of the colonization areas outside the Central Region. Given 
the fact that they had insufficient land to make a living from farming, how have 
they managed to survive? Can the problem of minifundism still be reduced to 
'insufficiency of land' and is there still a close relationship between farm size and 
rural prosperity, or have the survival strategies of the Central Region's rural 
population become much more diversified? 
So far we have suggested that the Central Region's 'minifundistas' are a 
completely homogeneous group of agricultural producers, living on subsistence 
holdings with invariably too little land to supply their daily needs. In reality, 
however, this is not the case. 
We have already argued in the preceding chapter that local conditions are an 
important factor influencing the decision of farmers on ways of compensating the 
insufficiency of land and are, consequently, an important cause of differentiation. 
This was illustrated by pointing to the spatial differentiation of 'vertical', 
'diagonal' and 'vertical' responses in the Central Region. 
Human behaviour is determined not only by characteristics of the spatial 
context, however, but depends also on the socio-economic characteristics of the 
individual household. Living in an area with relatively favourable opportunities for 
'vertical' or 'diagonal' responses therefore does not necessarily imply that all 
farmers will be equally inclined or equally able to intensify agricultural land use 
or to supplement their farm income with other sources of employment. Nor will 
all farmers in remote areas with little on or off-farm employment opportunities 
invariably decide to move to less congested areas. 
Given the fact that many 'minifundistas' have stayed on their small parcels within 
the Central Region, even though most of them were in urgent need of additional 
sources of income, it may be asked to what extent have they compensated the 
lack of land with intensification or on and off-farm employment, and to what 
extent have their decisions been influenced by local opportunities and their 
household characteristics. 
Have 'minifundistas' in the environs of Asunción invariably intensified 
agricultural production per hectare, or has the 'vertical' response been primarily 
the privilege of medium-sized farmers who were able to make productive 
investments? Was it particularly the smallest farmers who seized the employment 
opportunities offered by the secondary and tertiary sectors in and near Asunción, 
or have these 'diagonal' responses been used primarily by other groups? Finally, 
has outmigration been a specific characteristic of 'minifundistas' living in the 
remote areas of the Central Region or have other categories of farmers also 
decided to move? In order to answer these questions, we shall have to focus more 
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closely on the socio-economic characteristics of individual 'minifundistas' and 
their survival strategies. 
The analysis in this chapter is based on data obtained from small producers 
living throughout the Central Region. On the assumption that 5 hectares are the 
necessary minimum for an average Paraguayan farmer to be able to live from 
agriculture when employing traditional fanning methods (Breitenbach 1973) , we 
took a sample of households with less than 5 hectares of land2. In order to 
achieve an optimal geographical representation, the sample was taken 
proportionally to the number of 'minifundistas' in each department of the Central 
Region. 
For the selection of 'compañías' and the households to be included in the 
sample we made use of the list frame for the agricultural census of 1981, provided 
by the Ministry of Agriculture. This list contained a representative sample of 
districts (subdivisions of departments) as well as a (representative) selection of 
farmers with holdings of different sizes, including those with less than 5 hectares 
to which our research would be limited. From this list we continued to select 
'compañías' until we arrived at the previously fixed number of farmers needed per 
department. 
We collected information about the general characteristics of each family, its 
income sources, level of prosperity and other aspects by making use of a closed 
questionnaire (see Annex 1). The survey was held during the agricultural off-
season, from May to July 1986, 89% of the interviews being taken in the rural 
zones and only 11% in the 'urban areas', i.e. the villages themselves. 
We held 275 interviews in 74 'compañías' situated in 20 districts of the five 
departments making up the Central Region (see Annex 2). The 275 families 
interviewed contained 1,483 persons, which gave an average family size of 5.4 
persons. Since the population included in each sample segment was fairly 
homogeneous (i.e only farmers with less than 5 hectares), it is unlikely that the 
results would have been significantly different if a larger sample had been taken. 
After carrying out the interviews, in order to discover to what extent the 
survival strategies of the 'minifundistas' were determined by 'characteristics of 
space', we divided the Central Region into two zones on the basis of distance to 
Asunción. 
Zone 1, covering the area which can be reached from Asunción within a two-
hours ride by public transport, included the Central department and parts of 
Cordillera and Paraguan. This zone, where opportunities for 'vertical' and 
'diagonal' responses are relatively favourable, accounted for 36% of the families 
interviewed and 34% of the sample population. 
Zone 2, covering the departments of Caazapá, Guaira and the remaining part of 
Paraguan and Cordillera, where local conditions force many farmers to migrate, 
accounted for 64% of the families interviewed and 66% of the sample population. 
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Table 20: 
Geographical distribution of households included in the research 
sample. 
Number of households: Number of persons: 
Total Zone 1 Zone 2 Total Zone 1 Zone 2 
abs % abs % abs % abs % abs % abs % 
Central 
Cordillera 
Paraguari 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Total 
57 
58 
74 
47 
39 
275 
21 
21 
27 
17 
14 
100 
57 
26 
15 
0 
0 
98 
100 
45 
20 
0 
0 
36 
0 
32 
59 
47 
39 
177 
0 
55 
80 
100 
100 
64 1 
276 
304 
406 
254 
243 
.483 
19 
21 
27 
17 
16 
100 
276 
146 
76 
0 
0 
498 
100 
48 
19 
0 
0 
35 
0 
158 
330 
254 
243 
985 
0 
52 
81 
100 
100 
66 
Source: Sample survey 1986 
hraiseHoltl included η the sompl* 
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Map 5: 
Geographical distribution of households included in the research sample. 
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In the following section of this chapter, attention will be focused on the question 
of how the individual families included in our sample have tried to compensate for 
their lack of land by agricultural intensification, on and off-farm employment or 
outmigration and what have been the effects of this on their level of prosperity. 
Before doing so, some general characteristics of the sample population have to be 
described. 
3.2 Some general characteristics of the sample population 
The 'minifundistas' living in the Central Region appear at first sight to be a 
rather homogeneous group. Most of them are relatively old , live with their 
nuclear families on small parcels of land, and inhabit small adobe houses with 
generally only two rooms. No less than 43% of the households comprise more 
than 5 persons, 5% of them even having more than 11, so that one may speak of 
a 'rather over-populated' situation which is further aggravated by the poor 
housing conditions. More than 32% of the families are living in one room houses, 
whereas only 25% of the houses have 3 rooms and over. 
Besides the lack of space, infrastructural facilities are also very poor. Only 
22% of the families have access to running water, while the majority (68%) have 
to make use of wells. Most of the wells are privately used, but some 
'minifundistas' have to share the well with neighbours. There are also families 
who have to draw water from a brook (10%). In general, water quality is very 
poor. In addition, the way in which meals are prepared is not very hygienic and 
rather primitive. The majority of the 'minifundistas' (75%) simply put a fire on 
the floor, while only 9% of them have provisional cooking facilities on a stand. 
Only 15% of the families make use of gas or kerosine. Not more than 16% of the 
'minifundistas' interviewed use electric lighting. Oil lamps are commonly used 
(79%), while other families (4%) make use of candles. 'Luxury articles' like 
refrigerators or televisions were found in only 14% and 15%, respectively, of the 
households. Radios, however, are owned by 67% of the 'minifundistas'. 
The transport situation is also rather unfavourable. Only 20% of the families 
had the use of a bicycle, the majority had to walk or use of public transport. 
Only 1% of the families have a motorcycle or car. 
3.3 The vertical response 
It is more relevant and interesting to focus on the agricultural land use of the 
seemingly homogeneous sample population. The average 'minifundista' included in 
our sample has access to only 2.6 hectares of land, normally divided into two 
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separate parcels. Insofar as the land is still used for agriculture (88%) ,^ half of 
the total area (1.3 hectare) is reserved for subsistence crops. Nearly all 
'minifundistas' grow manioc and maize, which are often called the 'bread' of the 
countryside. Both crops together cover an average area of about 1 hectare per 
farm and are planted by 80% and 67% of the farmers, respectively. Other, less 
important, subsistence crops are beans, groundnuts and sweet potatoes, grown by 
59%, 32% and 15% of the 'minifundistas'. 
Table 21: 
Crops grown by commercially-oriented and subsistence farms 
included in the sample (and X of the households concerned). 
All 
farms 
Commercially- Subsistence 
oriented farms farms 
Number of farms 275 (100%) 
Total average area 2.6 ha 
Fallow land 0.6 ha (60X) 
134 (49%) 141 (51%) 
3.1 ha 1.7 ha 
0.6 ha (54%) 0.6 ha (65%) 
MANIOC 
number of farms 
average area 
219 (80%) 
0.6 ha 
117 (87%) 
0.6 ha 
102 (72%) 
0.5 ha 
MAIZE 
number of farms 
average area 
184 (67%) 
0.4 ha 
93 (69%) 
0.4 ha 
91 (64%) 
0.4 ha 
BEANS 
number of farms 
average area 
161 (59%) 
0.2 ha 
87 (65%) 
0.2 ha 
74 (52%) 
0.2 ha 
GROUNDNUTS 
number of farms 
average area 
88 (32%) 
0.08 ha 
52 (39%) 
0.09 ha 
36 (26%) 
0.05 ha 
SWEET POTATOES 
number of farms 
average area 
42 (15%) 
0.03 ha 
18 (13%) 
0.03 ha 
24 (17%) 
0.04 ha 
COTTON 
number of farms 
average area 
112 (41%) 
0.5 ha 
112 (84%) 
0.5 ha 
Source: Sample 1986. 
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Only 49% of the farmers interviewed also grow some cash crops, i.e. products 
which they intend to sell. Whereas the subsistence farmers have an average area 
of only 1.7 hectare, the commercially-oriented fanners have 3.1 hectares at their 
disposal. Cash crops normally occupy an average area of only 0.5 hectare, leaving 
sufficient land for the production of maize and manioc. Like the pure subsistence 
farmers, the commercially-oriented farmers use about 1 hectare of their land for 
the production of food crops, whereas the rest of it is lying fallow or needed for 
housing and living space. 
Most 'minifundistas' who practise commercial farming concentrate solely on cotton 
production (84%), because of the relatively low risks involved. They do not have 
to make large investments, since most of the necessary inputs (seeds, insecticides 
etc.) are distributed by local middlemen ('acopiadores') and paid off after the 
harvest from February to May, when they sell them the cotton". 
When they buy the crops, the 'acopiadores' generally quote and pay low prices, 
which the farmers cannot contest, because most of them lack information about 
real market prices. Most 'acopiadores' have a monopoly in the area they serve, 
can dictate their own rules and therefore have a very dominant position within 
their 'kingdom', especially as many of them have increased their power through 
other activities, such as money lending. Because the majority of the small 
producers lack titles to their land and capital is scarce, it is virtually impossible 
for many of them to obtain credit except through the facilities of the 'acoplador', 
who is regarded as the principal provider of credit for productive and non-
productive purposes. 
Most 'minifundistas' are not equipped to store large amounts of their harvest 
adequately. They simply deliver the cotton at a central point from which the 
'acopiador' takes care of further transport to one of the cotton mills. The cotton 
is normally bought by 'examination', with little regard to standards of quality, 
condition or correct weight. Almost no facilities exist for preparing or improving 
the product to be sold to the cotton mills and, because of the lack of proper 
storage facilities, a relatively high proportion of the cotton is lost, especially at 
harvest time. 
Some of the middlemen buy for certain big firms and are officially employed 
by local cotton-processing plants that wish to secure a sufficient and permanent 
supply of raw materials . The majority of the 'acopiadores', however, operate on 
their own account and sell the products to the firm paying the best prices. 
There is hardly any specialization, because, apart from playing a central part in 
the collection of cotton, most of them also buy other products and have other 
activities: '..Casi todo acopiador es a la vez un comerciante que explota un 
negocio de ramos generales u otros rubros, ya productor de arroz, maíz, ganadero, 
vendedor de gasolina etc., y cuando dispone de camión propio no es extraño que 
realice fletes para terceros..' (Vázquez 1972). 
As long as most farmers are not eligible for official credits and have no means of 
transporting the cotton to the mills themselves, the 'acopiadores' are unlikely to 
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lose their hold on the 'minifundistas'. Many middlemen even strengthened their 
position during the drought of 1985-1986, when no less than 67% of the cotton 
farmers included in our sample were unable to fulfil their obligations and run up 
an average debt of 64,000 Guaraníes (128 US dollars). As long as the 
'minifundistas' remain indebted, the patron-client relationship will persist and the 
middlemen will continue to pay lower prices. It hardly needs to be stressed that, 
because of the permanent indebtedness, such patron-client relationships are very 
stable. They are also hierarchical; the fact that the credit giver is the 'patrón' 
and the receiver his 'cliente' is perceptible in many things of daily life. 
The production of other cash crops (like sugar cane or, more recently, vegetables 
or horticultural crops for the Asunción market) is much less attractive, because 
the farmers have to buy the necessary production inputs themselves and only 
those with larger holdings and legal titles to the land can obtain official loans. 
Moreover, they have to organize their own transport and too much labour is 
needed for the production of these crops. This means, for example, that, at 
harvest time, a sugar cane farmer needs to hire extra labour at an average cost 
of 1,000 Guaraníes per man day (2 US dollars). 
Another disadvantage is that the production of these crops is much more risky. 
Sugar cane, for example, is a crop which can generally not be cultivated in 
combination with other (subsistence) crops, so that most sugar cane growers, in 
contrast to the cotton farmers, who can still produce their own maize and 
manioc, have to buy their food on the market. Concentrating on monoculture 
would therefore run counter to the minifundistas' need to spread risks and 
guarantee a daily livelihood. Another reason why sugar cane cultivation is a 
rather risky affair results from its high vulnerability to ground frosts. One night 
with temperatures below zero is enough to cause a bad harvest and the complete 
or partial loss of the money and labour invested. In addition, sugar cane cannot 
be sold whenever it suits the farmer best, since the sugar mills with which the 
farmers are connected have drawn up 'calendarios', exactly indicating which 
farmers have to deliver their sugar cane on which day. Moreover, the cane has to 
arrive at the factory gate within 24 hours of being cut, otherwise its quality will 
have fallen below certain standards of acceptance. Because most of the roads of 
the Central Region are in poor condition and there is almost complete absence of 
all-weather roads, sugar cane production is, in practice, attractive only to farmers 
living in the direct vicinity of a sugar mill". 
Other perishable products, like horticultural crops, are also very risky ones 
and can only be cultivated at short distances from Asunción. Given the high 
demands on labour, know-how and investments and the limited financial capacity 
of most 'minifundistas', it is not surprising that only a few of them (3% of the 
sample) are engaged in this type of commercial farming. 
The number of farmers who have tried to earn some money by selling a part 
of their subsistence crops is also relatively small (13%). Very few of the peasants 
interviewed were able to produce real surpluses from their tiny parcels. Moreover, 
the market for food crops is not very large, since most of the rural population 
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produce their own manioc and maize and the urban market for these products is 
rather limited. 
To sum up, neither the subsistence nor the commercially-oriented 'minifundistas' 
make full use of their land. Although they have plots of insufficient size, 60% of 
the farmers still have fallow land, with an average area of 0.6 hectare (see Table 
21). Very few of the farmers employ such methods as crop rotation and none of 
them use modem methods for improving soil quality, so that the most common 
way of restoring natural soil fertility is to leave the land out of cultivation 
during several months of the year ('tierra en descanso'). In 5% of the cases the 
land remained unused because it had become too poor to be cultivated, as a 
result of misuse and erosion. An additional 6% of the farmers leave part of their 
land unused because, in their eyes, there is no need to exploit the whole farm. 
The production methods of most 'minifundistas' are still traditional. Nearly all 
farmers have only hoes or 'machetes' at their disposal and cultivate the land in 
more or less the same way as their parents or grandparents. Very few animal 
drawn or mechanized ploughs are used and these do not enable the farmers to 
expand agricultural production appreciably, because of the small size of their 
parcels. Farming practices are in fact so poor that the land under cultivation 
hardly produces a profitable return. 
Where the 'minifundistas' had invested in their holdings, most of the money 
was used to buy seeds or other inputs and to hire some labour, and very little 
capital was spent on modernizing agricultural production and increasing 
productivity per head or per hectare'. 
Those commercial farmers who have made investments (87% of the total number) 
have spent on average more than 43,000 Guaraníes (80 US dollars), while the 
subsistence farmers, who did not expect any money income in return, have 
invested an average of over 15,000 Guaraníes (32 US dollars)^". The latter are 
apparently willing to put in some money in order to guarantee food production, 
and some of them have even contracted neighbours to do part of the farm work. 
They obtain their income from off-farm employment (see 3.4) and are therefore 
able to hire a neighbouring fanner to cultivate their manioc and maize. 
Where the 'minifundistas' did try to make some money by selling crops, their 
average net cash income amounted to only 60,967 Guaraníes (about 120 US 
dollars) in the agricultural year 1985-1986. Because of low soil quality and limited 
use of inputs, yields per hectare are low, so that the volume of total production 
remains small and, moreover, the prices paid for the products are unfavourable. 
Some of the commercial farmers (29%) had even ended with no cash income or a 
loss, because of the high costs of purchased inputs and a bad harvest. Because of 
the exceptional drought in 1986, yields had been disappointing for most of them 
in comparison with 'normal years'. 
If subsistence farmers are included, the average agricultural income from 
farming, for all farmers, was only 36,971 Guaraníes (75 US dollars). 12% of the 
84 
'minifundistas' interviewed had already even ceased to use their land for 
agricultural purposes and kept it only as a place of residence. 
Table 22: 
Cash farm income ( in Guaraníes) of ' m i n i f u n d i s t a s ' in the Centra l 
Region, 1985-1986. 
Total yield 
Total investments 
Net cash income 
Farmers with: 
Positive net income 
Zero income 
Negative net income 
Total 
All 
farms 
abs 
71,561 
34,590 
36,971 
95 
98 
82 
275 
% 
35 
35 
30 
100 
Commercial 
farms 
abs 
103,975 
43,008 
60,967 
95 
12 
27 
134 
% 
71 
9 
20 
100 
Subsistence 
farms 
abs 
— 
15,925 
-15,925 
0 
84 
57 
141 
% 
0 
61 
39 
100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Since only a part of the farmers still produce for the market and farm incomes 
tend to be very low, it may be concluded that, for the majority of the 
'minifundistas', farming activities have become a source of financial losses rather 
than a source of income. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that only 35% of 
the 'minifundistas' interviewed were left with a positive cash income, while the 
remaining 65% used the crops only for their own consumption (no money income) 
or had suffered losses (negative income). 
Leaving apart the commercial farmers who still invest with the intention of 
making a profit from farming, the majority of the 'minifundistas' consider the 
land rather as a guarantee for survival and as a capital asset, than as a source of 
income. Although the land still provides most of the farmers with food crops, the 
majority depend primarily on quite different sources of money income. Instead of 
being an important production factor and its use being intensified, the land has 
become a kitchen-garden for most 'minifundistas'. 
It may be said in conclusion that most 'minifundistas' in the Central Region have 
done little to offset the lack of land by increasing production per hectare. They 
have not introduced new crops, or tried to introduce more productive methods of 
cultivation. Even in the area with relatively favourable opportunities for growing 
tomatoes, pineapples and other commercial crops (zone 1, see 2.3.1), 
'minifundistas' have made insufficient use of these types of 'vertical response'. 
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The crop patterns of both zones 1 and 2 are basically the same and no clear 
tendency towards agricultural intensification can be observed^ . On the contrary: 
in contrast to what might be expected, most of the commercial (cotton-producing) 
farmers are to be found in zone 2, whereas the majority of the subsistence 
farmers live in the area near Asunción. In other words, where intensification was 
expected to be a logical response (zone 1) the majority of small farmers are 
engaged in the growing of food crops or have decided to let their land lie idle. In 
the relatively remote areas of zone 2, however, the proportion of commercial 
farmers is still relatively large, although most of them concentrate on growing 
cotton, instead of producing more remunerative crops. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn with regard to the area of fallow land. In 
zone 1, no less than 76% of the small farmers leave part of their land 
uncultivated, the average area being 0.8 hectare, whereas the proportion for zone 
2 is Only7 51% of the farmers and an average of 0.5 hectare of land. One may 
conclude, therefore, that most 'minifundistas' have not been able to make use of 
the relatively good opportunities for agricultural intensification in the vicinity of 
Asunción. Instead of increasing production per hectare, many them now actually 
practise a more extensive form of fanning. 
The relatively extensive land use in the area near Asunción is also reflected in 
the level of farm income and investments. Farming provides relatively high annual 
incomes in the more remote zone 2, namely 41,480 Guaraníes, whereas the figure 
is only 25,831 Guaraníes in zone 1. In the latter area, 50% of the farmers have 
made investments in their land (31,204 Guaraníes on average), as compared with 
no less than 69% in the former zone (35,950 Guaraníes on average). 
Our research shows that, particularly in the immediate environs of Asunción, most 
'minifundistas' have still failed to diversify or intensify agricultural production. 
Although we assumed that the farmers in this part of the Central Region were 
quite well-placed to do so, the cash income of most 'minifundistas' is, in 
practice, too small to enable them to make the investments needed to raise 
production per hectare substantially and to benefit from the relatively favourable 
infrastructure for agricultural modernization. 
Most of the farmers who have intensified their agricultural land use (and are 
engaged in market production), have farms of more than 5 hectares, but these are 
not included in our sample. 
69% of the 'minifundistas' who have started to treat their land only as place of 
residence without producing any crops, are to be found in the agricultural zone 
immediately surrounding Asunción and only 31% in the more remote zone 2. 
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Table 23: 
Crops grown per agricultural zone in the Central Region (and % of 
the households concerned). 
Central 
Region Zone 1 Zone 2 
Number of farms 275 98 177 
Total average area 2.6 ha 2.6 ha 2.6 ha 
Fallow land 0.6 ha (60%) 0.8 ha (76%) 0.5 ha (51%) 
MANIOC 
number of farms 219 (80%) 66 (67%) 153 (86%) 
average area 0.6 ha 0.5 ha 0.6 ha 
MAIZE 
number of farms 184 (67%) 52 (53%) 132 (75%) 
average area 0.4 ha 0.4 ha 0.5 ha 
BEANS 
number of farms 161 (59%) 46 (47%) 115 (65%) 
average area 0.2 ha 0.2 ha 0.2 ha 
GROUNDNUTS 
number of farms 88 (32%) 18 (18%) 70 (40%) 
average area 0.08 ha 0.06 ha 0.08 ha 
SWEET POTATOES 
number of farms 42 (15%) 17 (17%) 25 (14%) 
average area 0.03 ha 0.05 ha 0.02 ha 
COTTON 
number of farms 112 (41%) 31 (32%) 81 (46%) 
average area 0.5 ha 0.4 ha 0.5 ha 
Source: Sample 1986. 
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Table 24: 
Cash farm income (in Guaraníes) of 'minifundistas' per zone in 
the Central Region, 1985-1986. 
Total yield 
Total costs 
Average net income 
Farmers with: 
Positive net income 
Zero income 
Negative net income 
Central 
abs 
71,561 
34,590 
36,971 
95 
98 
82 
275 
Region: 
% 
35 
35 
30 
100 
Zone 1 
abs 
57,035 
31,204 
25,831 
25 
47 
26 
98 
% 
25 
48 
27 
36 
Zone 2 
abs 
77,430 
35,950 
41,480 
70 
51 
56 
177 
% 
40 
29 
31 
64 
Source: Sample 1986. 
In the absence of an appreciable 'vertical response', even in the more favourable 
area, we must now consider the question of whether the Central Region's 
'minifundistas' have found the 'diagonal responses' to be a more important and 
accessible alternative. What additional employment sources have been tapped by 
the various groups of 'minifundistas'? 
3.4 The diagonal response 
An analysis of the employment structure of the population included in our sample 
(1,483 persons) shows an economically active population of 522 persons, 227 of 
whom are 'jefes de familia' (43%) and 295 (57%) household members. Each family 
contained 1.9 working persons on average. The total working population had 938 
jobs, giving an average of 1.8 per head. Family heads tended to have 2.1 jobs, 
whereas working family members had 1.6 jobs on average. 
Whereas the pattern of land use was rather uniform, the 'minifundistas' appear to 
be a rather heterogeneous group as far as sources of supplementary farm income 
are concerned. The majority of the family heads (68%) have more than one job. 
Most of them are still working in the agricultural sector during most of the time 
and alternate their work with off-farm activities during several months of the 
year. During the agricultural off-season, they do all kind of odd jobs, like fencing 
the land of 'big' farmers or helping them with the preparation of the land. Some 
of the small farmers migrate temporarily to the department of Guaira for the 
sugar cane harvest, or go to more distant (colonization) areas to work as day 
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labourers. The remuneration of this kind of side-activity is very low, and most 
'minifundistas' earn on average only 800-1,500 Guaraníes per day (2-4 US dollars). 
Others commute to Asunción in order to find an additional job in the building 
industry (as 'ayudante'), or in the transport sector (as driver's mate). In 
comparison with rural off-farm jobs, the remuneration of urban work is much 
higher (125,000 Guaraníes as against 72,875 Guaraníes per year), but urban 
employment opportunities are unfortunately relatively scarce. 
The other members of the household try to supplement the family income in a 
different way. Instead of alternating between farm and off-farm work, most of 
them (56%) tend to have one principal activity. Some of the young male family 
members (mainly the sons) try to find employment in commerce, construction or 
other branches of the urban economy, but the majority of working household 
members prefer activities for which they do not have to leave the farm. In spite 
of the fact that family members are under-represented in farming, 39% of them 
(as against 31% of the heads) are engaged in activities which can be done on the 
farmyard. The participation of family members (especially women) in off-farm 
work is consequently relatively low. 
Jobs of household members range from informal activities to highly specialized 
occupations. Many members of the minifundia households who still practise 
commercial farming try to supplement their farm income by informal 'actividades 
prediales' which are naturally related to agricultural activity. Examples of this 
kind of extras are the sale of animals (pigs, poultry) '% dairy products (milk, 
butter, eggs) or 'gifts of nature' like coconuts", other fruit, dung or wood. 
Others supplement the farm income by processing manioc into starch, extracting 
vegetable oil from leaves of the bitter orange tree or coconuts, or producing 
charcoal from wood. The production of cheese, honey or alcoholic beverages are 
also extra sources of income. 
Because the majority of the 'minifundistas' no longer practise commercial 
farming, however, an ever-increasing number of household members have also 
tried to find a variety of jobs which are less closely connected to agriculture, but 
can still be done on the farmyard. The most informal type of on-farm 
employment are commercial and service activities. Part-time traders try to sell all 
kinds of non-agricultural products. Most of these traders are housewives who keep 
an eye on their small stores with cola, ballpoints and several other simple 
consumer goods ('almacén'), while at the same time doing other every day tasks. 
They come into action only when a customer enters the farmyard^. Some of 
these 'almaceneros' try to combine their work with that of butcher by 
slaughtering a beast once or twice a week and offering the meat for sale. Those 
neighbours who have sufficient money to buy a few extra cuts of meat have made 
it their job to resell these in the other neighbourhoods. Other farm-tied side-
activities include all kinds of simple services, such as washing or ironing clothes, 
hairdressing and tailoring. 
A second group of jobs consists of more formally organized, full-time 
manufacturing activities. Many women try to supplement the family income by 
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making 'ñandutí', 'aopoí' or other kinds of highly specialized wattle-work. Not all 
women, however, are engaged in this activity, since local traditions have led to 
the concentration of this craft in a few villages in the vicinity of Asunción. The 
incomes are generally extremely low, but some important advantages are that the 
earnings are relatively stable and that work can be combined with other jobs on 
the yard. Moreover, extra investments are unnecessary, because cotton and 
needles are distributed free of charge by local middlemen or women. The women 
get paid fortnightly according to the number and quality of the pieces produced, 
the average income being only some 1,000 Guaraníes a week (2 US dollars). 
Those male household members who have manufacturing jobs are mostly 
engaged in leather and wood processing, brick production or similar activities. 
Their number is relatively small, however, because this kind of activity demands 
considerable investment and the market is relatively small. 
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Figure 6: 
The employment structure of household heads and family members. 
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Table 25: 
Principal and subsidiary types of employment of economically 
active family heads and members in the Central Region. 
a. Family heads: 
Type of 
employment 
-Farming 
-On-farm 
activities* 
commerce 
manufacture 
service 
-Off-farm 
activities: 
rural 
urban 
Total 
Principal 
occup 
abs 
166 
15 
10 
3 
11 
22 
227 
lation 
X 
73 
7 
4 
1 
5 
10 
100 
2nd 
occupation 
abs 
21 
15 
6 
3 
88 
21 
154 
% 
14 
10 
4 
2 
56 
14 
100 
3rd 
occupation 
abs 
3 
6 
0 
2 
45 
14 
70 
% 
4 
9 
0 
3 
64 
20 
100 
4th 
occupation 
abs 
0 
0 
0 
0 
24 
2 
26 
% 
0 
0 
0 
0 
92 
8 
100 
Tota 
abs 
190 
36 
16 
8 
168 
59 
477 
il 
% 
40 
8 
3 
2 
35 
12 
100 
* Including on-farm activities related to agriculture 
Source: Sample 1986 
b. Family members: 
Type of Principal 2nd 3rd 4th Total 
employment occupation occupation occupation occupation 
abs % abs % abs % abs % abs % 
-Farming 
-On-farm 
activities*; 
commerce 
manufacture 
service 
-Off-farm 
activities: 
rural 
urban 
Total 
147 
30 
52 
10 
18 
38 
295 
50 
10 
18 
3 
6 
13 
100 
23 
6 
12 
5 
71 
14 
131 
18 
5 
9 
4 
53 
11 
100 
0 
2 
2 
0 
23 
4 
31 
0 
6 
6 
0 
75 
13 
100 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
4 
0 
25 
0 
0 
75 
0 
100 
170 
39 
66 
15 
115 
56 
461 
38 
8 
14 
3 
25 
12 
100 
* Including on-farm activities related to agriculture 
Source: Sample 1986. 
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с. Total sample population: 
Type of 
employment 
-Farming 
-On-farm 
activities*: 
commerce 
manufacture 
service 
-Off-farm 
activities: 
rural 
urban 
Total 
As a principal 
occupation 
abs 
313 
45 
62 
13 
29 
60 
522 
% 
87 
60 
76 
57 
10 
52 
As a subsii 
occupation 
abs 
47 
30 
20 
10 
254 
55 
416 
X 
13 
40 
24 
43 
90 
48 
diary 
(2nd-4th) 
All 
occupations 
abs 
360 
75 
82 
23 
283 
115 
938 
% 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
* Including on-farm activities related to agriculture 
Source: Sample 1986 
d. Total sample population: 
Type of 
employment 
-Farming 
-On-farm 
activities*: 
commerce 
manufacture 
service 
-Off-farm 
activities: 
rural 
urban 
Total 
Family 
abs 
190 
38 
16 
8 
168 
59 
477 
heads 
X 
53 
48 
20 
35 
59 
51 
Family 
abs 
170 
39 
66 
15 
115 
56 
461 
members 
X 
47 
52 
80 
65 
41 
49 
All 
abs 
360 
75 
82 
23 
283 
115 
938 
occupations 
X 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
* Including on-farm activities related to agriculture 
Source: sample 1986 
Farming and rural off-farm employment made up 39% and 30% of the total number 
of jobs, respectively. No less than 87% of the population engaged in agriculture 
(360 persons) still had fanning as their principal activity, most of them being 
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'jefes de familia'. For 90% of the rural 'jornaleros' (day labourers), however, this 
type of employment had become a side-activity along with other jobs. 
Insofar as people had on-farm jobs in the sphere of commerce, service or 
manufacturing (8%, 2% and 9% of the active population, respectively, most of them 
household members), the majority of them (60%, 57% and 76%, respectively) did 
the work as their only and principal job. 
Finally, 52% of the urban off-farm activities (12% of the total number of jobs) 
could be classified as principal occupations and 48% as secondary jobs, being 
equally distributed among household members (49%) and household heads (51%). 
Turning to the origins of the total family income of the 'minifundistas' included 
in our sample, four different sources of income could be distinguished: 
1. Commercial farming. 
2. On-farm activities indirectly related to fanning. 
3. A wide-range of activities in the sphere of manufacturing, 
service and commerce not related to farming and performed by 
different members of the family, including off-farm 
activities ('ingresos extra-prediales'). 
4. Gifts from relatives, and pensions, e.g. for veterans or 
disabled persons of the Chaco War. 
The average family income of the 'minifundistas' interviewed amounted to 373,000 
Guaraníes per year (about US 750 dollars), which is equivalent to about 69,000 
Guaraníes (138 US dollars) per household member. Although it has to be admitted 
that most of the 'minifundistas' were self-sufficient with respect to staple foods, 
the figures clearly illustrate that incomes were generally too low to make much 
investment in agriculture or to supply daily needs adequately (purchasing milk, 
meat or other 'luxuries', using public transport, making use of educational and 
health facilities etc.). 
An analysis of the relative importance of incomes derived from each of the 
above sources, shows considerable differences. Farm incomes (only 37,000 
Guaraníes on average) were supplemented with agricultural side-activities 
(category 2) in 65% of the cases, the latter providing an additional average 
income of 54,000 Guaraníes. The income which a relatively small number of 
families (17%) had obtained from gifts and pensions averaged 170,000 Guaraníes, or 
almost five times the mean farm income. 
The most important source of cash income for most of the families 
interviewed, however, were the earnings from on-farm jobs in the sphere of 
commerce, service and manufacturing^" and off-farm employment (category 3), 
since these had provided 82% of the families with an average extra income of no 
less than 342,000 Guaraníes per year (nine times the amount derived from 
fanning). Fanning and farm-related activities together provided less than 25% of 
the total family income, gifts, pensions, and non-agricultural activities being of 
much greater importance. This means that most 'minifundistas' were only partially 
dependent on agriculture for their survival. Farming was still rather important as 
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a source of food and as an occupation, but had clearly lost its importance as a 
source of cash income. Insofar as investments were made in fanning, the money 
required came mainly from other activities. 
The foregoing analysis shows that the households with less than 5 hectares of 
land included in our sample may be divided into two broad categories: 
'minifundistas' who still rely on farming and farmers who depend heavily on other 
income sources. 
It is not unusual to regard on and off-farm employment as a means of 
supplementing farm incomes. Farmers with negative net returns from agriculture, 
in particular, are assumed to have to supplement their income from agriculture 
with additional earnings. The sample data confirm this view. Farmers with a 
negative net farm income (30% of all farmers) are indeed over-represented in on 
and off-farm activities, which provide them with an average income of about 
389,000 Guaraníes. The data further show that the farmers with positive net 
incomes from agriculture (averaging 91,741 Guaraníes) depend less on these kind 
of additional earnings, the remuneration of their on and off-farm jobs being 
relatively low. 
On-farm activities related to farming are found to supplement the income of 
'minifundistas' with the highest earnings from farming, in particular. The selling 
of animals and coconuts, and the production of starch, especially, go together 
with relatively successful farming. The households with lower incomes from 
agriculture, however, are less inclined to make additional earnings from this kind 
of side-activity. This illustrates that semi-agricultural income sources are closely 
linked with agricultural production. In other words, when farmers are unable to 
invest in their farm, production remains low and there are no surpluses to develop 
activities linked to agricultural activity. 
Finally, our analysis shows that most of the families who rely on gifts or 
pensions belong to the category of farmers who have no money income from 
farming and do not make investments in their land. 
Looking at the total income level of the different categories of rural families, 
however, a different picture emerges. Table 26 shows that farmers with negative 
or zero cash incomes from farming have largely been able to counterbalance this 
unfavourable situation. The households with the highest earnings from farming, in 
fact, have relatively low total incomes (363,688 Guaraníes on average), whereas 
the 'minifundistas' with relatively low farm incomes enjoy the highest total 
incomes (387,915 and 369,043 Guaraníes, respectively). Wages derived from non-
agricultural activities, as well as gifts and pensions, which may originally have 
been of secondary importance, now largely compensate the relatively low returns 
from farming. 
The idea that the prosperity of the 'minifundistas' still depends on the income 
derived from farming is therefore no longer correct. The 'besf farmers (i.e. those 
who supplement their farm income with activities indirectly related to 
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agricultural produce), in fact, have lower total incomes than those who have 
succeeded in diversifying their economic base through non-agricultural activities. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the data of the income structure of 
commercial farming families in comparison with that of families who do not intend 
to sell crops. The data show that subsistence fanners who are largely dependent 
on non-agricultural activities, gifts and pensions, have higher total incomes than 
commercial farmers who supplement their farm income mainly from semi-
agricultural activities. The per capita income in the latter households amounts to 
78,940 Guaraníes, while that of families living from subsistence farming combined 
with non-agricultural jobs is 82,392 Guaraníes. In spite of the lower farm income, 
the latter category of households seems to be somewhat better off. 
Table 26: 
Average level and composition of total income (in Guaraníes) 
earned by 'minifundista' households in the Central Region, 
compared with the level of cash income from farming. 
Source of Neg¡ ative cash 
income farm income: 
1. Farming 
% of households 
2. Activities 
related to 
farming 
% of households 
3. Activities 
not related to 
farming 
% of households 
4. Gifts and 
pension 
% of households 
Total family 
income 
Per capita 
income 
Total number 
of families 
-26,480 G 
30 
44,803 G 
62 
389,111 G 
88 
152,285 G 
17 
369.043 G 
78,338 G 
82 
Zero cash 
farm income: 
0 G 
36 
50,137 G 
59 
381,846 G 
80 
189,090 G 
22 
387,915 G 
91,405 G 
98 
Positive cash 
farm income: 
91,741 G 
34 
64,154 G 
75 
257,421 G 
80 
156,000 G 
12 
363,688 G 
71,202 G 
95 
Source: Sample 1986. 
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Photograph 4: 
The production of starch: 
Many studies have stressed the relation between farm size and farm income. Our 
research data also confirm that there is a positive relation, since the 
'minifundistas' with relatively large areas (i.e. those with over 2.5 hectares) had 
an average income from farming of 57,231 Guaraníes, whereas those with farms 
of less than 2.5 hectares earned 16,013 Guaraníes on average (Table 27). 
The foregoing analysis, however, has made clear that these figures tell only 
part of the truth, because the data on total household income clearly show that 
many of the smallest farmers are still better off. They have largely been able to 
compensate their insufficient income from agriculture by tapping other sources of 
income, with the result that their average total per capita income amounts to 
95,932 Guaraníes, which is almost twice as high as that of 'minifundistas' with 
larger areas of land (59,218 Guaraníes). 
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Table 27: 
Average level and composition of tota l income ( in Guaraníes) 
earned by 'minifundista' households in the Central Region, 
compared with farm s i z e . 
Source of 
income 
1. Farming 
% of households 
2. Activities 
related to 
farming 
% of households 
3. Activities 
not related to 
farming 
% of households 
4. Gifts and 
pensions 
% of households 
Total family income 
Per capita income 
Number of families 
Farm size 
2.5 ha and over: 
57,231 G 
78 
66,804 G 
75 
263,010 G 
80 
166,400 G 
9 
322,493 G 
59,218 G 
116 
Farm size 
less than 2.5 ha: 
16,013 G 
55 
42,322 G 
59 
397,774 G 
84 
171,459 G 
23 
411.319 G 
95,932 G 
158 
Source: Sample 1986. 
We may now pass to the question of to what extent these differences in survival 
strategies have been determined by local conditions or spatial characteristics. 
Have 'diagonal responses' been a common reaction of farmers living in the vicinity 
of Asunción (zone 1), whereas the 'minifundistas' in the more remote areas (zone 
2) have mainly had to opt for other survival strategies? 
Our research data on the income composition of 'minifundistas' in the Central 
Region show that a relatively high proportion of households in zone 1 supplement 
their income from agriculture with extra earnings (Table 28). We may conclude, 
therefore, that 'diagonal responses' are indeed characteristic of the environs of 
Asunción. 
Farming is still a source of income for 52% of the population in this area, but 
in zone 2 no less than 71% of the households live from farming. Moreover, farm 
incomes in zone 1 are relatively low. Consequently, additional sources of income 
such as commerce, manufacturing and off-farm employment (category 3) are mainly 
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to be found in zone 1. Simple service activities, however, are equally distributed 
over both parts of the Central Region, since, even in the most isolated areas, 
families need barbers, people who wash or repair clothes etc.. The level of 
incomes derived from these activities not related to farming in zone 1 is 
relatively high, namely 490,776 Guaraníes on average, earned by 87% of the 
families, as against 252,822 Guaraníes and 80% of the households in 'zona 2'. 
The average income derived from activities directly connected with farming 
(category 2) is also generally higher in zone 1 than in zone 2, namely 59,900 
Guaraníes (earned by 71% of the families) and 50,500 Guaraníes (62%), 
respectively. In zone 1 these activities consist mainly of the marketing of dairy 
products (eggs, milk) or gathered products like fruit. In zone 2 there is a slight 
concentration of activities like the selling of livestock (especially cows and 
horses), the processing of products like vegetable oil, charcoal or starch. The 
income generated by these activities, however, is still higher in the area near 
Asunción17. 
With respect to the incomes from gifts and pensions (category 4), intra-
regional differences are quite small, since these account for 18% of the families in 
zone 1 and 16% in zone 2. The average amounts obtained from these sources were 
59,900 Guaraníes and 50,500 Guaraníes, respectively. 
Photograph 5: 
Extracting vegetable oil from leaves of the bitter orange tree. 
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Table 28: 
Average level and composition of total income (in Guaraníes) 
earned by 'minifundista' households in the Central Region, per 
zone. 
Source of 
income 
1. Farming 
% of households 
2. Activities 
related to 
farming 
% of households 
3. Activities 
not related to 
farming 
X of households 
4. Gifts and 
pensions 
X of households 
Total 
family income 
Per capita 
income 
Total number 
of families 
Zone 1: 
25,831 G 
52 
59,900 G 
71 
490,776 G 
87 
202,222 G 
18 
524,395 G 
119,160 G 
98 
Zone 2: 
41,480 G 
71 
50,500 G 
62 
252,822 G 
80 
150,620 G 
16 
290,272 G 
58,930 G 
177 
Central Region 
36,971 G 
64 
54,155 G 
65 
342,318 G 
82 
170,382 G 
17 
373,764 G 
80,410 G 
275 
Source: Sample 1986. 
To sum up, there are some pronounced intra-regional differences in the 
employment structure and the composition of the family income, with striking 
contrasts in the level of prosperity as a consequence. In zone 1, the total family 
income amounts to 524,395 Guaraníes, which is equivalent to 1.8 times the average 
income earned in zone 2. Average per capita income in zone 2 is actually less 
than the half of that in the zone 1 (58,930 Guaraníes and 119,160 Guaraníes, 
respectively). 
What has to be taken into account, however, is that a part of the different 
income levels between the two zones may be explained by the characteristics of 
the population, rather than by differences in spatial characteristics. Our research 
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data on the economically active population show that, although the families in 
zone 2 tend to be somewhat larger'", there is a higher proportion of economically 
active pereons in zone 1. The economically active population represents 44% of 
the total sample population in zone 1, as against 31% in zone 2. This difference 
largely explains why 62% of the working population of the zone 1 consists of 
family members (instead of family heads), whereas the proportion is 52% in zone 
2. 
The average number of working members in zone 1 is 2.2 per family, as 
against 1.7 in zone 2. Consequently, the family income in zone 1 is earned by a 
relatively large number of household members, whereas the inhabitants of zone 2 
are more dependent on the income earned by the head of the family. This seems, 
incidentally, to be in accordance with the earlier conclusion that a relatively 
large share of the population in zone 2 is still seriously engaged in commercial 
farming, the sector which especially employs 'jefes de familia'. 
The fact that a high proportion of the working population in zone 1 consists 
of family members largely explains the relatively high proportion of persons 
working on the farmyard (46% of the total number of workers in zone 1 as 
against 27% in zone 2). It is particularly farm-bound work which can easily be 
done by family members. 
Another reason for the relatively higher level of income in zone 1 may be the 
fact that the inhabitants of zone 1 are relatively older and better educated. In 
zone 1, 24% of the population is over 50 years, whereas the corresponding figure 
for zone 2 is 14%. The superior level of education of the inhabitants of zone 1 is 
illustrated by the fact that 51% of them had completed primary school and some 
had even attended secondary school. In zone 2 the proportion is only 41%. 
Moreover ' o n l / 19% are illiterate, as against 28% of the population interviewed in 
the more remote zone 2. 
Our findings clearly illustrate that rural poverty is to be found mainly in the 
most isolated areas with relatively few opportunities for intensification of 
agricultural land use or earning additional non-farm income. Does the unfavourable 
situation existing in zone 2 mean that it is particularly the inhabitants of this 
part of the Central Region who have been forced to migrate? The following 
section of this chapter will deal with this question. 
3.5 The horizontal response 
It was already shown in Chapter 2 that the highest rate of seasonal and 
permanent outmigration was to be found in the departments of Paraguari, 
Cordillera and Caazapá, because of the relatively small opportunities for 
agricultural intensification and off-farm employment in these relatively isolated 
areas. 
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Our research data show further that 8% of the working population have taken 
advantage of the possibility of temporary migration, most of them for a period of 
less than 2 months of the year. Harvesting all kinds of crops is one of the most 
important sources of seasonal labour. Most temporary labour migrants are family 
heads, probably because farming is still their principal activity, a situation which 
makes them likely persons for combining the two types of work. Those who are 
engaged in other jobs than farming appear to be less inclined to alternate this 
work with temporary migration. 
Table 29: 
Family status and geographical distribution of temporary labour 
migrants in the Central Region. 
Total Family Family 
number heads members Zone 1 Zone 2 
abs abs abs abs abs 
Seasonal 
migrants 41 23 18 8 33 
Total working 
population 522 227 295 220 302 
% 8 10 6 4 11 
Source: Sample 1986 
Table 29 shows that the majority of the temporary migrants originate from zone 
2, which includes the relatively remote and isolated departments of Cordillera, 
Paraguarí and Caazapá. Persons interviewed in zone 1 appeared to be much less 
inclined to temporary migration. 
Most seasonal migrants move to the departments of Itapúa (24%), San Pedro 
(23%) and Caaguazú (20%), where they find employment during short periods as 
'jornaleros' helping with the cotton harvest. As is shown by Table 30 and Map 6, 
seasonal migration is not necessarily restricted to nearby areas. Apart from 
distances, other factors, such as tradition, determine the migrants' destination. 
A much more important type of 'horizontal response', however, is permanent 
outmigration. Attention will be paid within the framework of this chapter only to 
the permanent migration taking place within the Central Region itself, because the 
migration to the colonization areas outside the 'Zona Central' (where land 
resources are still relatively abundant) will be dealt with in Chapter 5. 
In order to obtain an idea of the mobility of 'minifundistas' within the Central 
Region, we studied the migration history of the people included in our sample. 
The data on the year of settlement show a clear relationship between the length 
of residence and the zones concerned (see Table 31). In the immediate environs of 
Asunción (e.g. the Central department) farmers have stayed a relatively long time 
at the same spot, whereas the inhabitants of zone 2 (e.g. Caazapá and Guaira) 
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have been relatively mobile. This difference may be explained by the more 
favourable opportunities for counterbalancing the fragmentation of land with 
'vertical' and 'diagonal' responses, while another factor may be that the tenure 
situation is relatively favourable in zone 1 (see Chapter 2). Moreover, its 
population is older than that of zone 2. 
Table 30: 
Areas of destination of temporary labour migrants from the 
Central Region. 
Area of 
destination Total number 
of migrants: 
abs % 
Originating from: 
Cen- Cordi- Para-
tral Hera guari 
abs abs abs 
Caa-
zapá 
abs 
Guai-
ra 
abs 
Itapúa 
San Pedro 
Caaguazú 
Guaira 
Misiones 
Alto Paraná 
Caazapá 
Canendiyú 
Unknown 
10 
9 
8 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
4 
24 
23 
20 
7 
7 
5 
2 
2 
10 
Total 41 100 11 13 
Source: Sample 1986. 
—* 1 migrant 
Map 6: 
Areas of destination of temporary labour migrants from the Central Region. 
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Table 31: 
Distribution of 'minifundistas' by date of settlement 
present place of residence in the Central Region. 
at the 
Date of 
settlement 
Before 1960 
1961-1970 
1971-1980 
1981-1986 
Unknown 
Total number 
Present 
Cen­
tral 
abs 
34 
60% 
8 
14% 
5 
9% 
9 
16% 
1 
1% 
57 
100% 
% 
35 
15 
8 
15 
100 
place о 
Cord 
f residence 
i- Para-
Hera guari 
abs 
24 
41% 
12 
21% 
14 
24% 
8 
14% 
0 
0% 
58 
100% 
% abs 
25 25 
34% 
23 18 
24% 
22 12 
16% 
13 19 
26% 
0 0 
0% 
74 
100% 
% 
26 
35 
19 
32 
0 
Caa-
zapá 
abs 
7 
18% 
5 
13% 
15 
39% 
12 
30% 
0 
0% 
39 
100% 
% 
7 
10 
23 
20 
0 
Guai 
rá 
abs 
7 
15% 
9 
19% 
19 
40% 
12 
26% 
0 
0% 
47 
100% 
-
% 
7 
17 
29 
20 
0 
Source: sample 1986. 
0 10 20 30'«m 
Map 7: 
Distribution of 'minifundistas' by date of settlement at the present place of 
residence in the Central Region. 
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That there exist differences in mobility between the two zones is also illustrated 
by the extent to which the farmers of both areas have left parcels or acquired 
new ones during the past 10 years. According to our data, 38% and 56% of the 
'minifundistas' of zone 2 left or acquired 'lotes', whereas the proportions were 
only 28% and 44%, respectively, in zone 1. The situation in the area near 
Asunción appears to be more stable in this respect, too. 
In order to discover whether the decision to migrate resulted in the 
'minifundistas' acquiring larger areas of land, we compared the size of the land 
left behind with that of the newly acquired parcels. Only 39% of the families 
interviewed appeared to have improved their situation, whereas 20% now have to 
make do with smaller areas. In other words, in spite of their decision to occupy 
new land at new locations, they had been unable to maintain or improve their 
position''. 
The net result of the attempts to improve their position as users of the land 
has been that the area of the farms of those who moved has increased by 0.16 
hectare. It may be concluded, therefore, that the effects of 'horizontal response' 
have been very small and that the situation of the households involved has 
hardly improved . 
Table 32: 
The effects of migration within the Central Region on farm size 
during the past 10 years. 
Category Central Region: Zone 1: Zone 2: 
of households abs % abs % abs % 
Households who have 
acquired more land 108 39 36 37 72 41 
Households who have 56 20 19 19 37 21 
lost land 
Households without 111 41 43 44 68 38 
changes in farm size 
Total 275 100 98 100 177 100 
Net result + 0.16 ha -0.05 ha + 0.24 ha 
Source: sample 1986 
Table 32 also shows that the attempts to acquire larger areas of land were more 
successful in zone 2, which is less congested than the area near Asunción. In the 
latter area of the Central Region it has become virtually impossible to acquire 
more land. 
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It need hardly be said that the chances of obtaining access to more land within 
the Central Region have deteriorated, particularly in recent years, because of the 
increasing scarcity of this resource. Consequently, the families who moved in the 
1980s have been able to occupy only extremely small plots. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that those who have settled on new land recently, are among the 
smallest fanners in our sample. 
Table 33: 
Places of origin of 'minifundistas' who migrated to and within 
the Central Region. 
Present department of residence: 
Cen- Cordi- Para- Caa- Guai-
tral llera guarí zapa rá 
Department of origin abs % abs % abs % abs % abs % 
Asunción* - - 1 3 1 3 - - - -
San Pedro 1 4 2 6 - - - - - -
Cordillera· 2 θ 32 91 - - - - 1 3 
Guaira" - - - - - - 1 4 26 79 
Caaguazú _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 3 
Caazapá* 1 4 - - - - 2 1 84 3 9 
Itapúa - - - - 1 3 1 4 - -
Misiones - - - - 1 3 - - - -
Paraguari* 1 4 - - 26 84 1 4 - -
Central* 21 81 - - - - - - - -
Neembucú - - - - 1 3 - - - -
Other - - - - 1 3 14 26 
Total 26 17 35 23 31 21 25 17 33 22 
* Central Region 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Almost all migrants have remained within the same department and many of them 
have not even crossed the boundaries of their district, which means that they 
have migrated over extremely short distances. Only 20% of the migrants previously 
lived outside the Central Region. 
To sum up, seasonal and permanent migration occurs especially in the more 
isolated areas with relatively small opportunities for 'vertical' and 'diagonal' 
responses. Because of the congestion already existing within the Central Region, 
however, intra-regional migration has hardly been a means of providing the 
migrants with larger areas of land and so has seldom resulted in agricultural 
modernization or an appreciable increase in prosperity. 
But the opposite may be true with regard to the migration to colonization 
areas situated on the country's periphery. The question of whether this long-
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distance migration to areas outside the Central Region has relieved population 
pressure in the 'Zona Central', stimulated agricultural modernization or provided 
the migrants (and the stayers) with higher incomes will be dealt with in Chapter 
5. 
3.6 Conclusions and suggestions 
In their efforts to offset the negative effects of the small and even decreasing 
size of their farms, most 'minifundistas' of the Central Region have had little 
success in intensifying agricultural production per hectare. With respect to the 
use of their land, they have continued to be a rather homogeneous group of 
farmers who, rather than specializing in commercial crops, nearly all produce food 
crops. Very few of them have intensified their agricultural land use, not even in 
the area with relatively favourable opportunities for 'vertical responses', one of 
the main reasons being the lack of sufficient capital for making appreciable 
investments in their farms. 
'Horizontal responses' to offset the small and diminishing farm size and 
agricultural returns have also been limited in their effect. Except for the most 
remote areas in zone 2, little unused land remains for occupation in most parts of 
the Central Region. 
Migration to agricultural colonies situated outside the Central Region has also 
remained of limited extent, because many 'minifundistas' have preferred to 
counterbalance the lack of sufficient agricultural land with 'diagonal responses'. 
By developing a wide range of additional 'survival strategies', most of which are 
not directly related to agriculture, many 'mmifundistas' have succeeded in 
obtaining higher incomes than can be derived from agriculture. As a result, there 
is no need for those who have managed to find sufficient additional sources of 
income to give up their small and often already impoverished parcels in the 
Central Region. They preferred not to settle in one of the colonization areas 
outside the congested 'Zona Central', since opportunities for finding extra sources 
of income in these zones would be relatively small, not only because of the less 
diversified character of the frontier economy, but also because most of the 
available family labour would be needed for clearing the newly obtained land 
(Chapter 5). Starting a new life as a colonist in the 'middle of nowhere' would 
have meant that most family members would have had to give up their jobs, so 
that family income in the 'colonia' would become almost completely dependent on 
agriculture instead of on a wide range of activities. 
The 'minifundistas' of the Central Region cannot therefore be said to be a 
homogeneous group of farmers who are invariably in need of land and all equally 
interested in leaving their present place of residence for a larger area of land in 
a colonization zone. The majority of the 'minifundistas' have not, in fact, 
106 
considered the acquisition of larger farms as the best solution to their problems, 
since they do not primarily depend on farming, but on a wide variety of other 
sources of income. 
It must be stressed that this variety is not a recent phenomenon. Even in the 
early 1970s, when the possibilities for agricultural colonization were considerably 
greater than at the end of the 1980s, most of the household heads were already 
combining different jobs, while members of the household were also earning 
additional incomes. The relative importance of the off-farm jobs has, however, 
increased with the passage of time21. 
Most of the off-farm activities are nevertheless of a temporary nature and 
very insecure, so that they will not be a solution for survival in the long run. 
One of the major problems in Paraguay has always been that of creating 
sufficient jobs for the rural population for whom no employment can be found in 
the agricultural sector and it must be feared that alternative employment 
opportunities will continue to be scarce in the near future. In spite of this, many 
farmers have already given up their agricultural aspirations, because farming has 
not turned out to be a very lucrative source of income. It is not unlikely that 
many others will follow them in the years to come. 
Even if the 'minifundistas' were provided with larger areas of land within the 
Central Region, agricultural modernization and increasing rural prosperity would 
not automatically materialize. Much depends on the way in which the land is 
going to be used. When they were asked what they would do with an additional 5 
hectares, no less than 72% of the farmers interviewed answered that they would 
probably use it in the same way as their present plot, namely for growing 
subsistence crops. Only 12% replied that they would use it for cash crop 
production (cotton), while 11% answered that they would prefer to sell the extra 
land in 'lotes urbanos'. The majority of these 'speculators' were concentrated in 
the vicinity of Asunción. 
In other words, as long as small farmers are too poor and are insufficiently 
prepared and motivated to make productive investments, the distribution of larger 
areas of land will lead to little fundamental change in their economic position. 
Although the lack of land may have been the initial cause of the present 
problems, farm enlargement is not the automatic key to the solution. 
In order to 'reanimate' the agricultural sector in the 'Zona Central', more 
attention must be paid to the improvement of the land use pattern and marketing 
facilities, rather than continuing to emphasize the need of farm enlargement. 
Improving the road structure22 and marketing facilities would be more adequate 
measures for achieving higher farm incomes, provided the farmers have sufficient 
means to make the necessary investments. Even with the area now available, many 
farmers can increase agricultural production considerably by growing high yielding 
crops" and improving their methods of production, although the small market will 
remain a highly restrictive factor. 
Increasing the productivity of land and labour in order to offset the 
disadvantages of minifundism, requires more sophisticated levels of technology24, 
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new and better tools, seeds, fertilizers and other indispensable inputs, along with 
improvement of the credit facilities. Because only a small minority of the farmers 
will be able to use their own capital, favourable credit facilities must play a 
major role in the development of a more flourishing agricultural sector. Up to 
now, however, many 'minifundistas' have been unable to obtain credit, even 
through the informal circuit of the 'acopladores', so that production has remained 
traditional2^. Apart from improving facilities for ample and 'low-budgef credit, 
the government should try to improve the remuneration of non-agricultural 
employment, thus enabling farmers to pay their 'own' way in carrying out 
agricultural modernization and economic diversification. 
To sum up, insufficient farm size is not the minifundistas' major problem and 
improved farm sizes will not automatically lead to higher family incomes. 
Nevertheless, a number of rural development experts still believe that the 
situation in Paraguay's Central Region will be drastically improved only when 
outmigration is stimulated and more land is given to the farmers. As we have 
shown, however, the majority of the 'minifundistas' are not very motivated to 
settle in one of the colonization areas outside the Central Region. Even if the 
IBR did carry out a radical land reform within the 'Zona Central', agricultural 
modernization and higher income levels might fail to materialize because of 
unchanged production methods and marketing conditions. It is not unlikely that 
more land will lead to nothing more than a slight improvement in the level of 
subsistence. In brief, more land alone will not be the 'deus ex machina'. 
We incidentally do not wish to suggest with these observations that there is 
no need for land reform in the Central Region. The very skewed distribution of 
agricultural land is, in fact, one of the fundamental causes of the region's rural 
poverty. But the problems related to minifundism cannot be successfully eliminated 
by simply offering land in the colonization areas or within the 'Zona Central'. We 
therefore consider it necessary to emphasize that Paraguay's policy of 
colonization is based on the wrong assumption, namely that agricultural 
modernization and rural prosperity are more or less guaranteed as soon as farmers 
have access to sufficient areas of land. Much of the success will ultimately 
depend on the way in which people use the newly acquired land. 
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Chapter 4: 
OCCUPANCY, LEGAL SECURITY AND RURAL PROSPERITY · 
4.1 Introduction 
In addition to the assumption that 'minifundistas' in the Central Region would 
benefit as a homogeneous group from measures aimed at outmigration and less 
unbalanced rural property relationships, the rural development policy also based on 
the assumption that the 'ocupantes1' would be helped by being given a legal 
status. 
The IBR, like many other advocates of tenure regulation, had the idea that, 
apart from insufficient farm size, the persistence of traditional agriculture and 
rural poverty in the Central Region was to be explained primarily by the lack of 
legal security and the consequent lack of motivation of the peasants to make 
investments for conserving or even improving soil fertility and raising agricultural 
production. In other words, they assumed that legal security based on full land-
ownership would help to stabilize agricultural enterprise and raise the level of 
investment. In the National Plan for 1977-1981 the advantages of land-ownership 
are described in the following words: 
"..el ser propietario de la tierra que cultiva ha sido el desideratum de todo 
agricultor Paraguayo, pues ello confiere la sensación de seguridad al 
productor constituyendo la base de estabilidad de la familia rural y es el 
primer elemento indicador del nivel social de las mismas.." (Ministerio de 
Agricultura y Ganadería 1976 B-E). 
To improve the position of the 'ocupantes', the IBR developed a special 'programa 
de titulización'. Informal occupiers could become full land-owners by filling out an 
official application form at the IBR office in Asunción and paying off their parcel 
in instalments. Having acquired title deeds, agricultural development and increased 
prosperity were expected to follow. 
After more than 25 years of rural development policy, the tenure situation in 
the Central Region has indeed improved (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, many 
'minifundistas' still have no legal property titles to their land, but remain 
'ocupantes'. This is illustrated, for example, by the fact that no less than 50% of 
the 445 plots of land worked by the 'minifundistas' included in our sample were 
still held on the basis of simple occupation. Only 34% of the 'lotes' were legally 
owned and 15% were rented2. Insofar as changes in the land tenure situation have 
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occurred, they have primarily benefitted the farmers in the area near Asunción. In 
this zone 53% of the 142 plots worked by 'minifundistas' were legally owned, 
whereas the figure was only 26% of the plots in 'zona 2'. 
In devising a 'programa de titulización', the IBR started from a number of 
assumptions. First, it assumed that legalization did not need to be promoted, 
because most 'ocupantes' would be so interested in becoming full owners of their 
land that they themselves would immediately take the first steps to legalize their 
status. Secondly, the IBR regarded the 'ocupantes' as a homogeneous group of 
farmers, who all had to cope with insecurity and would therefore be anxious for 
legalization. It did not therefore distinguish between subgroups. Thirdly, it 
assumed that legalization would have a positive impact on agricultural 
modernization and the prosperity level of the rural population involved. As land-
owners, the former 'ocupantes' would be more inclined to make investments in 
their farms, and this would automatically lead to increased production and higher 
income levels. 
Since a high proportion of the 'ocupantes' have never availed themselves of the 
opportunities offered by the 'programa de titulización' and still have an illegal, or 
at least an informal status, it may be asked what factors are responsible for this 
situation. Is the persistence of occupation the result of the inadequate and slow 
implementation of the government measures and of the intricacy of the 
procedural steps to be taken, or have many farmers preferred to remain occupiers 
because the acquisitions of title deeds offered few advantages in terms of 
security? These two questions will be dealt with in the second and third parts of 
this chapter (4.2 and 4.3), while attention will be paid in the fourth and fifth 
sections to the question of whether legalization, land security, agricultural 
modernization and increasing rural prosperity do indeed go together in the Central 
Region (4.4 and 4.5). 
4.2 Procedures and regulations as causes of persisting 
occupation 
One of the reasons why only a small number of the 'minifundistas' included in our 
sample have benefitted from the legalization programme is the intricacy of the 
procedure for becoming a legal land-owner. 
The 'programa de titulización' starts from the idea that the initiative to achieve 
legalization has to be taken by the 'ocupantes'. The IBR has therefore never 
launched an active campaign for encouraging farmers to acquire property titles, 
not even in the most isolated areas where the majority of the informal occupiers 
are to be found. The legalization programme was, in fact, hardly a 'programme' in 
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the full sense of the word, since the IBR did not take any measures to encourage 
the fanners to become the legal owners. The farmers who wished to become 
owners of their land had to go to Asunción and start the procedure themselves. 
Because individual initiatives rather than government action played a decisive 
part, it is not surprising that it is particularly the inhabitants in the area near 
Asunción who have improved their legal position. 
The legalization procedure requires a considerable amount of money, because 
farmers who wish to acquire title deeds have to enlist a lawyer's services for 
preparing a draft deed and consulting the register of landed property in Asunción 
in order to check that the land is not already owned by somebody else^. Having 
verified that the land does not belong to somebody else, the lawyer's request 
together with information about the transaction, the applicant involved and his 
personal particulars, are passed on to a notary. Because there is no register of 
real property, the lawyer also adds an official description of the exact 
geographical location, boundaries and other essential characteristics of the parcel. 
The notary then prepares the deed on the basis of the lawyer's draft, after which 
it is sent to various taxation agencies and the municipality. Finally, the notary 
requests and receives a certificate from the registrar of landed properties stating 
that the land may be transferred. After this document has been sent to the 
'registro de propiedad', the title becomes definitive. 
Lawyers will generally charge 30% of the real value of the property and there 
are also costs for transfer and title registration, plus those of travelling and 
staying in the capital. Expenses are high relative to the value of the land. It is 
therefore not surprising that many occupiers, especially those of small areas of 
land, have not been able to become the legal owners. 
Another reason for the persistence of occupancy is that many farmers know 
that definitive titles to the land do not guarantee complete certainty as long as 
there is no modem register of real property. When other persons are able to 
prove satisfactorily that they have older rights than the 'new owner', the title 
will cease to be valid and the document will become worthless. Moreover, they 
know that most earlier land divisions have never been registered accurately, if at 
all, so that the exact delimitation of properties is now a complicated matter. 
Many property boundaries have become extremely vague and debatable. 
It should further be mentioned that the law of succession also encourages 
informal occupation. In principle, the granting of land titles is only a temporary 
legalization. When the owner dies, his heirs become 'ocupante'. They will have to 
go to Asunción and go through the whole procedure again (Figure 7) in order to 
have the land transferred in their own names. Properties are therefore frequently 
not formally divided by their heirs, especially if they wish to avoid costs or when 
the size of the inherited land is already so small that further fragmentation is 
hardly feasible. 
That the division of the land into (un)equal and yet smaller pieces is 
stimulated by inheritance laws, often without any appreciable advantage to the 
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heirs, may be further illustrated by the following example taken from the archives 
of a lawyer in Asunción. 
After the death of their father (1985), the legal heirs went to Asunción in 
order to arrange the transfer of property rights on 5 hectares of land in 
Escobar (Cordillera). The testator had only two sons, which meant that each 
of them would inherit 2.5 hectares. One of the sons, however, had already 
died, so that the land had to be divided into four parcels instead of two; 
the living son inherited 2.5 hectares, while the other half was equally 
distributed between the widow and the two children of his brother, each of 
them receiving 0.8 hectare. The two children, who both lived in Asunción, 
decided to sell their part as 'lote urbano', which meant that the family in 
Escobar lost 1.6 hectare. 
The example shows that the family who formerly shared the 5 hectares had to 
make do with 3.4 hectares after division, one share even being less than 1 
hectare. It is not surprising, therefore, that in such cases many heirs do not wish 
to take the trouble to go to Asunción for arranging the legal transfer. They 
have to spend a large sum of money for the sake of only a tiny parcel of land. 
The heirs in the case mentioned, for example, had to pay a total sum of 400,000 
Guaraníes (about 800 US dollars in 1986). About 10,000 Guaraníes had to be spent 
on the purchase of certificates from the 'Registro Civil' and an official copy of 
the title entered in the 'Registro Publico', but most of the costs were incurred in 
putting the land title in the inheritors' names, which requires a document issued 
by a court or by a lawyer with official authorization. 
The complexity of the official procedures and their high costs explain why the 
overwhelming majority of the inheritances have remained unrecorded. It is much 
easier for inheritors to make an informal agreement with the other relatives about 
what will be each one's rights instead of settling them by law. In this way there 
is no rightful owner of the property, which may have the advantage that nobody 
runs the risk of being excluded, as sometimes happens when only some of the 
heirs take the necessary steps to transfer property rights, so that only they 
acquire official title deeds. 
Another reason why many heirs prefer to settle the inheritance in an informal 
way is that the official procedures are time-consuming, as well as expensive. 
Official arrangements generally take more than half a year, but often more time 
is needed. The case given in the example was closed on May 31st 1986, which 
meant that the whole procedure had taken over one year and a half. 
The regulations laid down in the Agrarian Statute with respect to the elimination 
of minifundism may also be held responsible for the fact that the large majority 
of the 'ocupantes' have not yet become the legal owners of the land. Under these 
regulations, farms should have a size of at least 2 hectares in suburban zones 
and of 7 hectares in rural areas to be viable agricultural units. It needs hardly be 
said that most of the holdings of the 'minifundistas' do not meet these conditions. 
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In the long-settled Central Region most plots have become quite small and 
irrationally shaped as a result of repeated subdivision in accordance with local 
customs and official inheritance laws. According to these customs, many parcels 
have been divided lengthwise, in order to guarantee all their users access by 
roads or waterways, so that they have become narrower and narrower, sometimes 
to such an extent that they hardly can be used rationally, either for commercial 
production or for subsistence agriculture4. The granting of land titles to these 
minifundia or even microfundia would mean that the IBR was formally tolerating 
and even encouraging minifundism instead of trying to eliminate it. Many 
'minifundistas' expected that their request to become owners of their land would 
therefore not be accepted. 
Figure 7: 
The difficult path to acquiring legal land titles. 
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Finally, complicated expropriation procedures have also contributed to the 
persistence of informal occupation. According to law 622 of 1960 and law 854 of 
1963 (see Chapter 1), private land was to be sold by its owner to squatters living 
on it, provided that they have occupied the land permanently and in good faith 
for at least 20 years. 
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A similar obligation is laid down in the Civil Code, which literally says that the 
person who acquires real estate in good and just faith can acquire a property 
title by possessing the land continuously for a period of 10 years if the true 
owner lives in the department where the property is situated, otherwise for 20 
years if the true owner lives outside the province (Civil Code, sections 3948, 
3999^). During this period, the possessor must have been unmolested by the 
owner, his occupancy must be continuous and there must not have been any 
arrangement with the rightful owner for any consideration of the squatter's 
occupancy (Civil Code, section 4015). 
In spite of the fact that most squatters have, indeed, occupied their parcels 
without interruption during the required period of time and so possess the right 
to claim a land title, many of them have still failed to take the necessary steps 
to acquire title deeds. In view of the difficulties which frequently arise with the 
expropriation of privately owned land, one may say that only the occupiers of 
'tierra fiscal' have a relatively good chance of becoming the owners of their land. 
Most 'private' 'latifundistas' have managed to prevent the application of the 
regulations, so that, as long as properties are not being considered for 
expropriation, occupiers have absolutely no chance of owning them. 
To illustrate the difficulties which may arise in connection with the 
expropriation of private property, we may cite the example of Tobati (department 
of Cordillera). In this village, a group of 108 'ocupantes' of privately owned land 
wished to be considered for legal property titles, since they had occupied the 
land in good faith for more than 20 years and therefore met the conditions laid 
down in the law. 
On November 8th 1983, a group of occupiers of privately owned land in 
Tobati decided to go to the IBR office in Asunción in order to request the 
expropriation of the land and its redistribution. The IBR started 
negotiations with the legal owner, but he refused to sell his land. The 
occupiers appealed against the refusal and were molested. Unknown 
intruders, probably hired by the land-owner, started to cut down trees and 
start fires. After three months, however, the owner became more willing to 
sell the land, provided that he could get the price he wished. Since this 
was extremely high, the occupiers did not agree with his conditions and, 
again, the IBR tried to play a mediating role. The decision to expropriate 
was delayed, because the spokesman of the 'ocupantes' had not sufficiently 
proved the exact duration of Occupation in good faith' and specified the 
exact number of farmers who wished to be eligible for legal land titles. 
Then the roads of Tobati were blocked. Military police hindered the 
spokesman in Asunción in fulfilling his task by preventing him from seeing 
his 'clients'. The next day his car was impounded. 
After a long period of further negotiations, over a year after the date of 
the request, the IBR decided to expropriate the land and establish a 
'colonia agrícola-granjera' of more than 4,500 hectares. The land was 
divided into equal parcels and, on January 1st, 1985, the first 'lote' was 
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sold. Only 59 of the 108 occupiers, however, became legal owners of their 
land, since the others preferred to remain 'ocupante' or decided to move to 
other areas. Along with the legalization procedures set in train for the 'old 
inhabitants', a group of 28 new- squatters had arrived and settled at the 
margins of the colony (Archives of the Conferencia Episcopal Paraguaya)". 
The example of Tobati is fairly representative of the difficulties which arise in 
cases of expropriation and redistribution of privately owned land. As soon as the 
IBR initiates a legalization programme and draws up the 'plan de loteamiento', 
there are found occupiers who are unable or unwilling to pay for the property 
titles, while at the same time other squatters are attracted by the IBR activities. 
The poorest farmers, in particular, will be forced to move. The legalization 
programme appears to increase social disparities, because it tends to divide the 
occupiers into two different groups: those who manage to become the legal owners 
of their land and those who voluntarily or involuntarily retain the status of 
informal 'ocupantes'. The latter group runs the risk of being eventually expelled. 
Instead of improving the situation for the whole group, the 'programa' may in 
practice undermine social homogeneity and unity of the 'ocupantes'. 
4.3 Other causes of persisting occupation 
Besides the procedural and formal obstacles to legalization, another explanation 
for the relatively large number of fanners without property titles is that many of 
them are insufficiently interested in acquiring the documents. 
'Ocupantes' have so far been presented as a homogeneous group of farmers 
who run the risk of being expelled from their land, especially when congestion 
increases. We implicitly assumed a positive relationship between full land-
ownership and legal security and assumed that the negative effects of rural over-
population would be most dramatic in areas with large concentrations of informal 
occupiers. There, it was mainly the farmers without legal rights to their land who 
were assumed to be a threatened group unless their tenancy was changed. But 
how far can the 'ocupantes' really be considered a homogeneous group of farmers 
whose problems can be solved by a simple government programme? This question 
will be dealt with in this section of the chapter. 
A closer examination of the group of interviewed farmers with the status of 
'ocupantes', shows that 89% of them live on land owned by some relative. The 
position of this group of 'ocupantes familiares' is relatively secure, which means 
that occupation and insecurity do not necessarily go together under all 
circumstances. Legalization procedures might, of course, improve their position, 
but the problem is that these occupiers will not be able to become the owners of 
the parcels they now occupy, because the land already belongs to somebody else 
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whose property is not eligible for expropriation. In other words, many 'ocupantes 
familiares' will be able to exchange their status of informal user for that of legal 
owner only by moving elsewhere and occupying other plots of land. 
Moreover, occupiers who live on land owned by private individuals or the state 
(11%) do not directly run the risk of being expelled from it. Most of them have 
made verbal agreements with the owners of the land they use and are more or 
less protected by Law 622, which says that, after 20 years of occupation, use 
rights may be converted into property rights. Because most of the 'ocupantes' 
have already been living on the land for several decades, they cannot be expelled 
legally. As was stated in Chapter 3, 35% of the 'minifundistas' interviewed have 
been occupying their 'lote' since 1960 or even before (see Table 31). As long as 
the status of 'ocupante' and the risk of expulsion do not necessarily go hand in 
hand, many 'minifundistas' believe that, rather than contributing to greater legal 
security, the acquisition of land titles involves unnecessary costs. 
We may conclude, therefore, that, with respect to the Central Region where 
the land has been used for generations, the necessity for a legalization programme 
has been exaggerated. A relatively large number of 'ocupantes' will not be 
motivated to become the legal owner, but are 'locked up' or content with their 
informal status and informal agreements. 
Another reason why a considerable proportion of the squatters have not yet 
applied for property titles is that many of them are still unaware of their 
informal, or illegal status. Many occupiers have written buying and selling 
agreements from local people without legal value, which they consider as their 
official 'título de propiedad'. Although these documents may give the farmers 
some security, these are no legal proofs as long as land transfers are not entered 
in the property register. It goes without saying that occupiers who are not aware 
of the legal invalidity of their documents cannot be expected to spontaneously 
take the initiative of going to the IBR office to take the final steps. 
Even where farmers know that they are occupiers of the land, many of them 
are unacquainted with the law and their rights as 'ocupante', while the high costs 
of acquiring title deeds also play a prohibitive role. As a result, many users of 
private land remain squatters and do not seem to worry. 
A final reason why many squatters are hardly interested in acquiring a legal 
status is the fact that informal occupiers do not need to pay taxes. This explains 
why only 11% of the farmers interviewed answered that they had been paying 
taxes in 1985-1986 (21,410 Guaraníes on average). 
When they were asked why they had not yet become the legal owner of the land, 
12% of the occupiers included in our sample answered that they lacked the money 
to take the necessary step» or did not see any appreciable advantage. 14% of 
them were unfamiliar with the procedures and were still passively waiting for 
action by the IBR. The large majority of the occupiers (72%), however, responded 
that they had occupied land already owned by others, whose property was not 
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eligible for expropriation. This group never expected to become land-owners, 
unless they settled on new land in one of the colonization areas. 
4.4 Property titles and the stability of the situation 
A very common idea is that it is especially squatters who move from one place to 
another after a few years, because of insecurity and pressure from land-owners. 
To quote Hill (1960, p.10): They have no assurance that they will not be evicted 
before they have fulfilled the residence requirements of 20 years to become 
eligible to purchase the land they occupy1. 
In reality, however, the occupiers in the Central Region do not seem to be 
more mobile than other groups of farmers, including those with legal property 
titles. Even the opposite tends to be true. Land-owners and tenants appear to 
have disposed of land more frequently than 'ocupantes'. This may be illustrated by 
the fact that of the 110 parcels of land (farms or parts of farms) disposed of by 
the 'minifundistas' in our sample in the period 1976-1986, 35% were legally owned 
and 18% rented. Not more than 47% of the plots were in the hands of 'ocupantes'. 
In other words, not only occupiers, but also a large proportion of land-owners 
and tenants have moved and disposed of land, which means that the idea that 
land titles or good tenancy regulations contribute to a more stable situation is 
not confirmed by what has occurred in the Central Region. 
In the period up to 1980, in particular, a relatively large number of the plots 
were disposed of by legal owners (39%) who had decided to sell their farms or 
parts of them. One of the main reasons is that the government's effort to grant 
land titles to the 'ocupantes' has initiated a rapid process of land speculation, 
especially in the area surrounding Asunción. When farmers become the legal 
owners of their parcels, they find it more attractive to sell the land in 'lotes 
urbanos'. Thus, legalization procedures and the granting of property titles do not 
necessarily keep the fanners on their land. On the contrary, property titles may 
increase the market value and encourage land transactions. 
Official land sales by legal owners have declined since the beginning of the 1980s, 
while, however, increasing numbers of tenants and occupiers have disposed of 
their parcels. Contrary to the view that this mobility is a reflection of a deficient 
tenure situation, our figures show that insecurity or even outright expulsion have 
not been an important force behind the mobility of these farmers. Growing 
population pressure seems to be a more adequate explanation than crude expulsion, 
which can be illustrated by the fact that 46% of the parcels they left passed 
into the hands of family members or relatives who remained behind. Population 
growth and land fragmentation seem to have a greater effect on the mobility of 
the population than the lack of title deeds. This means that peasants move in 
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order to find more room for themselves and improve the situation for those who 
stay behind. Such processes will not be stopped by land legalization. 
Analysis of the net result of 'land exchange' within the Central Region shows 
that the tenure form of the newly acquired parcels is less favourable than of the 
plots disposed of. No less than 56% of those who acquired parcels have simply 
occupied new land in other places and consequently assumed the status of 
'ocupante', whereas the corresponding proportion was 'onl/ 47% of the parcels 
left behind. Only 20% became tenants of the new land while 24% became the legal 
owners. After 1981, in particular, an increasing number of the farmers who have 
moved have been forced to occupy (or rent) land instead of being able to buy it. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that most of those who now are owners of the 
land, acquired their parcel in the preceding period. This illustrates that, with 
increasing land scarcity, informal occupation (and renting) are becoming more 
common ways of obtaining new parcels. 
In contrast to the parcels left, which generally passed into the hands of family 
members or relatives who had stayed behind, most of the newly acquired land is 
taken over from unknown people and neighbours. No less than 39% of the new 
parcels were acquired from strangers, indicating that the 'security of the land' of 
many occupiers has declined in comparison with their former situation. In recent 
years, however, the takeover of land from family members, i.e. 'family 
occupation', has become more important. 
Table 34: 
Tenure characteristics of the land disposed of by 
'minifundistas', 1976-1986. 
Form of 
Tenure 
Owned 
Rented 
Occupied 
Unknown 
Total 
Tota 
of ρ 
abs 
151 
65 
224 
5 
445 
1 number 
arcels: 
% 
34 
15 
50 
1 
100 
Parce 
dispc 
abs 
39 
20 
51 
0 
110 
ils 
ised of: 
% 
35 
18 
47 
0 
100 
D 
1976 
abs 
16 
6 
19 
0 
41 
isposed 
-1980 
% 
39 
15 
46 
0 
100 
of ir 
1981-
abs 
23 
14 
32 
0 
69 
I: 
•1986 
% 
33 
20 
47 
0 
100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Since the majority of the farmers without property titles are to be found in zone 
2, it may be asked whether developments in this part of the Central Region have 
been different from those in zone 1, in which a higher proportion of the farming 
population are owners of their land. According to our research data, differences 
do indeed exist. 
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Table 35: 
Presen.t users of the land disposed of by 'minifundistas', 1976-
1986. 
Present 
users 
Family members/relatives 
Neighbouring farmers 
Unknown persons 
Unknown 
1976-
abs 
19 
8 
12 
2 
-1980 
X 
46 
20 
29 
5 
Disposed 
1981-
abs 
33 
17 
20 
0 
of in: 
-1986 
% 
46 
25 
30 
0 
1976-
abs 
51 
25 
32 
2 
-1986 
% 
46 
23 
29 
2 
Total 41 100 69 100 110 100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 36: 
Tenure characteristics of the land acquired by 'minifundistas', 
1976-1986. 
Form of 
Tenure 
Owned 
Rented 
Occupied 
Unknown 
Total 
Tota 
of ρ 
abs 
151 
65 
224 
5 
445 
1 number 
arcels: 
X 
34 
15 
50 
1 
100 
Acquired 
parce 
abs 
49 
42 
115 
0 
206 
ils: 
X 
24 
20 
56 
0 
100 
1976-
abs 
20 
10 
35 
0 
65 
Acquir 
-1980 
X 
31 
15 
54 
0 
100 
ed in: 
1981-
abs 
29 
32 
80 
0 
141 
-1986 
X 
20 
23 
57 
0 
100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 37: 
Former users of the land acquired by 'minifundistas', 1976-1986. 
Former Acquired in: 
users 1976-1980 1981-1986 1976-1986 
abs X abs X abs X 
Family members/relatives 26 
Neighbouring farmers 8 
Unknown persons 27 
Unknown 4 
Total 65 100 141 100 206 100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
40 
12 
42 
6 
59 
21 
52 
9 
42 
15 
37 
6 
85 
29 
79 
13 
41 
14 
39 
6 
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75% of the plots disposed of in zone 1 were owned or rented, compared with 
only 43% in zone 2. 47% of the plots sold in zone 1 came into the hands of 
unknown people as against 19% in zone 2, which may be an indication of the 
tendency that, especially in the immediate surroundings of Asunción, fanners are 
selling their land to urban residents. In zone 2, where farmers are more inclined 
to acquire and dispose of land, most persons who moved were 'ocupantes' before 
they left (57% as against 25% in zone 1) and have also resettled elsewhere still 
without acquiring property rights. Most of them disposed of their land voluntarily 
in order to make room for relatives who stayed behind (55% as against 28% in 
zone 1), rather than leaving the land to unknown users. 
As for the newly acquired land, renting or official purchase are also more 
common ways of obtaining it in zone 1 than in zone 2 (59% as against 39%, 
respectively). In zone 2 most land has been acquired by simple occupation (61% as 
against 41% in zone 1), which illustrates that unexploited land is more abundant 
in the more remote areas. Occupation is still a more important way of obtaining 
land than official purchase or renting in zone 2. 
Table 38: 
Tenure characteristics of the land disposed of by 'minifundistas' 
in zones 1 and 2, 197Θ-1Θ86. 
Form of 
tenure 
Owned 
Rented 
Occupied 
Total 
Disposed 
Zone 1 
abs 
19 
8 
9 
36 
of ІП: 
% 
53 
22 
25 
100 
Zone 2 
abs 
20 
12 
42 
74 
% 
27 
16 
57 
100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 39: 
Present users of the land disposed of by 'minifundistas' in zones 
1 and 2, 1976-1986. 
Present 
users Zone 
abs 
1 
Dispos 
% 
ed of in: 
Zone 
abs 
2 
% 
Family members/relatives 
Neighbouring farmers 
Unknown persons 
Unknown 
10 
8 
17 
1 
28 
22 
47 
3 
41 
17 
14 
2 
55 
23 
19 
3 
Total 36 100 74 100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
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Table 40: 
Tenure characteristics of the land acquired by 'minifundistas' in 
zones 1 and 2, 1976-1986. 
Form of 
tenure 
Owned 
Rented 
Occupied 
Total 
Zone 1 
abs 
19 
13 
22 
54 
Acquir 
% 
35 
24 
41 
100 
ed in: 
Zone 2 
abs 
32 
28 
93 
153 
% 
21 
18 
61 
100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 41: 
Former users of the land acquired by 'minifundistas' in zones 1 
and 2, 1976-1986. 
Former 
users 
Family members/ relatives 
Neighbouring farmers 
Unknown persons 
Unknown 
Total 
Zone 1 
abs 
24 
3 
26 
1 
54 
Acquired 
X 
44 
6 
48 
2 
100 
ІП: 
Zone 
abs 
61 
26 
61 
5 
153 
2 
% 
40 
17 
40 
3 
100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
To sum up the first section of this chapter, it may be said that the 'programa de 
titulización' has not solved the Central Region's problem of illegal or informal 
occupation. On the one hand, this must be explained by the passive approach of 
the IBR to the elimination of this problem and by the complicated and expensive 
official procedures for becoming a legal land-owner. On the other hand, it must 
also be stressed that the 'ocupantes' were not a completely homogeneous group 
and the advantages and disadvantages of their informal status varied considerably. 
Some of them were very interested in becoming legal land-owners and others were 
not. Some of them were 'ocupantes de hecho', which means that they had been 
living on the land for 20 years or more uninterruptedly and in good faith, while 
others were occupying the land of family members or relatives. Both groups, but 
especially the latter, are not in immediate danger of being expelled from the land. 
The category of 'ocupantes' who may be most threatened with expulsion is that of 
fanners who have recently settled on land in the hands of unknown private land-
owners, as is increasingly happening in zone 2. 
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The IBR, however, seems to have been insufficiently aware of these differences, 
since it has not actively concentrated on giving land rights to the last category. 
Nor has it tried especially to grant land titles to farmers whose livelihood still 
largely depends on agriculture and who have only one plot of informally occupied 
land at their disposal. In practice, titles have also been granted to non-farmers, 
even if the latter were already the legal owners of several other plots of land. 
4.5 Property titles, agricultural modernization and rural 
prosperity 
In the view of the IBR, security of tenure is one of the basic conditions for 
modem agricultural production. When farmers have little security with respect to 
land rights and do not know whether they will reap the fruits of their efforts to 
intensify land use, they will have little incentive to make investments for 
conserving or improving soil fertility or to take other measures to raise 
agricultural output (Hill I960, p.4). Unfavourable tenure conditions are often even 
considered to be one of the fundamental causes of rural poverty, since they are 
an important obstacle to the process of agricultural modernization. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the IBR assumed that improvements in the tenure 
situation would be one of the most adequate instruments for raising the 
subsistence level of the 'minifundistas'. 
The IBR illustrates the success of the 'programa de titulización' by publishing 
data about the number of property deeds which have been distributed each year 
(Photograph 6). Each new title is presented as an act of justice, as it is a further 
step into the direction of agricultural modernization and higher income levels for 
the rural poor. As has been argued in the previous section of this chapter, 
however, the effects of property legalization will depend on the status farmers 
had before receiving property documents. The question may, therefore, be raised 
of to what extent the granting of land titles is in fact an essential condition for 
further improvement of the agricultural economy and the minifundista's level of 
prosperity. 
In our view, the positive effects of land legalization have been overestimated. 
Even if the procedure were simplified and full property rights did considerably 
improve the security of the farmer's existence, this need not mean that land titles 
will automatically stimulate agricultural modernization or lead to higher levels of 
income. Whether land legalization will in fact result in higher levels of investment 
and the introduction of more remunerative crops and fanning methods will be 
influenced primarily by the survival strategy of the different categories of 
farmers, including their interest in intensifying the use of the agricultural 
holdings. 
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/ Por 1.000.000 de propiedades para 
1.000.000 de propietarios con el Gobierno^ 
Colorado del Presidente Stroessner 
ІЭв^ІЭвЭ
-
 ~ 
Propiedades 
en la 
capital 
114.045 lotes 
Propiedades 
urbanas 
del interior 
413.364 lotes 
Propiedades 
rurales 
328.553 lotes 
INCREMENTOS / I B R 
PLANIFICADOS/ι·.«.ΜΜ··»ιη·« ікл» (198519891 
(12 00C№o . г ото*! л о ™ а _ 
т е * , ітооо 
аттшашашЛт 
ЮЛ38 totas 
Colonización 
privada 
y parcelación 
de propiedades 
mayores 
'25.000 lotes 
Loteamientos 
de 
municipios 
y empresas 
privadas 
'20.000 Iotas 
* 5 000 lotes por año por 5 años '4.000 lotes por año por 5 años 
Propiedades existentes 
empadronados por 
Імрімйо Inmobiliario 
(1984) 
855.962* 
Propiedades a titularse 
1985-1989 
144.038 
£Μί·*,Ι9*ΖΕ^: і~ 
Total a titularse para el año 1989 
^ ¿ · ! · · · JJ*£Z¿M± 
de propiedades 
El bienettar rural se consolida reipaldarvdo la 
capacidad productiva del hombre del campo, 
con el acceso a la propiedad de I» tierra, que le 
asegura a él. su familia y a la patna toda, los 
beneficios del progreso 
Cumpliendo con la política de transformar la 
estructura de la tenencia y propiedad de la tie 
rra, que consolida el bienestar del hombre del 
campo mediante el acceso a la tierra propia у, 
cumpliendo con el mandato de la Constitu­
ción Nacional que en su Art 83 establece el 
derecho de toda familia a tener tu hogar en un 
pedazo de tierra propia el Instituto de Bienes 
tar Rural ha lanzado un programa por 
1.000.000 DE PROPIEDADES PARA 
1Л0О.000 DE FELICES PROPiETARIOS EN 
EL PARAGUAY, QUE SERA A L C A N Z A D O 
EN EL AÑO DE 1989 
El 90 % de la producción del algodón, el 
1 0 0 % del tabaco, el 80 % de la soia, bale de 
las exportaciones nacionales, se generan en co-
lonias habilitadas por el IBR El mayor porcen 
taje de la producción de alimentos, materias 
pnmas para U industria nacional ν bienes 
agrícolas exponablet, tienen su origen en la 
tierra propia de los campesinos 
Cada paraguayo en tu tierra propia está con 
tribuyendo con tu producción al progreso y 
ia segundad del pais, s empuje de la revolu-
ción pacifica del coloraditmo con tu ltder el 
Presidente Stroessner 
Cada campesino con su tierra fotalece la de 
mocracia con su participación activa en la 
producción de bienes y con el disfrute de la 
riqueza y la cultura que eleven dia a dia su 
nivel de vida 
La función social de la tierra es cumplida con 
un sentido de desarrollo integral y humano, en 
paz. en libertad y con la alegría ν felicidad pro 
pías de los que con tu i-abajü se hacen forja-
dores de tu propio destino 
INSTITUTO DE BIENESTAR RURAL 
* Propiedades empadronadas por computadora para el pago del Impuesto Inmobiliario. 
Photograph 6. Propaganda about the legalization programme: 
The 'Programa de ІДЮДЮО propiedades' 
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Table 42: 
Land tenure and orientation to commercial or subsistence farming 
by 'minifundistas' of the Central Region. 
Form of 
Tenure 
Legally owned 
Rented 
Occupied 
Unknown 
Total 
All 
farmers: 
abs 
151 
65 
224 
5 
445 
X 
34 
15 
50 
1 
100 
Commercial 
farmers 
abs 
66 
37 
121 
2 
226 
: 
% 
29 
16 
54 
1 
100 
Subsistence 
farmers 
abs 
85 
28 
103 
3 
219 
: 
% 
39 
13 
47 
1 
100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 43: 
The average level and composition of the total cash income (in 
Guaraníes) of 'minifundistas' in the Central Region, by form of 
tenure. 
Source of Predominant form of tenure: 
income Owners Tenants Occupiers 
1. Farming 
% of households 
2. Activities 
related to 
farming 
% of households 
3. Activities 
not related to 
farming 
X of households 
4. Gifts and 
pensions 
X of households 
Total 
family income 
Per capita 
income 
Total number 
of families 
50, 
64, 
422, 
179, 
460, 
98 
513 G 
58 
,987 G 
72 
,816 G 
85 
,111 G 
16 
,675 G 
,982 G 
115 
-13, 
67, 
471, 
329 
584 
113 
454 G 
79 
,545 G 
79 
,142 G 
100 
,333 G 
21 
,214 G 
,222 G 
14 
31,455 G 
70 
41,983 G 
61 
252,035 G 
79 
147,680 G 
18 
275.811 G 
60,330 G 
141 
Source: Sample 1986. 
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Comparing the three groups of farmers, i.e. owners, tenants and occupiers , our 
research shows that there is no direct and strong correlation between the form of 
tenure and the level of farm income. This clearly illustrates that full or partial 
ownership of land does not necessarily lead to higher agricultural returns than 
informal occupancy. Rather than confirming the view that 'legal owners' will be 
inclined to make larger investments in their farms in order to use their land more 
intensively, our research seems to show the opposite. The majority of the farmers 
who have become the owners of their land are subsistence farmers. Only 29% of 
the plots used by commercial farmers were legally owned, as opposed to 39% of 
the parcels of the subsistence farmers. 
This situation appears rather contradictory at first sight. What should be bome 
in mind, however, is that persons who wish to become the legal owner of a piece 
of land have to start a complicated procedure in Asunción by retaining a solicitor 
to consult the property register to check the applicant's rights. This procedure 
will not only take several months, but also costs a lot of money, so that only 
persons with a relatively high income will be able to pay for it. As has been 
shown by our analysis of income levels, however, the lowest incomes are earned 
by those who are still trying to make a living from farming, whereas the earnings 
of the households no longer dependent on farming are considerably higher. 
Consequently, a relatively high proportion of occupiers who use their land only 
for subsistence farming and/or residential purposes are able to acquire definitive 
property titles, while the poorest farmers whose livelihood still depends on 
farming and therefore on adequate access to the land are forced to remain 
behind as simple occupiers. The total average family income of occupiers included 
in our sample (275,811 Guaraníes) clearly remains below that of farmers with the 
status of owners or tenants (460,675 Guaraníes and 584,214 Guaraníes, 
respectively). In other words, as long as the acquisition of legal land titles 
requires considerable expense, the government's 'programa de titulización' seems 
rather to discourage than to attract the farming population. 
Most of the households with sufficient income for the acquisition of legal titles 
have already lost their interest in full-time farming and are not even considering 
concentrating on fanning again. This means that one of the positive effects which 
is usually attributed to legalization policies, namely the possibility of avoiding 
informal money lenders and making use of official credit facilities, will be limited. 
Apart from not being very interested in taking credit for agricultural purposes, 
the majority of the owners will also remain excluded from these facilities because, 
under the criteria of the 'Banco Nacional de Fomento' and other official agencies, 
their parcels will be too small and too poor to make farming activity pay. Thus, 
even many 'interested' owners remain excluded from the credit system. 
The need for agricultural modernization will of course remain especially in those 
areas where farming is still the most important source of income, e.g. the most 
remote areas (zone 2). The majority of the occupiers are to be found in this part 
of the Central Region. But even if the 'programa de titulización' had been 
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directed towards these areas, the new owners would not readily have been able to 
start the production of remunerative crops, because the conditions for marketing 
perishable products are still unfavourable. This again illustrates that the effects 
of land legalization will be greatly influenced by local conditions ('spatial 
characteristics'), and that the 'programa de titulización' will only bring about 
agricultural modernization when combined with such measures as improvement of 
the road network and marketing facilities. Similar conclusions can be drawn with 
respect to land quality. Much of the land held by squatters is rough or poorly 
drained and not well-suited for cultivation. Even if they did become the legal 
owners of the land and make more investments in it, agricultural modernization 
and higher production levels are unlikely to follow. 
4.6 Conclusions and suggestions 
To sum up, although the IBR has enabled occupiers to become land-owners within 
the Central Region, the results of its policy have been disappointing. In order to 
improve the effects of the government's policy of increasing the number of legally 
registered properties, it will be necessary first of all to simplify the procedure 
and reduce its costs. The present 'programa de titulización' seems to be much 
more an 'acto de bureacracía' than an 'acto de justicia'. Apart from this, the 
normalization of the Central Region's occupation relationships should no longer be 
considered as an issue with high priority, since insecurity of tenure is not the 
most important problem with which the 'ocupantes' have to cope. Their decision 
to move to other areas is not primarily influenced by the lack of property titles, 
but much more by population pressure and insufficiency of land. Furthermore, the 
IBR should become more aware of the fact that legalization, agricultural 
modernization and higher income levels not necessarily go together. Those 
farmers who are still dependent on agriculture often lack the necessary money to 
obtain legal titles to the land and consequently remain excluded from official 
credit. Those who have the necessary means to buy property deeds are generally 
no longer living from farming and are thus less interested in documents, credit 
facilities or agricultural modernization. 
Under the present circumstances, the main effect of the legalization 
programme seems to have been that it has changed the legal status of some 
peasants without providing them with larger holdings. The possibilities for 
improving the use of their land remained limited, however, so that most of them 
remained subsistence farmers. 
Instead of creating more favourable conditions for agricultural modernization, 
the further granting of land titles may even encourage peasants to sell their land, 
because the legalization procedure transforms the land into a saleable commodity 
with a certain market value. In the direct vicinity of Asunción, in particular, an 
increasing number of urban inhabitants have bought land from ex-farmers. 
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Although the granting of land titles has not substantially improved the economic 
position of the squatters, nor contributed to a process of rapid agricultural 
modernization, the IBR is likely to continue its 'programa de titulìzación'. We 
would like to recommend, therefore, that it should concentrate its efforts on 
areas where there is much competition for land and where occupancy and 
insecurity still go hand in hand, namely, the areas of recent colonization. More 
attention will be paid to these areas in the following chapter. 
127 
Chapters: 
THE EFFECTS OF COLONIZATION ON THE CENTRAL REGION AND 
LIFE AT THE PIONEER FRONTIER 
5.1 Introduction 
So far, we have evaluated the effects of the rural development policy in relation 
to the Central Region. In spite of the fact that the policy of agricultural 
colonization was aimed at alleviating population pressure and eliminating the 
problems of minifundism and informal occupancy, we concluded that the problems 
have basically remained the same. The 'Zona Central' is as densely populated as 
before, the problem of minifundism has persisted and a relatively large number of 
farmers still do not possess full property titles to the land they work. 
It has been argued that the policy of agricultural colonization has taken 
insufficient account of the fact that the Central Region's rural problems cannot 
be reduced simply to a problem of over-population that can be solved by 
stimulating outmigration. Minifundism is not solely a problem of insufficient land, 
and insecurity is not the main obstacle with which the occupiers have to cope. In 
other words, government policy has been insufficiently aware of the 
multidimensional character of rural problems, the diversity of the minifundista's 
agricultural and non-agricultural survival strategies, and the role of traditional 
land rights, which have made many occupiers less interested in the acquisition of 
full property titles. It is not surprising, therefore, that the various programmes of 
the IBR, i.e. the 'programa de colonización y migración intema', the 'programa de 
'reparcelación' and the 'programa de titulización', have not been successful in 
solving the Central Region's problems or at least reducing them substantially. 
The evaluation of Paraguay's recent rural development policy would be incomplete, 
however, if our analysis were limited solely to the changes which have occurred 
or failed to occur within the Central Region. 
In order to explain why outmigration has done little to reduce congestion in 
the Central Region, an understanding is needed of the characteristics of the 
colonists in general, and of their circumstances of life before departure. In 
addition, knowledge is required of the effects of the rural development policy for 
the farmers who decided to leave and settle on new land in one of the 
agricultural colonies in eastern Paraguay. This movement was mainly spontaneous, 
but partly under direct supervision of the IBR. 
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More specifically, we shall concentrate on the questions of how far the 
persistence of congestion in the 'Zona Central' can be explained by the 
characteristics of the population who left, and to what extent the colonization 
programme has improved the economic position of the pioneers. With respect to 
the latter, we shall concentrate on the question of how far land productivity and 
income levels are higher than in the Central Region and to what extent these are 
determined by farm size and tenure. Have the colonists been able to acquire 
larger areas of land and full property rights and to what extent has their 
'improved access to land' resulted in more modem types of farming and higher 
levels of prosperity? These questions will be dealt with in this chapter. 
To obtain the necessary data, we made use of the information provided by those 
'minifundistas' in the Central Region who told us that they had brothers, sisters, 
children or other relatives who had settled in one of the areas of colonization. 
Because we also wished to have information about pioneer families without 
relatives in the 'Zona Central' and about colonists who left behind relatives with 
more than 5 hectares (who are not included in our sample), we also visited 
Colonia Mallorquín, one of the oldest colonies in the department of Alto Paraná. 
There, we interviewed 20 colonists who had come from the Central Region. This 
chapter is therefore based on both sources of data. 
In the first part, a description will be given of some relevant characteristics of 
the colonists, including their areas of origin and destination (5.2). Attention will 
then be paid to the question of why, despite the outmigration of part of its 
population, the Central Region remained nearly as congested as before (5.3). 
Finally, we shift the scene from the Central Region to the frontier of 
colonization in order to discover to what extent the colonists have benefitted 
from the government's colonization policy (5.4). Has their social and economic 
position become more favourable than it was in the 'Zona Central' and how does 
their level of prosperity compare with that of the farmers who decided not to 
move? 
5.2 Some relevant characteristics of the colonists 
Only 71 or 26% of the families interviewed in the Central Region had relatives 
who had moved to one of the colonization areas, the average per family being 1.5 
colonists. This means that, in the majority of the cases none of the relatives had 
left the Central Region and that the whole family still lived on its small, and 
often impoverished, parcel in the 'Zona Central'. It may further mean that most 
of the farmers who decided to move either left the Central Region with their 
whole family or originated mainly from the group of farmers not included in our 
sample (e.g. those with more than 5 hectares). 
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Those inhabitants who decided to start a pioneer life left the Central Region at 
different periods. Of the total group of 106 colonists included in our sample, 34% 
left the area before 1970, 36% in the period 1971-1980 and the remainder (30%) 
from 1981 to 1986. 
Table 44: 
Areas of origin of the colonists leaving the Central Region, by 
zone and period of departure. 
Number 
of farmers 
Absolute 
% 
Zone 1 
Zone 2 
Total 
106 
100 
Area of origin: 
Zone 1 Zone 2 
14 92 
13 87 
Period 
1963-70 
36 
34 
57% 
30% 
of departure: 
1971-80 1981-86 
38 32 
36 30 
43% 
41% 29% 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 44 also shows that no less than 87% of the colonists originated from zone 
2, particularly the departments of Paraguari and Cordillera^, which have been 
described as areas with relatively high migration rates and limited opportunities 
for vertical and diagonal responses. Most of these colonists were full-time 
farmers at the time of their departure, while the majority of the 'stayers' had 
multiple survival strategies , especially since the 1970s. 
With respect to the areas of destination, the most important factor influencing 
the direction of the migration flow seems to have been the order in which the 
IBR opened up new areas. Whereas, in the first period of colonization, a relatively 
large number of colonists were still able to settle within the Central Region 
(departments of Guaira and Caazapá)^, more recently the majority of colonists 
have had to move to more distant frontiers. According to our data, 90 colonists, 
or 84% of the total, went to areas outside the Central Region, mainly to Caaguazú 
up to 1970, then to the department of Alto Paraná and, finally, mainly to the 
departments of San Pedro, Itapúa and Canendiyú. This means that the colonists 
who left the Central Region more recently had to migrate over longer distances 
than those who moved earlier (see Map 8). 
26% of the colonists who emerged from our sample, are currently living in the 
department of Caaguazú, 23% in Alto Paraná, while 16%, 12% and 7% have gone to 
the departments of San Pedro, Itapúa and Canendiyú, respectively. 
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Table 45: 
Areas of origin of the colonists leaving the Central Region, by 
department and period of departure. 
Department of Area of origin: Period of departure: 
origin Total Zone 1 Zone 2 1963-70 1971-80 1981-86 
Cordillera 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Paraguarí 
Central 
25X 
15X 
22% 
35X 
ЗХ 
42X 
-
-
29X 
29X 
22X 
17X 
25X 
36X 
-
28X 
22X 
ИХ 
28Х 
ИХ 
19Х 
13Х 
34Х 
34Х 
-
28Х 
9Х 
19Х 
44Х 
-
Total 100Х 100Х 100Х 100Х 100Х 100Х 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 46: 
Areas of destination of the colonists leaving the Central 
Region, by department and period of departure. 
Department of 
destination 
Within the 
Central Region: 
Guaira 
Caazapá 
Cordillera 
Paraguari 
Outside the 
Central Region: 
Caaguazú 
Alto Paraná 
San Pedro 
Itapúa 
Canendiyû 
Total 
Total 
of CO 
abs 
7 
7 
1 
1 
28 
24 
17 
13 
β 
106 
number 
lonists: 
X 
7 
7 
1 
1 
26 
23 
16 
12 
7 
100 
1963 
abs 
4 
1 
1 
0 
15 
6 
7 
2 
0 
36 
Period of 
-70 
X 
11 
3 
3 
0 
42 
17 
19 
5 
0 
100 
1971 
abs 
2 
4 
0 
1 
9 
8 
6 
7 
1 
38 
departure: 
-80 
X 
5 
11 
0 
1 
24 
21 
1 
19 
3 
100 
1981-
abs 
1 
2 
0 
0 
4 
10 
4 
4 
7 
32 
-86 
X 
3 
6 
0 
0 
12 
31 
13 
13 
22 
100 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 47: 
Sex and age structure of the colonists leaving the Central 
Region, at time of departure. 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
Average age 
All 
colonists 
71X 
29X 
31 
Area 
Zone 
79X 
21X 
33 
of 
1 
orig: 
Zone 
71X 
29X 
31 
in: 
2 
Period of departure: 
1963-70 1971-80 1981-86 
56X 
44X 
31 
74X 84X 
26X 16X 
35 27 
Source: Sample 1986. 
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Map 8: 
Migration flows from the Central Region to colonization areas in eastern Paraguay 
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A further examination of the persons who have left shows that most of them 
(71%) were male and that the majority migrated at the average age of 31, 60% of 
them being accompanied by their wives and children. 
Before 1971, in particular, a relatively high proportion of the total number of 
colonists were female dependents (44%) following their husbands. More recently, 
however, the number of females has decreased , while, at the same time a 
growing number of single males have become colonists. These changes are not 
surprising. In the course of time, colonization has lost many of the characteristics 
of a hareh pioneer life in the jungle. Instead of having to be accompanied by wife 
and children in order to be able to clear the land, individual colonists may now 
settle on land which has already been occupied and cleared by relatives who 
migrated earlier, or they may try to find a job as 'jornalero' on the land of other 
farmers. This explains why family-based colonization decreased from 72% before 
1971 to only 43% in the period 1981-1986, in favour of individual migration^. 
That the 'pioneering stage' is over and the type of colonists has changed may 
also be concluded from the fact that the average age of those who decided to 
migrate was 27 in the 1980s, whereas it was 31 in the period before 1971. In 
other words, the flow of relatively old persons and family migration have become 
less important compared with the movement of younger, single men. 
5.3 The effect of colonization on decongestion in the Central 
Region: the case of Colonia Dr. J.L. Mallorquín 
In order to gain a better insight into the migration history of the colonists, the 
settlement process and the present situation of the pioneere, we studied the case 
of Colonia Dr. J.L. Mallorquín, which was founded in 1958 and is therefore one of 
the oldest agricultural colonies in Alto Paraná". 
The colony was established on both sides of the international road connecting 
Asunción with Ciudad Presidente Stroessner, at a distance of 260 kilometres from 
the former city and 67 kilometres from the latter. Colonia Mallorquín is 
surrounded by Japanese colonies on the east and north, while in the northwest it 
is bordered by Colonia J.D. Ocampo and on the south by the Rio Monday. 
The area in which Mallorquín was founded was originally covered with 
subtropical forests, its topography is hilly and natural soil fertility is high. Within 
the area of the colony, several soil types can be distinguished, each of which is 
used for specific purposes. The lowlands (flooded during part of the year) are 
mainly suitable for pasture and the growing of rice and horticultural products, 
while the higher lands are used for a variety of other crops. 
A comparison of the original plan with aerial photographs from 1965 and 1976 
shows that colonization has proceeded very slowly. The IBR started to build 
secondary roads from the main axis of colonization (i.e. the international road) 
for further opening up the area and facilitating its colonization. This created a 
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rectilinear pattern, which is also shown by the photographs. In the middle of the 
colony, the IBR planned a 'núcleo urbano' (urban centre) with 'lotes urbanos' of 
0.8 hectare each. The land near the road was distributed in plots of 20 hectares, 
and the remaining area, within 1 kilometre of the main road, in 'lotes' of a 
minimum area of 25 hectares. When it planned the colony, the IBR took little 
account of the topography, the water economy and other physical conditions, with 
the consequence that even areas unsuited for agricultural production, such as 
river beds, were included in the parcels. This deficient way of planning the 
colony clearly proves that the IBR did not carry out sufficient fieldwork before 
preparing the scheme. 
The rectilinear pattern of roads was intended to open up the land, so that the 
colonists, mainly recruited in the Central Region through the 'programa de 
migración interna', could readily clear their own plots. Having deforested the land 
and built their own houses, they were expected to start with the production of 
food crops, but gradually switch to growing commercial crops. 
According to a study of Mallorquín made in 1965 (Gómez Velazquez et al. 
1965), many of the colonists of the new settlement came from Cordillera (26%) 
and Paraguari (19%), which agrees with our research findings. 15% had come from 
the department of Central (including Asunción) and only 4% from Guaira. The 
reason why none of the colonists originated from the department of Caazapá may 
be that this department was still rather thinly populated in the 1960s. The 36% of 
colonists who were bom outside the Central Region came mainly from the 
department of Caaguazú, which was a colonization zone before the frontier moved 
on to the eastern border area. 
In order to obtain an idea of the life of the pioneers who had originated from 
the Central Region, we selected 20 colonists who fulfilled the condition of being 
bom in the Central Region. The selection had to be made by trial and error, 
because the poor registration meant that there was no complete list of 
inhabitants. We tried, nevertheless, to achieve an optimum spatial distribution of 
the sample population . The questionnaire mainly included questions about the 
migrants' socio-economic status in the Central Region before they left, their 
migration history and their present situation. 
55% and 20%, respectively, of the colonists interviewed originated from the 
departments of Paraguari and Cordillera. Although the sample is too small to draw 
real conclusions, it may be assumed that the two departments have remained the 
most important supplier of migrants since 1965 (when the aforementioned study 
on Mallorquín was made). Additionally, 10% of the colonists interviewed came from 
the department of Guaira, 10% from Caazapá and only 5% from Central. 
The generally individualistic character of the settlement process is illustrated 
by the fact that even the farmers who originated from the same area have hardly 
stuck together. None of the colonists interviewed originated from the same villa-
ge. Although the large majority already had acquaintances in the area of destina-
tion, most colonists started their new life relatively independently, settling on the 
land with their families, clearing it with the help of their wives and children and 
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constructing their houses without using the help of relatives, friends or 
neighbours. 
Most of the colonists had arrived in Colonia Mallorquín at the age of 37 and 
were relatively old in comparison with the group of 106 colonists included in our 
sample study in the Central Region. The average size of their family was 4 
persons, and only 3 colonists had come alone. 
In further characterizing the colonists, the first group we may distinguish is 
that of 'first-generation pioneers' who cleared the land in the initial years after 
the establishment of Colonia Mallorquín. In contrast to the widespread idea that 
most of these pioneers were actively recruited by administrators of the IBR, it 
appeared that most of them had arrived in Mallorquín 'by accident'. They had 
encountered 'administradores' on their way to Argentina and Brazil, changed their 
mind and lingered in the colony to clear the land. The great majority of this 
group, however, is said to have already returned to their area of origin or moved 
to newer pioneer areas. Only a small number of them settled on the plot to which 
they were entitled, sent for their families and started to cultivate the land. 
A second group of colonists is formed by those who arrived soon after the 
land had been deforested. Most of them decided to leave the Central Region to 
give their children a better future and officially applied for a plot of 20 or 25 
hectares, which they started to bring into cultivation". 
A third category, to which the majority of the interviewed colonists belong, is 
made up of families who acquired relatively small plots of land by other means 
than official application. They bought the rights to the land, including the 
'mejoras' (improvements), from farmers who needed money to clear and cultivate 
the rest of their holding or to make the necessary payments for acquiring 
property titles and therefore decided to dispose of part of their land. 
A fourth group of settlers, who arrived more recently, consists of peasants 
from older colonization areas, where they settled in the early 1960s. With the 
increasing congestion in areas like Caaguazú, they lost their land or preferred to 
sell it. Others were expelled by the 'programa de titulización', because the IBR 
started to exert pressure some years ago on farmers who settled on the land 
illegally, or at least informally, to leave. Some colonists have also been driven 
from their land by speculators, land thieves or other competitors. Most of them 
are living in the urban centre of Mallorquín and have tried to find employment as 
'jornaleros' (day labourers) rather than acquiring land. Whereas rural off-farm 
activities are only additional sources of income in the Central Region, they have 
become the principal sources for this category of colonists. As was mentioned 
earlier, non-agricultural employment opportunities to supplement the farm income 
are almost non-existent in the middle of nowhere. Since 'jornaleros' are needed 
only during a few months a year and off-farm-employment is very scarce, the 
urban centre of Mallorquín is characterized by a high tum-over of population, so 
that many 'lotes urbanos' have been abandoned and there is still much open space. 
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Photograph 7: 
Aerial photograph of Colonia Mallorquín, 1965. 
Finally, a fifth group of settlers of still more recent origin is that of land 
speculators or persons who have bought land with the intention of settling on it 
if should they ever feel attracted to a 'quiet life' as farmers or when their 
current employment comes to an end. Most of them now live as 'traders' in 
Asunción or Ciudad Presidente Stroessner. A particular subgroup is formed by ex-
constructors of the Itaipú-project who have been able to save considerable 
amounts of money. Some land-owners of this category have let their land 
temporarily to farmers, while others simply do not use it. 
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Photograph 8: 
Aerial photograph of Colonia Mallorquín, 1976. 
The foundation of agricultural colonies like Colonia Mallorquín was intended (1) 
to relieve population pressure in the Central Region, (2) to eliminate the problem 
of minifundism and (3) to improve the tenure situation. The colonization 
opportunities would encourage the 'surplus population' to leave the over-
populated 'Zona Central', enabling both the farmers who preferred to stay and 
those who decided to leave to obtain access to larger areas of land and improve 
their legal position. 
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Photograph 9: 
The settlement scheme of Colonia Mallorquín. 
Since the majority of the inhabitants of Mallorquín do indeed originate from the 
Central Region, it may be asked what kind of farmers decided to leave and what 
were the effects of their departure. 
When they left, the majority of the 20 colonists interviewed were 'purely 
farmers' without any additional jobs, the average size of their farms being 4.4 
hectares". 50% of them were predominantly occupiers of fiscal land (5.2 hectares 
on average), 36% were mainly 'ocupante familiar' (3.4 hectares on average) and 
14% were tenants of small plots of only 2.7 hectares on average. 
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The fact that it was especially 'minifundistas' without any land of their own, i.e. 
tenants and occupiers, who were attracted by the colonization opportunities is in 
accordance with the officially formulated goals and may be judged positively. At 
the same time, however, it implies that the effects of their departure were quite 
modest. They invariably cultivated small parcels, most of which were informally 
occupied, so that little land was made available to the farmers who stayed. 
When the colonists were asked what happened to their farms after departure, 
55% of them replied that family members and relatives had taken over the land, 
30% of the plots had been annexed by neighbours and only 15% of the parcels had 
been left to unknown people, often through the intermediation of land speculators 
from Asunción. None of the parcels had officially been amalgamated with others 
into larger parcels, nor had the new users been provided with property titles. As 
soon as the colonist had left, family members or neighbouring farmers had 
annexed the land by simple occupation, so that the tenure situation remained 
unchanged. 
The example of Mallorquín further illustrates that outmigration has had little 
appreciable effect on the farm size structure in the Central Region. Most landless 
families remained landless, while those families who already had some land were 
sometimes so large and needed so much extra land that a few additional hectares 
handed over by family members or relatives did not help them very much. 
Moreover, because of soil impoverishment, informal tenancy and the lack of 
capital, most 'minifundistas' were unable to improve their situation, even if they 
had acquired more land. The fact that a large part of the population who decided 
to stay behind do not have farming as their principal source of income also 
explains why there is not an automatic connection between farm size and level of 
prosperity. 
Another reason why the effects of outmigration have been disappointing in 
terms of relief of congestion is that a large proportion of the colonists originated 
from areas with relatively low population densities, i.e. zone 2 of the Central 
Region. 
As for the future, the older pioneer zones have already become more or less 
saturated, so that a growing number of colonists will be inclined to leave these 
areas in order to find better opportunities in newer colonization zones. By doing 
so, they will reduce the possibilities for migrants from the Central Region who 
wish to settle in the frontier areas. Since a relatively large number of farmers in 
the Central Region have already preferred other survival strategies to settling on 
new land, the older pioneer areas outside the Central Region may even become 
the main suppliers of new colonists. The view that colonization will contribute 
appreciably to the future relief of congestion in the 'Zona Central' is therefore 
not very realistic. 
Another reason why outmigration from the Central Region is expected to slow 
down is the lack of direct contacts between the colonists and their relatives. 43% 
of the colonists interviewed reported that they had not heard from those they 
left behind for many years. The colonists originating from the relatively isolated 
139 
areas in zone 2, in particular, appeared to have lost contact with their relatives, 
so that chain-migration from the Central Region is unlikely to occur. Even when 
the colonists still maintain contacts with their area of birth (57%), the chance 
that relatives from the Central Region will decide to come is very small. Only 10% 
of the colonists interviewed had been visited by their relatives from the 'Zona 
Central'. For most of them, it is still quite a decision to visit relatives in the 
jungle, so that it is very unlikely that they will decide to become pioneers. Where 
contacts do still exist, it is often the colonists themselves who take the trouble 
to visit their 'tierra de origen', generally once a year. 
5.4 The effects of colonization on farm size, tenure position 
and the level of prosperity in the Central Region 
In this section, we shall consider the assumptions which were formulated about 
the 'minifundistas' who decided to become colonists. They were expected to 
become the legal owners, instead of informal occupiers, of sufficient land to 
modernize agricultural production and raise their income level. But how far have 
the colonists indeed been able to acquire larger farms and land titles, to what 
extent has the improved situation led to more modem and intensive patterns of 
land use and how far have these contributed to higher levels of prosperity, not 
only when compared to the colonists' former situation in the Central Region, but 
also in comparison with the level of those who decided to stay? 
According to the 'minifundistas' we interviewed in the Central Region, only 
76% of all family members and relatives who had decided to settle in one of the 
colonization areas had succeeded in acquiring land. The average size of their 
farms was 14.2 hectares, but those who had left the Central Region in the period 
1981-1986 had acquired only 11.5 hectares on average. The latter figure suggests 
that, with the increasing population density in the colonization areas, the 
competition for land has become more intense. This is also illustrated by the 
growing number of colonists who have not (yet) been able to occupy land. 24% of 
all migrants and no less than 37% of those who had left since 1981 were said to 
have become landless since their departure from the Central Region. Some of them 
had been forced to sell their parcels or had been expelled, while others were 
landless 'jornaleros' from the day of their arrival in the colonization area. 
Focussing more closely on the socio-economic situation of the colonists in Colonia 
Mallorquín, our research shows that almost none of the 'lotes' of the farmers we 
interviewed still had their original size. No less than 23% of the agricultural 
holdings in Mallorquín were under 5 hectares and 5% were even smaller than 0.5 
hectare1" in 1981 (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 1985). According to our 
data, only 2 of the 20 colonists interviewed still had farms of the originally 
established size of 20 or 25 hectares. The majority of the holdings had been 
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subdivided into smaller plots, so that the colonists interviewed in Mallorquín now 
have access to only 9.1 hectares on average. 
Table 48: 
Some characteristics of the colonists leaving the Central 
Region, by area of origin and period of departure. 
Type of Area of origin: Period of departure: 
colonist Total Zone 1 Zone 2 1963-70 1971-80 1981-86 
Colonists 
-with land 
-without land 
Average farm 
size (ha) 
Average area 
of cultivated 
land (ha) 
76% 
24X 
14.2 
5.8 
79% 
21% 
10.9 
4.2 
76% 
24% 
14.8 
5.9 
83% 
17% 
14.8 
4.9 
82% 
18% 
15.5 
8.3 
63% 
37% 
11.5 
4.2 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Table 49: 
Tenure position of the colonists leaving the Central Region and 
acquired land: 
Legal Area of origin: Period of departure: 
status Total Zone 1 Zone 2 1963-70 1971-80 1981-86 
Legal owner 
Still paying off 
Occupier 
Unknown 
42% 
33% 
11% 
14% 
55% 
27% 
9% 
9% 
40% 
34% 
12% 
14% 
50% 
30% 
0% 
20% 
32% 
36% 
16% 
16% 
45% 
35% 
20% 
0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Absolute 81 11 70 30 31 20 
Source: Sample 1986. 
Some colonists had sold parts of their 'lote' in order to have some capital for 
paying off the rest of their holding, reasoning that it was better to be the legal 
owner of 10 hectares than to run the risk of losing the whole farm. Others had 
sold part of their land in order to have some capital for clearing and cultivating 
the rest of it, reasoning that it was better to cultivate a small farm adequately 
than to have a large one without the resources to work it. In other cases, the 
original 'lote' had been subdivided among the children or allocated to two families 
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through an administrative error, so that each family had to make do with parcels 
smaller than the official 'lote colonial' from the day of arrival. 
Apart from the negative effects on farm size structure in Mallorquín described 
above, there is the rather chaotic tenancy situation. According to the agricultural 
census of 1981, only 50% of the agricultural holdings in Mallorquín were legally 
owned and these covered 22,398.8 hectares or 67% of the total area (Ministerio de 
Agricultura y Ganadería 1985). This is comparable with our findings, since only 
40% of the fanners interviewed in Colonia Mallorquín had acquired property titles, 
40% still had the status of 'ocupante11', while an additional 20% rented their 
land. 
Except for veterans of the Chaco War and fathers of families with 7 or more 
minor children, owners who obtained their title free of charge, it was only the 
real pioneers who had settled in the early 1960s who had been able to become 
legal owners, mainly because land prices were still low in the first years after the 
foundation of the colony. The extent to which land prices have gone up may be 
illustrated by the fact that, in 1971, colonists paid 5,000 Guaraníes on average per 
hectare, whereas in 1985 some farmers had to pay as much as 71,000 Guaraníes. 
Since the land has been brought into cultivation and the infrastructure has been 
improved, land prices have been driven up, especially since the arrival of land 
speculators on the scene. Rising land prices have obviously thwarted the efforts 
of a growing number of farmers to become the legal owners of their land. 
The price of land in Colonia Mallorquín was officially fixed at 40,000 
Guaraníes per hectare in 1985 (Resolución 257/1985^), but colonists have paid 
much higher prices in practice. Those colonists, in particular, who could not pay 
at once, but had to pay for their land by instalments, have lost considerable 
amounts of money, because some administrators have left taking the money 
already paid. Many farmers have stopped paying after losing their money several 
times. 
The majority of the recent settlers, however, have not even started to pay the 
first instalments on their land. Many of them have simply acquired the land by 
taking it over from official colonists who were short of money and paying for the 
'mejoras', generally without interference by the IBR. In spite of the fact that, 
officially, all land transfers have to be approved by the IBR, no less than 70% of 
the colonists interviewed had simply taken over pieces of land from other 
farmers, without taking the trouble to register them at the office of the IBR. 
That the more or less chaotic situation in Colonia Mallorquín is not an 
exceptional one, may be illustrated by the fact that only 45% of the total group 
of 106 colonists who left their family members and relatives in the Central Region 
had become the legal owners of their land; the others (55%) were still occupiers. 
33% of them had not even started to pay the instalments on the land, while 
others had not yet paid all the instalments needed to receive their property titles. 
Under the official regulations, the IBR regains the ownership if payments are not 
made on time, but most of the settlers have not yet been evicted. 
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As we have seen, only a small group of colonists have succeeded in acquiring 
property rights to larger areas of land, but it has already been argued in the 
preceding chapter, however, that increased farm size and tenure security do not 
necessarily result in agricultural modernization and rural prosperity. Much depends 
on the use which is made of the land and the role played by farming compared to 
other sources of income. 
Although the colonists have indeed acquired larger areas of land than the 4.4 
hectares, on average, which they left behind in the Central Region, they have 
taken only small areas of land into cultivation. The aerial photographs taken of 
Colonia Mallorquín in 1965 and 1976 (Photos 7 and 8) give a rather good picture 
of the situation. On the 1965 photograph the 'uiban centre', with a post office, 
police station, medical centre, school, church and several roads can be 
distinguished fairly well, but the agricultural plots are still quite vague. 
Nevertheless, Colonia Mallorquín was said to have 1,970 'lotes agrícolas' with a 
total area of 41,549 hectares. The holdings of 20-30 hectares made up 89% of all 
'lotes', the others were smaller (6%) or larger (4%) (Gómez Velazquez et al. 1965). 
In 1970 there were even 2,421 'lotes agrícolas' which covered 44,036 hectares, 
excluding a reserve of 2,000 hectares for various groups of Indians (Resolución 
1970, Directorio 342, IBR). 
Comparing the situation in 1965 with that shown by the 1976 photograph, 
however, we see that still only a part of the land was effectively used. In 1984, 
over 25 years after the colony had been founded, only 1,401 'lotes' with an area 
of 22398.8 hectares, had been taken into exploitation. 39% of this area was used 
for crop farming (8,807.6 hectares), the rest was used mainly as pastures and 
another part was lying fallow or still under forest. 
In order to gain an idea of the causes underlying this fragmentary 
exploitation, we focussed more closely on the land use pattern and methods of 
cultivation of the 20 colonists we interviewed. They cultivated only 3.9 hectares 
of land, which is less than the average of 4.4 hectares they farmed in the Central 
Region. 50% of the colonists interviewed still had an average area of 3.6 hectares 
of land under forest, which illustrates that clearing was making slow progress. 
One reason why most colonists have not been able to cultivate larger areas is 
the lack of sufficient labour. Cheap wage labour was scarce and most farmers abo 
had insufficient money to make use of it, so that nearly all of them had to rely 
completely on family labour. As long as the colonists have not yet cleared their 
own parcels, they will be little inclined to help their neighbours free of charge, 
which means that the 'minga' has failed to develop in most places. 
A second reason for the slow progress made in cultivating the land is the lack 
of sufficient capital. Most colonists arrived as poor 'minifundistas' who were only 
equipped to bring small parcels into exploitation. Insofar as they had owned 
ploughs, oxen or horses before departure, most of them had sold them when they 
left. 
Furthermore, the majority of the colonists have insufficient knowledge of how 
to take larger farms into exploitation. They were used to very small parcels which 
served mainly for growing subsistence crops, and they were less familiar with the 
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production of commercial crops. It is not surprising, therefore, that they were 
inclined to grow the same crops that they had grown in the Central Region, e.g. 
manioc and maize as subsistence crops and cotton as a cash crop, using seeds and 
plants taken from the previous harvest. 
Although most colonists obtained more land, the area used for growing 
subsistence crops has nevertheless declined, because yields per hectare were 
higher than on the impoverished soils of the Central Region. The average area 
under manioc and maize decreased by 0.1 and 0.3 hectare, respectively, but the 
area used for growing beans, groundnuts and sweet potatoes now covers an 
additional area of 0.2 hectare, which may indicate a slight improvement in the 
food situation. In addition, the improved farm size has enabled the colonists to 
increase the area under cotton by an average of 0.7 hectare, but in spite of this 
expansion, the rise in farm income has been disappointing. In comparison with the 
Central Region cotton prices are relatively low, because most of the middlemen 
take into account the higher transport costs when fixing the price per kilo. 
Very few of the colonists we interviewed had diversified or intensified 
agricultural production by growing new crops or using more sophisticated methods 
of production. Because of lack of money, they still concentrate, in fact, on crops 
which require very little investment, especially as many of them have not become 
the owners of their land and are therefore not eligible for official credit. An 
additional bottleneck seems to be that the network of 'acopladores' is still 
relatively underdeveloped in comparison with the Central Region. Moreover, it 
appears to be less easy to obtain credit from middlemen in the colonization areas 
than in the Central Region. In the latter area, the relationships between farmers 
and middlemen have become firmly established over the course of time, giving rise 
to a situation of mutual trust, but in the colonization areas the 'acopladores' are 
more inclined to act as pure businessmen. Another reason why it is rather 
difficult to introduce new crops and change farming methods is that, in most 
colonization areas, the inputs have to be bought in larger quantities than in the 
Central Region, where the commercial sector is attuned to small-scale producers. 
Finally, the production of commercial crop» is further discouraged by the 
relatively isolated position of the colonization area, the inadequate road system 
and the very poor marketing structure. Where the colonists have recently started 
to grow 'new7 crops like peas, onions and other vegetables, they generally grow 
them on small pieces of land. Most of the harvest is for domestic use and the 
surplus is sold at the market in Ciudad Presidente Stroessner. 
To sum up, we may conclude that most colonists live in circumstances comparable 
to those in the Central Region. The fact that they have gained access to more 
land has generally not resulted in agricultural modernization. Crop farming 
patterns and methods of production have largely remained the same. None of the 
colonists interviewed in Mallorquín made use of fertilizers, insecticides or 
pesticides to maintain or improve soil fertility and intensify production per 
hectare. In other words, their methods of production are as traditional as in the 
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'Zona Central'. They are in sharp contrast with the sophisticated production 
methods of a small number of highly specialized and capital-intensive agricultural 
enterprises which have also been established in the frontier areas and have 
concentrated mainly on the cultivation of export crops like soya. These farms 
constitute a growing threat to the small colonists. 
Since agricultural modernization has failed to materialize, it will be obvious that 
the level of prosperity has also remained below expectations. Where the colonists 
have improved their income level in comparison with that in the Central Region, 
this has mainly been the result of the higher soil fertility, rather than because 
they gained access to more land or improved their tenure situation. Because of 
insufficient crop rotation and the limited use of fertilizers, however, higher 
production will not be maintained. Further fragmentation will also reduce farm 
incomes, so that, within a relatively short time, many colonists will have to tap 
as many additional sources of income as their colleagues in the 'Zona Central', 
but these additional sources are still relatively scarce in the colonization areas. 
Where the colonists have managed to supplement their agricultural income with 
on-farm activities, most earnings are derived from selling livestock products 
(meat, milk etc.) or wood. Those colonists with large areas of uncultivated land, 
in particular, are in the rather favourable situation of being able to keep some 
cattle on their land and combine farming with wood-gathering. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the colonists interviewed in Mallorquín owned more 
animals (mainly chickens and cattle) than the 'minifundistas' in the Central 
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Region, where cattle ranching is restricted by the lack of space. The extra 
income from the sale of wood was rather low, since the most valuable species had 
already been sold by the IBR administrators at the time when Mallorquín was 
founded and most of the newly arrived colonists had no idea of reasonable prices 
for timber. 
Rural industries, like the processing of honey, vegetable oils or charcoal have 
scarcely developed, because of the limited regional market and the isolated 
position of the area, and also because, in most cases, all family labour was needed 
to cultivate the land. The majority of the colonists have been 'purely7 farmers 
since the day they settled in Mallorquín. The few colonists who had been able to 
find off-farm employment worked as 'jornalero agrícola' ('changa') or were 
'empleado' (wage labourer) in one of the saw-mills established in the area. 
A comparison of the average income level of the colonists in Mallorquín with that 
of the 'minifundistas' in the Central Region clearly shows that agricultural 
colonization and rural prosperity have not gone together. Families in the Central 
Region with a per capita income of 80,410 Guaraníes a year are still better of 
than the colonist families who earn an average of 66,120 Guaraníes per head, but 
have younger and larger households than the farmers who have stayed behind. The 
farm income of the colonist families is admittedly higher than that in the 'Zona 
Central' (an average of 188,573 Guaraníes as against 60,967 Guaraníes), but the 
'minifundistas' in the latter area have generally been able to supplement their 
lower incomes with higher earnings from on-farm activities and extra off-farm 
labour, and have also received more gifts. In other words, a combination of 
different survival strategies, with each member of the household making his or 
her own contribution to the household income, brings more 'grist to the mill' than 
a life purely based on farming, even though farm size and tenure have improved. 
This is mainly because the great majority of the colonists have been unable to 
bring their new plots into full exploitation and have received very low prices for 
their crops. 
That farm size and tenure are not the most important factors is also 
illustrated by the fact that higher soil fertility was stated to be the most 
important advantage in comparison to the Central Region. None of the colonists 
referred to farm size or title security, not even those who had been successful in 
acquiring property titles to larger parcels of land. The majority of the recent 
settlers (group 4) had even arrived without the expectation of ever getting large 
farms of their own. They had simply settled in the urban centre in the hope of 
having better opportunities to work as 'jornalero agrícola' ('changa') and being 
paid higher wages than they had received in the Central Region or on the older 
frontiers of colonization, reasoning that the 'minga' system had not developed 
and that many colonists would need to hire labour to enlarge the area of 
cultivated land and run the farm. 
The fact that many colonists have not succeeded in greatly increasing their 
prosperity and in clearing considerably larger areas of land for working by 
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modem methods is, incidentally, not the only disappointing result of the 
agricultural colonization policy. Several colonists interviewed in Mallorquín also 
told us somewhat bitterly that the land they had left in the Central Region had 
gone out of agricultural use, because their parents had died and relatives who had 
never wished to leave their 'tierra' had sold the land to brokers in Asunción, 
often without sending a share of money to those who had left. In retrospect, 
some of the colonists conclude that they might have been better off if they had 
never decided to move. 
5.5 Conclusions and suggestions 
Besides the disappointing fact that the problems in the Central Region, like 
congestion, minifundism and informal occupancy, have not been solved, the 
expectation that the colonists would considerably improve their standard of living 
by becoming legal owners of larger farms has also not been realized. The majority 
of the colonists have been unable to bring their new 'lotes' into full exploitation. 
Moreover, a high proportion of them have not yet acquired legal property rights, 
so that their position is still rather insecure. In spite of the fact that many 
agricultural colonies have been in existence for over 25 years, agricultural 
modernization and rural prosperity have still failed to materialize. 
Although it is unlikely that the contemporary problems of the Central Region will 
be solved by the policy of agricultural colonization, the IBR still has many tasks 
to perform in the areas of colonization. In contrast to the Central Region, where 
the characteristics of farming and the level of income are no longer exclusively 
determined by farm size and tenure conditions, the prosperity of the households 
in the colonization areas still largely depends on the way and the extent to which 
they have access to the land. As long as farming remains the colonists' principal 
source of income (instead of a range of different activities) and land security 
depends on legal property rights rather than on traditional rights, the efforts to 
stimulate agricultural modernization and full ownership have to be continued. Most 
colonists are unable to clear sufficient land and must therefore be helped 
financially and technically to bring their parcel into full exploitation. The IBR 
will also have to improve the road network and find a solution for the relatively 
long distances to the principal markets, while credit facilities and technical 
assistance also have to be increased. Last, but not least, as we stated before, the 
'programa de titulización' has to be simplified and the costs of obtaining title 
deeds reduced, so that farmers will more readily decide to take the necessary 
steps to become legal owners of the land. 
147 
Chapter 6: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Paraguay's agricultural sector in the early 1960s 
Paraguayan agriculture had to cope with several problems in the early 1960s. 
Production levels were low and there was little diversification, since arable 
farming was mainly limited to the growing of subsistence crops (like manioc and 
maize) and to a few export crops (like cotton and tobacco). The large majority of 
the rural families exploited minifundia and were poor, whereas a small number of 
extensively used latifundia owned by a small élite of foreign and Paraguayan 
land-owners monopolized a large part of the total farmland. 
Most alarming was the situation in the Central Region, where 57% of the 
country's rural population was concentrated on only 7% of the national territory. 
Because of the high population density and the skewed distribution of the land, 
the majority of the farmers had to make do with very small holdings and many of 
them did not even have official property titles. Population growth stimulated the 
further subdivision of the land, while soil fertility rapidly diminished as a result 
of over-exploitation and insufficient conservation measures. The majority of the 
farmers employed traditional methods of cultivation and were unable to meet the 
minimum level of subsistence. 
In order to stimulate agricultural production and improve the situation of the 
rural poor, the Paraguayan government assumed that it would be necessary to 
change fundamentally not only the geographical distribution of the country's 
population, but also rural property and occupation relationships. Insufficient farm 
size and informal tenancy were thought to be the major obstacles to a more 
rational and intensive use of land and labour. 'Minifundistas' had, therefore, to be 
provided with larger holdings, while the 'ocupantes' had to become the legal 
owners of their land. Both changes would facilitate the introduction of modem 
farming methods, the growth of agricultural production and the improvement of 
rural prosperity. 
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6.2 Agricultural colonization as an instrument for improving 
the situation 
Because the national territory outside the Central Region was still thinly 
populated in the early 1960s, a policy of further colonization seemed to offer the 
best opportunities for achieving rural development. By taking into exploitation the 
large areas of unexploited or extensively used land which were still available in 
the eastern part of Paraguay, 'minifundistas' and occupiers would be dispersed 
over a larger area of the country and automatically relieve population pressure in 
the Central Region. Both those who preferred to stay behind and the colonists 
settling in the pioneer areas would have the opportunity to become the legal 
owners of larger agricultural holdings. The improved farm size structure and 
tenure situation were expected to facilitate the introduction of new crops and 
more sophisticated methods of farming, which would in tum increase national 
agricultural production and the level of prosperity of the rural population. Thus, 
the policy of further colonization was seen as the most adequate solution to the 
problems existing at the national level as well of those existing at the household 
level, and there would be no need to cany out a radical land reform which would 
negatively affect the interests of the land-owning classes. 
6.3 Implementing the policy of agricultural colonization 
Having introduced a new Agrarian Statute in 1963 (Law 854), the Paraguayan 
government started to transform the agrarian structure of the country. The 
'Instituto de Bienestar Rural' (Institute of Rural Welfare), created in the same 
year by Law 852, became responsible for the realization of the new rural 
development policy. It was an autonomous institution, whose task was: 'to 
transform the agrarian structure of the countryside and to incorporate the rural 
population effectively into the economic and social development of the nation by 
means of legal solutions to facilitate the increasing elimination of latifundism 
and minifundism and their replacement with a just system of ownership, tenure 
and land exploitation. These legal solutions must further the fair division of land, 
as well as the adequate organization of credit, production and marketing, so that 
the farmers receive every help in achieving economic security, as a guarantee of 
their freedom and dignity and as a basis of social welfare' (Law 852, section 2). 
In order to achieve a more equal distribution of population, the IBR began 
with the establishment of agricultural colonies in eastern Paraguay, together with 
the implementation of a migration programme ('programa de colonización' and 
'programa de migración intema'). In the pioneer areas it distributed parcels mostly 
of between 20 and 25 hectares, which was the minimum area needed to guarantee 
rational exploitation and improve the country's farm size scructure. 
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Besides its task of organizing the colonization of 'new* land, the IBR was 
empowered to improve the situation in the longer occupied areas by replacing 
latifundism and minifundism with a juster system of property distribution 
('programa de reparcelación')- Under the Agrarian Statute, the IBR could 
expropriate and redistribute properties of more than 20,000 hectares in the 
western region (Chaco) and of more than 10,000 hectares in the more densely 
populated and fertile eastern part of Paraguay, where such estates were not 
rationally exploited. The IBR was also empowered to amalgamate minifundia into 
larger farms. 
To meet the objective of improving the tenure situation and the position of 
the 'ocupantes', the IBR devised a 'programa de titulización' to enable informal 
occupiers to become full land-owners by completing an official application form at 
the IBR office in Asunción and paying for their parcels in instalments. The 
migration of 'ocupantes' from the Central Region to the agricultural colonies 
established in the newly opened up pioneer areas, in particular, was expected to 
improve the tenure situation. Through paying off their instalments the colonists 
would automatically become the legal owners of their land. The fanners who 
remained behind in the longer settled areas, however, would also be able to 
improve their situation by applying for property rights on the parcels they 
occupied or those vacated by the migrants. The legalization process would also be 
stimulated by the provisions laid down in 'Ley 622 de Colonizaciones y 
Urbanizaciones de Hecho' (1960) and 'Ley 854' (1963), which provided that farmers 
who had occupied the land 'in good faith' for at least 20 years were entitled to 
become its legal owners. 
Finally, the IBR was made responsible for stimulating agricultural growth and 
diversification and providing colonies with the infrastructure needed to achieve 
these objectives ('programa de consolidación'). 
6.4 Evaluating the effects of the agricultural colonization 
policy 
a. in the colonization areas 
The IBR is reported to have opened up more than 7,572,000 hectares of land at 
519 different places between 1963 and 1985. Between 1963 and 1980, 18,667 
families containing 87,950 persons migrated or were repatriated under the 
migration programme. The large majority of colonists, however, migrated 
spontaneously, which means either that the IBR recognized their settlement as an 
'official colony' retrospectively or that they have still the status of informal 
occupiers. 
Despite the expectation that the colonization process would improve the level 
of prosperity of the rural poor who left the over-populated Central Region, its 
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effects have proved disappointing in reality. Some of the farmers who left the 
Central Region with the intention of becoming the legal owners of larger holdings 
have been forced to give up their 'lote', because they have not yet been able to 
acquire title deeds, one reason being that many IBR 'administradores' have 
disappeared with the money paid by the farmers for acquiring the necessary 
documents. Of much more importance, however, is the fact that the majority of 
the colonists have arrived without sufficient means and knowledge to bring their 
'lote' into full exploitation and build up the necessary capital for paying off the 
land. As a result, the majority still have the status of 'ocupante' or provisional 
owner. Many colonists have already decided to sell (the rights on) pieces of their 
land in order to pay off the rest of their 'lote' and cultivate it adequately. Most 
of these sales were, incidentally, not registered by the IBR and have therefore 
remained unrecorded in the property register. Consequently, the property 
relationships and the tenure situation in many colonization areas have become as 
chaotic as in the Central Region. It is not surprising, therefore, that many 
colonists are still mainly growing subsistence crops on small parcels and that 
farming patterns and methods of production have generally remained the same. 
The production of commercial crops was also discouraged by the relatively 
isolated location of the colonization areas, the deficient road system and the very 
poor marketing facilities. Another reason why it is rather difficult to introduce 
new crops and change farming methods is that, in most colonization areas, the 
inputs have to be bought in larger quantities and at higher prices than in the 
Central Region, where the commercial sector is better attuned to small-scale 
producers. 
Especially since the 1970s, with the arrival of large groups of European and 
Brazilian colonists and the establishment of agribusiness firms, the Paraguayan 
colonists have been increasingly threatened by competition. While the majority of 
the Paraguayans are still trying to bring their small parcels into cultivation and 
paying the instalments, many foreign firms and individuals have quickly succeeded 
in becoming land-owners and have started to grow export crops on large, modem 
holdings. 
Most of the studies which have appeared on the success or failure of agricultural 
colonization have remained at the rather general level of evaluation of the first 
part of this study. The results of the policy are often reviewed without 
distinguishing between the various possible levels of evaluation and without 
taking into account the differences which may exist between the various areas 
and social groups. Moreover, the time factor is very seldom taken into 
consideration. It need hardly be said, however, that the ultimate judgement will 
largely depend on the specific aspect on which the study concentrates. 
Those assessors who wish to prove the success of agricultural colonization 
policy will be inclined to emphasize that it has led to a further integration of the 
national territory, a more balanced distribution of the population, the partial or 
complete elimination of latifundism, an increase in the number of medium-sized 
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farms, the transformation of informal 'ocupantes' into legal owners and an 
increase in the volume of agricultural production. 
The assessors who wish to criticize the policy, however, will emphasize the 
persistence of latifundism, the reproduction of minifundism in the areas of pioneer 
settlement, the large number of farmers who are still waiting for titles to their 
land and the fact that agricultural production has remained as traditional and 
one-sided as before. They will further emphasize that the IBR has neglected its 
task of consolidating the colonization process by failing to provide the colonies 
with basic infrastructural and other facilities, so that subsistence farmers have 
been invited or encouraged to move while receiving little help to improve their 
economic status. 
The arguments of the critics seem to be the most convincing, at least at the 
household level. The majority of the colonists do, in fact, still live in poor 
conditions and have not been able to improve their situation appreciably. It may 
even be said that, in spite of more than 25 years of colonization policy, most 
colonists still live in circumstances comparable to those in the Central Region and 
their position is sometimes even worse. 
b. in the old agricultural core, e.g the Central Region 
Although much attention has been given to the study of colonization in Paraguay 
since the 1960s, some key issues, such as the question of whether the settlement 
schemes have been successful in relieving congesting and developing the country's 
Central Region, have been virtually neglected as themes of research. The central 
objective of the present study, therefore, was to analyze to what extent the 
policy of agricultural colonization has indeed relieved congestion in the Central 
Region and alleviated the plight of the rural poor. 
The authorities assumed that agricultural colonization would automatically relieve 
population pressure, improve farm sizes, change the tenure situation, and increase 
rural prosperity in the Central Region, since it was expected that the new 
opportunities offered by opening up the under-exploited eastern areas of the 
country for colonization would be seized by large numbers of peasants without 
sufficient land and lacking legal property titles. Their departure from the Central 
Region would result in a decrease in minifundism and informal occupation 
relationships and consequently improve the conditions for further development in 
the area of departure. 
Although 59% of the colonists were recruited within the framework of the 
'programa de migración' and the majority of the spontaneous colonists also 
originated from the Central Region, the situation in this area has improved only 
marginally. 
More specifically this means that the process of outmigration has had very 
little effect on the farm size structure of the Central Region, because a high 
proportion of the pioneers originated from areas with relatively low population 
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densities and most of the colonists vacated parcels of only a few hectares. As a 
consequence, most landless families remained landless, while those households who 
already had some land were sometimes so large and needed so much extra land 
that a few additional hectares handed over by family members or relatives did not 
help them much. Where the families who stayed behind have received larger 
holdings, these have not relieved their problems for very long, since natural 
population increase has remained high. Moreover, because of soil impoverishment, 
informal tenancy and the lack of capital, most 'minifundistas' have been unable to 
improve their situation, even if they did acquire more land. That outmigration has 
done little to stimulate agricultural modernization or a higher level of prosperity 
in the Central Region is also illustrated by the fact that many of the parcels 
left behind have come into the hands of land brokers and other persons who do 
not use the land for agricultural exploitation. 
In other words, the effects of outmigration in terms of relief of congestion 
and rural development have been disappointing. After 25 years of colonization 
policy, the Central Region is as densely populated as before and is still 
characterized by minifundism and informal occupancy. Agricultural modernization 
has failed to materialize and there has been little fundamental change in the 
prosperity of the Central Region's rural population. 
Although large groups of farmers have left the Central Region, the majority of 
the rural poor have decided to stay, partly because they preferred to use the 
facilities of the 'programa de titulización' to become full land-owners in their 
area of birth. Their decision obviously had a negative effect on the government's 
efforts to improve the geographical distribution of the national population. Nor 
should the impact of the agricultural colonization programme be overestimated as 
far as farm size structure and the process of agricultural modernization are 
concerned. Minifundism has persisted because the majority of the migrants had 
only small plots and no radical measures of land reform were taken. Moreover, 
land legalization generally did not take place in accordance with the officially 
established criteria (which provide that one cannot become an owner of extremely 
small or large holdings) and insufficient attention was paid to the characteristics 
of the beneficiaries of property deeds. Many land titles have been granted to 
non-farmers and to persons who were already relatively old (and probably not 
very open to change) or had large families when they became the owners of small 
parcels. This explains why the granting of land titles did not automatically give 
lead to agricultural modernization. 
6.5 Reasons for not leaving the Central Region 
In those studies which deal with the question of why the majority of the Central 
Region's population have preferred to remain behind instead of moving to areas 
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where they could become the legal owners of larger areas of land, most authors 
emphasize that many peasants abhor the life of a pioneer and stick to their land 
for reasons of tradition. In order to investigate the real reasons for the decision 
not to leave, we made an in-depth study of those who stayed behind and had less 
than 5 hectares of land, many of them with the status of 'ocupante'. The central 
question was: why did many of these small farmers decide not to move in spite of 
having the opportunity to become the legal owners of a larger holding in one of 
the colonization areas? 
When it devised the colonization policy, the IBR started from the implicit 
assumption that unfavourable farm size was the major problem of most 
'minifundistas'. It followed that the opening up of 'empty areas' would almost 
automatically result in the departure of those who had insufficient land and hoped 
to be able to establish larger farms in one of the pioneer areas. In other words, 
the possibilities of agricultural colonization would set in train a considerable 
migration of the poorest elements of the population. 
The migration to the agricultural colonies situated outside the Central Region 
has nevertheless remained limited in extent. Instead of moving towards the areas 
of colonization, the majority of the 'minifundistas' living in the Central Region 
have preferred to compensate the lack of sufficient agricultural land with 
'diagonal survival strategies'. By developing a wide range of additional sources of 
income, most of which are not directly related to agriculture, many households 
have managed to obtain higher incomes than would be derived from farming, with 
the consequence that they have preferred not to settle in one of the 
colonization areas. Starting a new life as a colonist in the 'middle of nowhere' 
would have meant that most of the family members would be forced to give up 
their activities, with the result that family income in the 'colonia' would become 
almost completely dependent on agriculture instead of on a wide range of jobs, 
and would consequently decrease considerably. In other words, many small 
farmers were fully aware of the fact that the opportunities for finding extra 
sources of income in the areas of colonization would be relatively small, not only 
because of the less diversified character of the frontier economy, but also because 
most of the available family labour would be needed for clearing the newly 
obtained land. 
The 'minifundistas' of the Central Region are therefore not a homogeneous 
group of farmers who invariably need land and are all equally interested in 
leaving their present place of residence in order to occupy larger holdings in one 
of the country's colonization zones. The majority of the 'minifundistas', in fact, 
did not consider the acquisition of larger farms as the best solution to their 
problems, since they did not depend primarily on farming, but on a wide variety 
of other sources of income. This largely explains why, despite 25 years of 
colonization policy, the majority of the 'minifundistas' have not opted to settle on 
larger 'lotes' outside the Central Region. 
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6.6 Minifundism as an obstacle to modernization and prosperity 
In order to transform the Central Region's backward agricultural economy and 
achieve rural development, the IBR assumed that its primary goal should be to 
improve the unfavourable rural property relationships. Insufficient farm size was 
regarded as one of the most fundamental obstacles to agricultural modernization, 
because the introduction of new and more productive crops and modem fanning 
methods on only a few hectares was not expected to be sufficiently remunerative. 
But agricultural modernization and rural prosperity were expected to materialize 
more or less automatically when farmers obtained access to adequate areas of 
land. 
Even where 'minifundistas' still live mainly from farming, however, their 
problems cannot be reduced simply to 'insufficiency of land'. This means that 
there is not a close relationship between farm size and rural prosperity. Even if 
the 'minifundistas' had been provided with larger areas of land within the Central 
Region, this would not necessarily have led to agricultural modernization and 
increased rural prosperity. Much depends on the way in which the land is going 
to be used. As long as small farmers have insufficient means to make productive 
investments in their land, marketing facilities remain deficient, and farmers 
without title deeds are not eligible for credit, changes in farm size are unlikely 
to give rise to improved land use patterns or to fundamental changes in the 
economic position of the rural families involved. As long as they remain farmers, 
the 'minifundistas' will probably use the extra land in the same way as the rest 
of their holding, namely for growing manioc and maize, while those who abandon 
farming may prefer to sell the land in 'lotes urbanos'. 
Although it is probably correct to regard the very skewed distribution of 
agricultural land as one of the fundamental causes of the region's rural poverty, 
the present problems cannot be successfully eliminated by simply offering larger 
parcels in the colonization areas or within the 'Zona Central'. The extent to 
which land reform really contributes to rural development will ultimately depend 
on the way in which people are able to use the newly acquired land. 
6.7 Occupancy as an obstacle to modernization and prosperity 
Besides the assumption that the 'minifundistas' in the Central Region would 
invariably benefit from measures aimed at outmigration and more balanced 
property relationships, Paraguay's rural development policy started from the idea 
that changes in the unfavourable tenure situation would be one of the best ways 
to raise the subsistence level of the 'ocupantes'. The IBR, like many other 
advocates of tenure regulation, had the idea that, apart from insufficient farm 
size, the persistence of traditional agriculture and rural poverty in the Central 
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Region were to be explained primarily by the lack of legal security and the 
subsequent lack of incentive for the peasants to make investments for conserving 
or even improving soil fertility and raising agricultural output. In other words, 
they supposed that legal security based on full land-ownership would have a 
positive effect on the stability of agricultural enterprise and the level of 
investment. Once the farmers obtained title deeds, agricultural development and 
increased prosperity were expected to follow. In practice, however, only a small 
number of the occupiers in the Central Region have become the legal owners of 
their land, and, in many cases, land legalization and rural development have not 
gone together. 
One of the reasons why only a small number of the occupiers in the Central 
Region have so far made use of the legalization facilities is the intricacy and 
high costs of the procedure for becoming a full owner. This has led many farmers 
to decide to remain 'ocupantes' rather than waste time and large sums of money. 
Many of them are also aware that land titles cannot easily be transferred to the 
next generation by inheritance, since heirs also have to start an expensive and 
time-consuming procedure in Asunción to have the documents transferred to their 
names. 
Besides these procedural obstacles, another reason for the relatively large 
number of fanners without property titles is that many of them are simply 
insufficiently interested in acquiring the documents. One of their arguments is 
that property deeds are not recorded in a modem and adequate way and are 
therefore of limited legal value. Even more important, however, is the fact that 
the large majority of the Central Region's occupiers are living on land which is 
owned by a relative. The position of this group of 'ocupantes familiares' is 
relatively safe, so that legalization procedures would do little to improve their 
situation. Occupancy and insecurity do not necessarily always go hand in hand. 
Moreover, this group of occupiers do not have the possibility of becoming the 
owners of the parcels on which they are living, since the land already belongs to 
somebody else whose property is not eligible for expropriation. In other words, 
many 'ocupantes familiares' will only be able to exchange their status of 
'squatter' for that of legal owner by moving to other places and occupying state 
land or privately owned land which is part of under-exploited latifundia. As long 
as their status of 'ocupante' does not cany the risk of losing the land, many 
'minifundistas' argue that, rather than contributing to greater legal security, the 
acquisition of land titles involves unnecessary costs. 
Moreover, many squatters have not yet applied for property titles because they 
are still unaware of their illegal, or at least informal status: they have always 
been using the land on the basis of traditional rights. Last, but not least, many 
squatters are not interested in acquiring legal status because they prefer to use 
the land without paying property taxes. 
Evaluating the 'programa de titulización', it may be concluded that it has not 
solved the problem of informal occupation in the Central Region. This can be 
explained in part by the IBR's passive approach to this problem and by the 
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complicated and expensive official procedures for becoming a legal land-owner. 
But it must also be stressed that the 'ocupantes' are not a completely 
homogeneous group, so that the advantages and disadvantages of their informal 
status vary considerably. Some of them were very interested in becoming legal 
land-owners, but others were not. Some of them are 'ocupantes de hecho', 
meaning that they have been living on the land for 20 years or more 
uninterruptedly and in good faith, while others are occupying the land of family 
members. Both groups, but especially the latter, are not in danger of being rapidly 
expelled from the land. The categories of 'ocupantes' who may be most threatened 
with expulsion are those farmers who have recently settled on land in the hands 
of unknown private land-owners and, to a lesser extent, those who have occupied 
state land in which land thieves and land speculators are also interested. 
The IBR, however, seems to have been insufficiently aware of these 
differences, since it has not pursued an active policy of giving land rights to the 
last-mentioned categories who are in greatest need. Nor has it concentrated on 
granting land titles to those farmers whose livelihood is still largely based on 
agriculture and have only one plot of informally occupied land at their disposal. 
Many titles have in fact been granted to non-farmers, i.e. people with relatively 
high incomes who could afford the costs of legalization, and to those who were 
often already full owners of several other plots of land. 
It needs hardly be said that the 'programa de titulización' will bring about 
agricultural modernization only if it is applied to the right group» of farmers and 
combined with such measures as improvements in the road network, cheap credit 
and marketing facilities. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to land 
quality. Much of the land held by squatters is rough or poorly drained and not 
well-suited for cultivation. Even if they did become the legal owners of the land 
and make more investments in it, agricultural modernization, higher production 
levels and higher incomes are unlikely to follow. 
6.8 Some suggestions for a more specific policy for the Central 
Region and the pioneer areas 
In view of the persistence of minifundism, occupancy and traditional fanning in 
the Central Region, and the emergence of similar problems in most of the pioneer 
areas, it may be concluded that the policy of agricultural colonization has not 
alleviated the situation of the rural poor. Rural poverty has, in fact, persisted in 
both areas and sometimes even become more severe. Nor can further agricultural 
colonization be expected to solve the rural problem in the future. Apart from 
this, the growing shortage of land in eastern Paraguay and the ecological 
problems caused by intensive deforestation also argue for a halt to colonization. 
The time has arrived to recognize the need to revise the rural development 
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policy. Future development policy should be concentrated on the areas which have 
already been taken into exploitation and take into account their specific 
characteristics and potential. 
To solve the 'old' problems of the Central Region more successfully, area-
specific programmes have to be developed, based on the fact that the Central 
Region is not a homogeneous island of congestion but one which is spatially 
differentiated, with at least two subregions. Their specific features and the 
policies they require are dealt with in the next section of this chapter. 
a. zone 1 : the immediate surroundings of Asunción 
The area immediately surrounding Asunción (zone 1) is characterized by high 
population density. The area of extensively exploited land is not very large, and 
the proportion of 'ocupantes' is relatively small in comparison with other parts of 
the Central Region. This is partly explained by the fact that there are good 
opportunities for finding additional jobs ('diagonal responses'), so that a relatively 
high proportion of the population have incomes which allow them to purchase title 
deeds. 
A policy of further agricultural colonization ('programa de colonización' and 
'programa de migración interna') would have little positive effect on this zone. 
Outmigration to one of the pioneer areas would be very limited, since only a 
relatively small part of the rural population is still seriously interested in full-
time farming. In areas where non-agricultural employment opportunities have 
become a more important source of income than farming the population will 
simply no longer be interested in migrating to colonization areas. 
The possibilities for carrying out a successful 'programa de redistribución' are 
also very small, because of the absolute lack of land resulting from population 
pressure. Moreover, a more favourable farm size in this zone, in particular, will 
not automatically result in agricultural modernization or higher incomes from 
farming, although a small group of farmers may become interested in commercial 
production for supplying the market of Asunción. 
Finally, the developmental impact of the 'programa de titulización' will also be 
very small, not only because of the limited interest in farming and the relatively 
high proportion of owners, but also because most of the 'ocupantes' do not run 
the risk of being expelled from their parcels. Rather than concentrating efforts 
on making 'ocupantes' full owners of their land, government action should be 
directed at restricting land speculation in the rural-urban fringe of Asunción, 
which is encouraging an increasing number of peasants to sell their land in 'lotes 
urbanos'. Moreover, the efforts of the population to diversify their sources of 
income should be supported by rural industrialization programmes, aimed at 
improving the quality and level of production and raising the remuneration of on 
and off-farm activities. 
Once higher levels of income have been achieved, other government measures 
might be aimed at 'reanimating' commercial agriculture by encouraging farmers to 
158 
make productive investments in their land and facilitating the introduction of 
new crops and more advanced methods of cultivation by giving them technical 
assistance and offering cheap credit. In the area near Asunción, the opportunities 
for the production of horticultural and other remunerative crops are relatively 
favourable, thanks to the proximity of the market. By improving production per 
hectare, the farmers may ultimately succeed in compensating the small size of 
their holdings. When these measures are introduced, however, a distinction should 
be made between those who are interested in becoming full-time farmers again 
and those who only wish to grow some crops for their own consumption. 
b. zone 2: the more remote areas of the Central Region 
The more remote parts of the Central Region (zone 2) are characterized by a 
relatively low level of prosperity and the tenure situation is also relatively 
unfavourable. Farming is still the principal source of income for the majority of 
the rural population, as additional sources of income are rather scarce. The most 
important problem for the 'minifundistas' in this area is how to increase 
productivity per hectare in order to compensate the small size of their farms and 
the increasing fragmentation of the land. Farm incomes tend to be too low to 
make sufficient investments and most of the farmers are denied official credit 
since they have no legal land titles. Another factor which discourages the 
introduction of more remunerative crops and commercial farming is the inadequate 
road network and marketing structure. 
Most of the 'minifundistas' who have tried to compensate the lack of 
sufficient land, have done so by migrating to less congested areas ('horizontal 
response'). Because a relatively large part of the land within zone 2 is still used 
extensively or even not at all, some 'minifundistas' have preferred to move only 
short distances instead of migrating to the areas of colonization situated in the 
eastern border departments of the country. The mobility of the population of zone 
2 is relatively high. 
In contrast with zone 1, where land fragmentation has mainly been the result 
of a growing absolute scarcity of land, rather than of its unequal distribution, the 
'programa de redistribución' may still have positive effects in the more remote 
parts of the Central Region, where latifundia still exist. 
Whether the improved size of agricultural holdings will lead to agricultural 
modernization and higher farm incomes depends, however, on the ability and 
willingness of the farmers to make investments in their land and bring their 
products to the markets, and this means that land reform measures have to be 
accompanied by such measures as the provision of cheap credit and the 
improvement of the infrastructure (roads, storage facilities etc.). While the 
acquisition of title deeds remains expensive, occupiers cannot be expected to 
become owners of their land unless they enjoy higher incomes. 'Ocupantes' should, 
therefore, also be eligible for official credit. 
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At the same time, the procedures for acquiring official land rights must be 
simplified and, instead of passively waiting for 'ocupantes' who decide to go to 
Asunción, the authorities should provide the more remote areas with local offices 
for property legalization. This is, incidentally, not to say that all occupiers will 
immediately make use of their services. As long as 'іпзесигіі/ is not the 
ocupantes' greatest problem, they will prefer to make productive investments in 
their land rather than spending money on acquiring 'paper rights'. 
Once they have succeeded in raising agricultural production, the next step may 
be the diversification of their income sources through the development of various 
side-activities, such as the processing of crops and other products. Government 
measures should also support this process of economic diversification. 
с the colonization areas 
In the colonization zones, government measures should be aimed at preventing 
further land fragmentation and the spontaneous occupation of new areas. Whereas 
most 'ocupantes' in the Central Region are protected by traditional rights and 
claims, security of land tenure in the newly occupied colonization areas is mainly 
based on definitive, or at least provisional, legal ownership. This means that 
priority has to be given to the implementation of the 'programa de titulización', 
provided, of course, that its procedures become less expensive and time-
consuming. As in zone 2, however, it seems to be still more important to assist 
the colonists to bring their land into full exploitation. 
In these areas, in particular, the infrastructure needs to be improved. As long 
as road and marketing networks remain deficient and basic facilities are absent, 
little progress will be made, even if the farm size and tenure situation become 
more favourable. 
The detrimental effects of unfavourable farm sizes and informal occupancy may 
be even more severe in the areas of pioneer settlement than in the Central 
Region. In most frontier areas the possibilities for agricultural intensification and 
for tapping additional sources of income are relatively small and therefore cannot 
serve as safety valves. 
Finally, if the policy of agricultural colonization is really intended to improve 
the situation of the small and poorest farmers, there must be restrictions on the 
free settlement of foreign colonists and well-to-do Paraguayan farmers. 
6.9 Epilogue 
We started this study with the imaginary story of a crowded island in the middle 
of the ocean which was connected to the mainland by the construction of a 
bridge. This story served to illustrate the situation of the Paraguayan countryside 
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in the early 1960s, when the Central Region was surrounded by thinly populated 
areas with large latifundia. The best policy at that time seemed to be to provide 
opportunities for further colonization, which would encourage the surplus 
population to move out. 
Looking again at the island after more than 25 years, we see that it is as 
crowded as before. Its population is still engaged in the production of subsistence 
crops, while only a few farmers grow appreciable quantities of cash crops. As 
before, many farmers are 'ocupantes'. Most rural families are still struggling to 
make a living and trying to adapt themselves to the impoverished natural 
environment. With the growing population, however, the competition for space and 
the range of alternative income sources have increased. 
As agriculture became less able to absorb the growing island population, an 
increasing number of smallholders started to tap additional sources of income in 
the spheres of services, commerce or manufacturing. Others decided to cross the 
bridge in order to settle on the 'mainland', where population density was 
relatively low. Not all of them, however, reached their destination and most of 
them arrived without money. Where they did manage to acquire land, they had to 
clear it with bare hands and simple tools. 
As an increasing number of drowned people are cast up on the shore, the 
islanders have become increasingly cautious about leaving the island and crossing 
the bridge. As long as they are able to keep their heads above water, they 
prefer to stay instead of running the risk of drowning and drifting ashore. In 
the present circumstances, the alternative of agricultural colonization is still 'a 
bridge too far' for the majority of the rural poor. 
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NOTES 
Notes to Chapter 1 : 
1. See Kleinpenning (1987 A) for further details. 
2. The construction of the first railroad, work on which started in 1858, offered 
fresh possibilities for further colonization, but because of the low population 
pressure it attracted only a small number of settlers. 
3. In 1960, the number of Paraguayans who had emigrated to Argentina was 
estimated at 155,269. 55% of them worked as 'bracero' (seasonal labourer) in 
the agricultural border area of the provinces of Misiones and Formosa and 28% 
were employed in the service sector of Buenos Aires. 80% of the 16,000 
Paraguayans who were living in Brazil were to be found in the countryside of 
the state of Mato Grosso (Secretaría Técnica de Planificación 1980 В, pp.208-219). 
4. In contrast to other Latin American countries, where many latifundia had been 
established in colonial times, the number of large land holdings remained 
limited in Paraguay. Consequently, the phenomenon of'dependent minifundism', 
i.e. that of small farms directly related to the organizational structure and 
labour requirements of large holdings, never developed in colonial times. As far 
as the Spaniards made use of Indian labour, they generally used the framework 
of the 'encomienda' system and the 'mita'. The Jesuits succeeded in 
establishing various tightly regulated land-use communities, the so-called 
'reducciones' in order to protect the Indians. 
5. Various attempts have been made since the 1880s to give the large majority of 
Paraguayans a little land. The laws promulgated to achieve this aim were: the 
'Ley de Colonización y del Hogai' of 1904, the 'Ley de Homestead' of 1918, 
the 'Ley de Creación, Fomento y Conservación de la Pequeña Propiedad 
Agropecuario' of 1926, the 'Decreto-Ley de Reforma Agraria' of 1936, and the 
law of 1940 which established the first Agrarian Statute and replaced the land 
reform law of 1936. 
6. Colonization in this area had already started in 1956, under the responsibility 
of the Instituto de Reforma Agraria (IRA). 
7. According to the forthcoming 'Memoria' of 1986, the IBR opened up 9,138 
thousand hectares. The total number of official colonies in 1986 amounted to 
680, with 132,936 'lotes coloniales' (IBR 1986, unpublished). 
8. More specifically, the IBR colonized 590,000 hectares in the department of 
Chaco (1981), 770,000 hectares in the department of Nuevo Asunción (1982) 
and 220,000 hectares in that of Boquerón (1983). 
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9. To the extent that 'migrantes internos' originated from the Central Region, the 
most important 'areas of origin' were the villages of Quiindy, Caraguatay, 
Santa Rosa, San Juan Bautista, Borja, Yaguarón and Ita, and these migrants 
formed the initial population of the colonies of Naranja Jhai, Naranjito, 
Caraguatay-mí, Pirapey, Itaipyté, Tacuaré and San Buenaventura, respectively 
(Instituto de Bienestar Rural, Memoria 1986, unpublished). 
10. A special category of colonies created by the IBR are 'colonias indígenas', 
intended to give land to Indian groups. In 1986 these 'colonias indígenas' 
(51) covered an area of 183,074 hectares (Instituto de Bienestar Rural, 
Memoria 1986, unpublished). 
11. Before the Agrarian Statute of 1963 came into operation, expropriations were 
mainly based on Law 662 of 1960 ('Ley de la Parcelación Proporcional de 
Propiedades Mayores), under which, at least 10% of the area of rural 
properties of 10,000 hectares and more, which were suitable for arable 
farming, had to be reserved for distribution among landless farmers or those 
with less than 10 hectares. 
12. In addition to the 'programa de redistribución', the IBR was also entitled to 
create 'campos comunales' for farmers with insufficient land for keeping 
animais on their farm. From 1963 up to 1986, the IBR is said to have created 
171 'campos' on a total area of 183,074 hectares (Instituto de Bienestar 
Rural, Memoria 1986, unpublished). 
13. The prices depended on the quality of the land and its location. The 
negative effect of land speculation in most areas of colonization is 
illustrated by the fact that, in 1982, the price of the land varied from 1,500 
and 30,000 Guaraníes per hectare. 
14. In order to realize its task of consolidating the colonization process, the IBR 
prepared special 'Proyectos Integrados de Desarrollo Rural' for the 
departments of Alto Paraná and Canendiyú and the 'Eje Norte'. In 1983 it 
also started projects in the departments of Paraguarf and Caazapá, where it 
tried to improve the land distribution, the tenure situation and the 
infrastructure (roads, electricity, credit, health centres, schools). In practice, 
however, these projects are faced with many problems, because of 
insufficient means and organizational disorder (over 6 ministries are supposed 
to cooperate) (IBR 1986, unpublished). 
15. 61 farmers of this group, i.e. Chaco-veterans and fathers of 7 minor children 
or more, received title deeds free of charge. 
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Notes to Chapter 2: 
1. In 1956,326,860 hectares of area of the Central Region were under crops. 
2. To facilitate comparability between the 1956 and 1981 censuses we have used 
the area of crop land, instead of the total farm area. In contrast with the 
classification of 1981, the 1956 census does not distinguish 'farms without land' 
as a separate category. 
3. The agricultural census unfortunately does not give information on the total 
area occupied by holdings with less than 5 hectares of crop land at the 
department level. 
4. This total is larger than the total number of holdings given in table 13, 
because information was given on the tenure situation per 'lote' in 1981, 
whereas the 1956 census used the 'farm' as the unit of calculation. 
5. This improvement is overestimated, because the 1981 census gives information 
on the tenure situation per 'lote', whereas the 1956 census used the 'farm' as 
the unit of calculation. The real improvement has been smaller than stated (see 
note 4). 
6. One of the few examples of 'real' land redistribution is Colonia Ojopoi in the 
department of Cordillera. In order to improve the land distribution and local 
tenure situation, the IBR expropriated some latifundia in 1956 and distributed 
the land in small parcels among the 'ocupantes' according to criteria such as 
family size, age composition of the family and area already under cultivation. 
This project had to cope with several problems. The distribution of the land 
took a long time and, even after painful negotiations, it was not possible to 
fully satisfy all the farmers. Soil fertility remained low and methods of 
production traditional. The whole experiment proved to be very expensive, so 
that it is not surprising that the Paraguayan government preferred to stimulate 
the colonization of thinly populated areas on the country's periphery. 
7. Commercial production of horticultural crops in these departments started in 
the late 1950s in the districts of San Lorenzo and Capiatá, as well as in 
Villeta and Areguá. 
8. One hectare of pineapples, for example, gave an average yield of more than 
6,000 kilos in 1981. 
9. The Rio Paraguay is the country's principal exit to the sea. The Asunción-
Encamación railroad, which links the Paraguayan capital with Buenos Aires, 
has lost much of its importance because of the deplorable condition of the line 
and the obsolete rolling stock. 
10. As 'industrias azucareras' were established in Villarica, each of them created 
its own community with 'sugar-sponsored' schools, shops and houses for the 
labour force. Some of the farmers living in the vicinity of the plants became 
tied to the 'fábricas' as outgrowers, cultivating the sugar cane as a monoculture. 
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11. The situation in Guaira and Cordillera, however, did not coincide with these 
expectations. With the former department, outmigration was expected to be 
very large because of the lack of opportunities for 'vertical' and 'diagonal 
responses', the high population density and the absence of substantial 
development measures, but outmigration was in fact rather low. This was in 
contrast to the latter department, where despite the comparatively favourable 
alternatives, a relatively large part of the rural population preferred to leave 
the area. 
12. The IBR has only recently begun to pay attention to 'vertical' and 'diagonal' 
responses by designing two 'programas de desarrollo rural', one for the 
development of Paraguari (1978), and the other one for Caazapá and parts of 
Guaira (1979). Besides measures in the field of colonization (enabling the 
'horizontal response') and legalization, the programmes also include measures 
for improving the area's basic infrastructure (marketing facilities, roads, 
electricity, schools etc.), diversifying the rural economy by stimulating 
'artesanía' and rural industries, as well as introducing new horticultural 
crops and modem methods of agricultural production and soil conservation. 
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Notes to Chapter 3: 
1. According to Breitenbach, farmers need about 3 hectares of commercial crops 
like cotton and sugar to earn the income needed for buying things like basic 
food and clothing which they cannot produce themselves. Moreover, on poor 
soils at least 2 hectares are required for growing sufficient subsistence crops 
(Breitenbach 1973). 
2. Our sample included 0.7% of the 39,754 agricultural holdings with an area of 1 
to 5 hectares in 1981. 
3. No less than 54% (148) of the heads of households are over 50 years of age 
and 29% (80) are over 60 years of age. Only 9% (25) are under 30 years, while 
the remaining 37% (102) are between 30 and 50 years. 
4. 76% of the 'jefes' are married or cohabiting. They live in one house with their 
partner and children, forming a nuclear family. Only 16% of the total 
population consist of persons (parents, other relatives or friends) who may be 
regarded as part of the extended family. 
5. 12% of the minifundists use their land only as 'place of residence' without 
growing any crops. These families entirely rely on non-agricultural sources of 
income. 69% of the 'minifundistas' who no longer cultivate their land are living 
in agricultural zone 1, i.e. in the vicinity of the capital, Asunción. In contrast 
to their colleagues who still grow crops, most ex-farmers have only one small 
piece of land, the average area being 0.7 hectare. 
6. In the agricultural year 1985-1986, farmers received prices ranging from 80 to 
150 Guaraníes, dependent on the quality of the crop, the location and the 
whims of the individual middleman. 
7. Industries and exporters have recently become less inclined to employ local 
middlemen, because at harvest time many of them appear to have vanished or 
sold the seeds to other mills, despite the loans they received. 
8. Another reason why sugar cane is not a very attractive crop for most of the 
'minifundistas' is the fact that the first harvest takes place two years after 
the investment has been made. The sugar mills give loans only to those 
farmers who have sufficient land for efficient production. When selling the 
cane, they receive nationally established prices (4 Guaraníes per kilo in 1986) 
minus the credit received. Because many farmers do not hesitate to sell their 
harvest to competing mills, the 'azucareras' are often unwilling to give credit. 
9. In both zones (the more isolated areas as well as the area in the vicinity of 
Asunción), the average man-land ratio is 1.8 persons per hectare. The average 
yield per hectare is relatively low. Although manioc normally produces 8,000 to 
15,000 kilos per hectare, the average yield of the minifundistas' farms was only 
5,500 kilos. This is considerably higher than that of maize (1,300 kilos), sweet 
potato (3,800 kilos) or other food crops, although the normal yields of maize 
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and sweet potato are 1,000-3,000 kilos and 3,000-6,000 kilos, respectively. The 
same is true of beans and peanuts, which yielded only 1,000 and 900 kilos per 
hectare, the normal yield being 800 to 1,500 and 800 to 3,000 kilos, 
respectively. The average cotton yield amounted to 2,800 kilos per hectare 
(which is more or less equivalent to the normal level), to be sold for about 
150 Guaraníes per kilos. Sugar cane production per hectare averaged 7,500 
kilos per hectare (normally about 40,000 kilos); one kilo yielded less than 3 
Guaraníes in 1985. 
The average farmer invested about 3,000 Guaraníes per hectare of cotton. 
The investment per hectare for manioc or maize amounted to 187 and 201 
Guaraníes, respectively. The costs for growing other food crops like beans, 
peanuts and sweet potato, were more or less the same (289, 336 and 347 
Guaraníes, respectively). 
The lack of agricultural intensification is explained, among other things, by 
the limited demand and the lack of capital for making investments. 
Almost all 'minifundistas' keep some livestock, not only in order to be as 
self-sufficient as possible, but also to have animals for sale and obtain some 
cash income for buying additional food in times of bad harvest or for other 
necessary articles. With the further fragmentation of the land, this 
traditional 'ad hoc' insurance system seems to have become a normal and 
generally accepted survival strategy, especially since the early sixties. As 
soon as some extra money is earned, however, it is reinvested in new 
livestock in order to be able to resist difficult times in the future. The sale 
of pigs and poultry by 29% and 17% of the families, respectively, produced 
an average annual income of about 25,000 and 10,000 Guaraníes, while the 
selling of eggs was less important (7,000 Guaraníes per annum on average). 
Most attractive, but less common was the selling of cows, since only 16% of 
the farmers we interviewed said that they had done this. It is, incidentally, 
not surprising that most 'minifundistas' sell mainly small livestock and their 
products (like eggs). They do not have to make large investments in this 
type of stock-raising, pigs and chickens find a large part of their food by 
scavenging on and near the farmyard and, moreover, these animals supply 
domestic demand. Much larger investments are needed for the raising of 
cattle and horses, although returns are also higher. Most 'minifundistas' will, 
of course, be inclined to sell these animals only in the event of extreme 
need. In the agricultural year 1985-1986 no less than 59% of the 
'minifundistas' sold part of their livestock. Whereas the selling of small 
livestock was of equal importance in both zones, the selling of cattle was 
more common in zone 2. In both zones together, sales produced an average 
income of only 25,000 Guaraníes per annum. In the area surrounding 
Asunción (zone 1), however, the prices are more favourable, because of 
better marketing facilities and higher demand. 
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13. The gathering of coconuts in the period from December to February and 
June to July is mainly the work of children. Local middlemen sell the nuts to 
oil-processing industries. 
14. Farmers who produce 'petit grain' bring the raw material to small extraction 
plants ('fábricas de esencia'), paying an average price of 200 Guaraníes per 
sack of leaves. 
15. Only a small number of 'comerciantes' sell such products as hammocks, candy 
or other home made goods at the market of Asunción. Some of them travel 
around, but the majority of the 'comerciantes' do not leave their yard. 
16. The most remunerative activity was commerce, which in some cases has 
produced annual incomes of over 400,000 Guaraníes. In zone 1, in particular, 
a relatively high proportion of the small farmers seem to have supplemented 
their agricultural income with earnings from commercial activities, a 
situation which clearly illustrates that demand is larger than in zone 2. 
Manufacturing activities yielded an average annual income of only 195,000 
Guaraníes, while the income obtained from service activities was still lower 
(about 155,000 Guaraníes a year). 
17. Moreover, farmers in the vicinity of the capital, developed on-farm activities 
a relatively long time ago, whereas in zone 2 the inhabitants have only 
recently started to supplement their income with earnings from these 
activities. The selling of cows, horses and milk, and the production of starch 
and charcoal are relatively new activities, whereas the other ones are 'old'. 
18. In zone 1 households with less than 5 members comprise 60% of the 
population, compared with 55% in zone 2. 
19. We had to leave out of consideration the effects of differences in soil 
quality. 
20. A further analysis of the total group of farmers who have managed to 
acquire new parcels during the last 10 years (142, or 52% of all 
'minifundistas' of our sample) reveals that the average area of newly 
occupied land was 1.9 hectare. 46% of the farmers involved left plots at 
other places, with an average size of 2.7 hectares. This means that, in many 
cases, access to the land has, in fact, deteriorated. As for the 95 families 
(35% of all 'minifundistas') who have disposed of plots of land during the 
past 10 years, the data show that the average size of the land concerned 
was 2.6 hectares. 69% of these families have been able to offset the 'losses' 
by acquiring plots at other places, but because the average size of the newly 
acquired parcels is only 2.1 hectares, the position of many households of this 
group as land users has also deteriorated. Both groups include mainly 
'minifundistas' with very little land. This is shown by the fact that the 
farmers who have acquired or lost parcels now have access to only 2.4 and 
2.2 hectares of land, respectively, on average, while the average area for all 
'minifundistas' of our sample amounted to 2.6 hectares. 
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21. The employment histories of the economically active persons show that 28% 
of them had jobs before. This is especially the case with the family heads 
living in zone 1. Persons with previous jobs appear to be over-represented in 
the urban off-farm employment sector. Those who are engaged in farming or 
on-farm activities, however, have been doing the same work for long time. 
This means that those who are working in the urban off-farm sector have a 
more diversified employment history. Comparing the range of present 
occupations with that of former jobs, off-farm employment appears to be the 
sector in which a relatively large number of persons have lost their work. 
Some of the people concerned have worked in the building industry in 
Buenos Aires, but have now returned to Paraguay. Others found employment 
in Asunción or in the Itaipú project during the 'golden decade of 
construction' in the 1970s. The fact that most of the former employment was 
found far away explains why 69% of the jobs lost were done outside the 
village, whereas this applies to only 19% of the present jobs. A comparison 
of the present employment structure with that of 10 years ago shows that 
farming has become less important and the role of rural off-farm employment 
has increased. 
22. It has already been mentioned that the road system is still very poor and 
therefore inadequate for the easy collection and marketing of agricultural 
products. Most roads are best described as suited for oxcarts or are little 
more than tracks. Improvements in the road network are therefore another 
necessary condition for change. 
23. The best examples of high return crops requiring relatively small areas of 
land are tomatoes, peppers and strawberries, but even several crops with 
lower returns like pineapples, garlic and bananas offer relatively good 
prospects for intensive land use, even on very small farms (Frètes Ventre & 
Asociados 1979). Highly perishable crops like lettuce, eggplants or peas are 
now produced almost exclusively in the direct vicinity of Asunción, but if 
the road system and the marketing facilities were drastically improved, the 
production area could be expanded considerably, provided there is a market. 
With the use of irrigation (necessary to guarantee the quality of crops like 
strawberries, pepper, pineapples and tomatoes) and the application of 
fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides, the production per hectare would 
increase considerably. During the off-farm season (from November to June), 
in particular, when most of the land is lying fallow, there may be 
possibilities for the production of fruits, horticultural crops or vegetables. 
24. Farmers should be familiar with modem production techniques, including the 
treatment of plant diseases. Crops like citrus, but also tomatoes, peppers and 
bananas are rather vulnerable to all kinds of bacterial diseases and have to 
be regularly controlled, but many farmers do not yet know how to proceed. 
25. One hectare of tomatoes, producing a net income of almost 5,000,000 
Guaraníes, needs an investment of over 1,600,000 Guaraníes (3200 US dollars) 
in seeds, pesticides, labour etc. This clearly illustrates that small farmers 
wishing to specialize in crops like these need capital of their own or cheap 
credit. 
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Notes to Chapter 4: 
1. Ocupantes' are those farmers who have neither a legal property title nor a 
lease contract for the land they work. 
2. Most of the farmers who rented land also owned or occupied smaller or larger 
parcels. 
3. Where there is any doubt, an agent of the IBR will visit the place to speak 
with the applicants family and its neighbours. In his report he will explain 
whether the applicant really is the occupier of the land concerned and that his 
claim seems to be correct. 
4. In Paraguari we interviewed a farmer who had to work a parcel of 2.5 by 
3,000 meters. 
5. This legal procedure is called 'prescription'. 
6. The Conferencia Episcopal Paraguaya gives free legal help to the poorest 
farmers who wish to become legal owners of their land. 
7. When using the terms owners, tenants and occupiers, we mean, respectively, 
farmers with property titles on at least one of their parcels, fanners who use 
{part of) their land under sharecropping or other renting arrangements, and 
farmers not belonging to either of these categories. Because a high proportion 
of farmers have only one parcel at their disposal, however, the categories 
generally refer to 'full owners', 'full tenants' and 'full occupiers' of the land, 
respectively. 
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Notes to Chapter 5: 
1. The two departments supplied 35% and 25%, respectively, of all colonists. The 
fact that Caazapá and Guaira supplied only 22% and 15% of the colonists is to 
be explained by the smaller population and the lower population density. Only 
3% of the colonists originated from the department of Central. 
2. This is shown by the fact that the 'minifundistas' interviewed in the Central 
Region were over-represented in non-farming employment, whereas the majority 
of the colonists were 'purel/ farmers at the time they left. Comparing the 
occupations of both groups, it appears that most colonists were formerly 
employed in only one sector, whereas those who have stayed behind already 
supplemented their income from other sources (on-farm and off-farm activities 
in the sphere of commerce, manufacturing and services). The colonists who 
have left since 1981, in particular, were fully engaged in farming. 
3. Only 16% of the total group of colonists settled within the Central Region, 88% 
of them in the departments of Guaira and Caazapá. 
4. Between 1981 and 1986 the share of female colonists decreased from 26% to 
onlyl6%,whichclearlyiUustratesthatdependentmigrationhasbecomelessimportant. 
5. Individual migration has increased from 28% before 1971 to 57% since 1981. 
6. Colonia Mallorquín was founded by the 'Instituto de Reforma Agraria' (IRA). 
We selected one of the oldest colonies because we assumed that, after many 
years, the colonists would have had sufficient time to achieve the highest level 
of prosperity. 
7. We interviewed colonists living on both sides of the road and at a minimum 
walking distance of 15 minutes. In order to achieve an optimal geographical 
distribution of the interviews we were helped by the militaiy police, who 
decided to arrest us twice, so that we had to begin interviewing again at 
another place. 
8. This meant that they officially applied for land titles according to the 
procedure described in Chapter 4. 
9. Because the 'minifundistas' who stayed in the Central Region now have farms 
of not more than 2.6 hectares on average, one may conclude that the colonists 
did not originate from the group of smallest farmers. This seems to be in 
accordance with our finding (Chapter 3) that it is mainly the smallest farmers 
who have preferred to stay, clinging to the different strategies of survival 
they had managed to develop. 
10. As against 16% and 2% for Alto Paraná as a whole. 
11. Some of these 'occupiers' were living on land which had been inherited from 
family members, but had failed to transfer the title on their own name. 
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12. On 13 February 1985, the IBR published a new Ibt of land prices per 
'colonia' in Eastern Paraguay, arguing that the prices had to be revised 
because of the infrastructure provided (roads, credit facilities, electricity). 
'Las referidas circunstancias han determinado una considerable plusvalía para 
las tierras de labranza y han incrementado notoriamente la frontera de la 
producción agrícola que se traduce en un mayor ingreso para el agricultor' 
(Resolución 257). The minimum price ranges from 15,000 Guaraníes (in the 
colonies of San Carlos and San Lázaro in the department of Concepción) to 
130,000 Guaraníes per hectare (in the colonies of Toledo Cañada, Almada 
Cañada and 'Fracciones Fiscales' in Areguá in the department of Central). 
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Amsterdam 4-8 July 1988. 
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3. Journals, statistical sources and maps 
ABC 
Diario. Suplemento Económico (30-8-1981, 6-12-1981, 17-10-1982, 24-10-1982, 
14-8-1983). Asunción. 
BANCO PARAGUAYO DE DATOS 
Resumen 1-24, Paraguay Económico (1979-81) 
1-33, Paraguay Económico (1982,1-12), Paraguay Gremial (1982,1-12), Paraguay 
Social (1982,1-12), Paraguay Político (1982,1-12). Asunción. 
BANCO PARAGUAYO DE DATOS (1982) 
Paraguay Económico. Resumen Mensual de Noticias, año II. BPD. Núm.1-10. 
Asunción. 
DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y CENSOS (1962) 
Censo nacional de población y de viviendas. Cifras provisionales. Asunción. 
DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y CENSOS (1972) 
Censo nacional de población y de viviendas. Cifras provisionales. Asunción. 
DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y CENSOS (1982) 
Censo nacional de población y de viviendas. Cifras provisionales. Asunción. 
INSTITUTO DE BIENESTAR RURAL (1963- ) 
Memoria General del Ejercicio 1963-1986. Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (n.d) 
Hojas Informativas. Dirección de investigaciones y extensión agropecuaria y 
forestal. Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (1956- ) 
Memoria 1956-84. Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (1961) 
Censo agropecuario 1956. Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (1969- ) 
Cuentas Culturales 1969-70,1981-82. Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (1971- ) 
Encuesta agropecuario por muestra 1971,1979. Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (1976) 
Plan de desarrollo agropecuario y forestal 1977-81; Anexo estadístico (diciembre 
1976). Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (1979) 
Encuesta de tractores y cosechadores. Secretaría Técnica de Planificación. 
Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (1983) 
Plan nacional de desarrollo agropecuario y forestal 1985-89. Oferta y demanda. 
Apéndice estadístico (diciembre 1983). Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (1985) 
Censo agropecuario 1981. Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA (1986) 
Atlas censal. Dirección General de Estadística y Censos (enero 1986). Asunción. 
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MINISTERIO DE INDUSTRIA Y COMERCIO (1979) 
Directorio Industrial. División de Estadística y Censos. Gabinete Técnico. 
Asunción. 
MINISTERIO DE INDUSTRIA Y COMERCIO (1980) 
Encuesta industrial urbana 1977. División de Estadística y Censos. Gabinete 
Técnico. Asunción. 
SERVICIO TECNICO INTERAMERICANO DE COOPERACIÓN AGRICOLA (1955- ) 
Manual Estadístico del Paraguay 1955, 1958. Sección economía agrícola. 
Asunción. 
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ANNEX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND DEFINITION OF CONCTPTS 
(Cuestionario y definición de conceptos) 
1. Identificación 
1. Encuesta número (000-275) 
2. Zona número (distancia desde Asunción) 
3. Localización geográfica (departamento, distrito, compañía) 
2. Información sobre la familia 
1. ¿Cuántas personas viven en su casa * ? 
* Conjunto de personas que viven en una misma vivienda bajo un régimen 
familiar o parecido y comparten sus comidas. Está compuesto por el jefe del 
hogar, familiares, parientes o criados que allí residen. Se incluye también a 
los familiares ausentes por un corto período pero que aún fijan residencia 
allí. 
2. ¿Cómo se llama el jefe..(otras personas)? 
3. ¿Qué relación familiar tiene ...(otras personas) con el jefe (esposa, concubina, 
hijo, padre, otro)? 
4. ¿Cuántos años tiene? 
5. ¿Qué sexo (hombre, mujer)? 
6. ¿Dónde nació (departamento, distrito, compañía) 
7. ¿Qué estado civil (casado, concubinado, separado, soltero, viudo, otro)? 
8. ¿Sabe leer y / o escribir? 
9. ¿Cuál fue el último grado que aprobó (primaria, secundaria, universitaria)? 
10. ¿A qué se dedica durante el día (trabajo, ama de casa, estudio, desocupado, 
jubilado, enfermo, otro)? 
. / . Solamente para personas que trabajan o buscan trabajo 
11. ¿Qué ocupación principal tiene * ? 
* Ocupación principal: ocupación realizada habitual y continuamente o 
trabajo remunerado que hace las más veces / horas. 
195 
Información sobre la ocupación principal 
¿Cuántas horas al día trabaja en su ocupación principal? 
¿Cuántas días a la semana trabaja en su ocupación principal? 
¿Cuántas meses al año trabaja en su ocupación principal? 
¿Dónde práctica su ocupación principal? 
¿Cuánto gana semanalmente con su ocupación principal (Guaraníes). 
Información sobre las ocupaciones 2-3-4 
¿Además de la ocupación principal, cuáles personas tienen otras actividades 
remuneradas * ? 
* Ocupación ocasional: ocupación realizada discontinuamente, sólo 
durante cierta época del año, trabajos de relativamente corta duración, 
inferior a la ocupación principal. 
¿Qué otro trabajo remunerado tiene? 
¿Cuántas horas al día trabaja en su ocupación 2-4? 
¿Cuántas días a la semana trabaja en su ocupación 2-4? 
¿Cuántas meses al año trabaja en su ocupación 2-4? 
¿Dónde práctica su ocupación 2-4? 
¿Cuánto gana semanalmente con su ocupación 2-4 (Guaraníes). 
¿Además de esas 3 actividades suplementarias, tiene más trabajos 
remunerados? 
¿Cuánto es el ingreso familiar semanal, incluso la remuneración de todos los 
miembros del hogar por todos los trabajos realizados (principal, 2-3-4)? 
Información sobre negocios prediales * 
* Negocio predial: pequeños comercios 
¿En todas sus chacras, cuántas aves, vacas, caballos, cerdos y otros animales 
tiene? 
¿Este año agrícola, cuánto ganó con la venta de aves, vacas, caballos, 
cerdos? 
¿Este año agrícola, cuánto ganó con la venta de frutales, productos 
forestales, leche, huevos, queso, manteca, miel, esencia de petit grain, 
carbón, otros productos? 
¿Este año agrícola, cuánto ganó con la venta de productos artesanales? 
¿Para cada negocio predial: desde qué año hace este negocio en su chacra? 
¿Cuánto es el ingreso familiar semanal, incluso la remuneración de todos los 
negocios prediales? 
¿Incluso todos actividades prediales y extraprediales de todas las personas de 
la familia, cuánto es el ingreso total familiar semanal * ? 
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* Ingreso total: Retribución, remuneración o pago por trabajo(s) 
realizado(s) por todos los miembros del hogar, en cualquier actividad 
económica, por concepto de donaciones y regalos, jubilaciones, pensiones u 
otros rentas en dinero (excluso el ingreso agrícola). 
6. Información sobre la historia de ocupaciones principales 
./. Solamente para personas que trabajan, buscan trabajo o que tenían trabajo. 
1. ¿Quién de las personas tenían otras ocupaciones en tiempos anteriores o han 
cambiado el lugar del trabajo? 
2. ¿Cuál ocupación (1-3) tenía antes de la ocupación principal actual? 
3. ¿De qué año hasta qué año ha practicado esa ocupación anterior (1-3)? 
4. ¿Dónde ha practicado esa ocupación anterior (1-3)? 
5. ¿Porqué dejó (1-3)? 
6. ¿Además de esas 3 ocupaciones anteriores, tenía más? 
7. ¿Hace aproximadamente 10 años, cuáles ocupaciones tenía al 
mismo tiempo? 
7. Información de cultivos 
* Qué superficie utiliza Usted para asiento de su morada y para sus cultivos? 
1. ¿Cuáles son los cultivos principales que ha cultivado en todas sus chacras? 
./. De cada uno de los cultivos: 
2. ¿Cuántas hectáreas fueron plantadas/ sembradas? 
3. ¿Cuántas hectáreas fueron cosechadas? 
4. ¿Cuántas kilos/ plantas fueron cosechados? 
5. ¿Qué parte de la cosecha se vendió? 
6. ¿A quién se vendió? 
7. ¿Cómo se pagó? 
8. ¿Cuánto se pagó? 
9. ¿Cuánto gastó Usted para comprar los insumos/ fertilizantes/ abonos/ 
insecticidas/ preparar la tierra/ cosechar? 
10. ¿Ha Usted conseguido crédito este año? 
11. ¿Cuánto (en Guaraníes)? 
12. ¿Qué tasa de ínteres tiene? 
13. ¿En todas las chacras que Usted trabaja, cuántas hectáreas no aprovecha? 
14. ¿Porqué no las aprovecha? 
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8. Información sobre las tierras 
1. ¿Cuántos lotes tiene Usted? 
./. Para cada uno de los lotes: 
2. ¿Qué superficie tiene (en hectáreas) 
3. ¿Dónde se encuentra? 
4. ¿Desde qué año lo tiene? 
5. ¿Qué tenencia tiene? 
6. ¿Cuánto está pagando por su lote(s)? 
./. Solamente para ocupantes: 
7. ¿La tierra que ocupa, de quién es? 
8. ¿Porqué no solicitó formalmente el lote al IBR? 
./ . Para todos: 
9. ¿Cuántas días trabajo bajo el sistema de Minga? 
10. ¿Qué tipo de trabajo fue? 
11. ¿En qué lugar fue? 
12. ¿Cuánto se le pagó cada día? 
9. Información sobre la historia de migración y las tierras 
1. ¿Desde qué año vive aquí? 
2. ¿Dónde vivió antes de migrar a este lugar? 
./ . Solamente para familias que tienen 10 años o más en el 
mismo lugar (1976): 
2. ¿Los últimos 10 años (desde 1976), cuántas hectáreas perdió Usted? 
3. ¿En qué año fue? 
4. ¿Dónde estaba el lote que perdió? 
5. ¿Qué tenencia tenía? 
6. ¿Cómo lo perdió? 
7. ¿A quién lo perdió? 
8. ¿Los últimos 10 años (desde 1976), cuántas hectáreas adquirió Usted? 
9. ¿En qué año fue? 
10. ¿Dónde estaba el lote que adquirió? 
11. ¿Qué tenencia tenía? 
12. ¿Cómo lo adquirió? 
13. ¿De quién lo adquirió? 
14. ¿Cuántas personas que viven en su casa trabajan en su chacra? 
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15. ¿Además de las pereonas que viven en su casa, cuántas otras personas 
trabajan también en su chacra? 
10. Información sobre colonización y bienestar rural 
1. ¿Quién de las personas que viven en su casa han vivido o trabajado 
(temporalemente) en una colonia del IBR (Zona de colonización)? 
./ . Para cada uno de los migrantes temporales: 
2. ¿Cuántas veces ha estado en una colonia del IBR? 
3. ¿En total, cuántos meses estuvo allá? 
4. ¿Qué colonia fue? 
5. ¿Porqué salió? 
6. ¿Tiene Usted parientes que han migrado a uno de los ejes de colonización? 
. / . De cada uno de los colonos: 
7. ¿En qué año salió de su casa? 
8. ¿Qué relación familiar tenía con el jefe? 
9. ¿Sexo? 
10. ¿Dónde nació? 
. / . El año que se fue.. 
11. ¿Cuántos años tenía? 
12. ¿Qué estado civil tenía y con quién se fue? 
13. ¿Podía leer y escribir? 
14. ¿Cuál fue el último grado que aprobó en la escuela primaria, secundaria o 
universitaria? 
15. ¿Cuál ocupación tenía? 
16. ¿Adonde migrò (en qué colonia se estableció)? 
17. ¿En este momento, dónde vive? 
18. ¿Cuántas hectáreas de tierra cultiva? 
19. ¿Qué tenencia tiene? 
20. ¿Qué contacto tiene Usted con los que han migrado a las colonias? 
11. Información final 
1. ¿Qué tenencia tiene su casa? 
2. ¿Su casa, cuántas habitaciones tiene (se excluyen cocina, corredor y baño)? 
3. ¿Qué tipo de cocina tiene? 
4. ¿Qué tipo de provisión de agua tiene? 
5. ¿Qué tipo de provisión de luz tiene? 
6. ¿Tiene heladera? 
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7. ¿Tiene radio? 
8. ¿Tiene tv? 
9. ¿Tiene máquina de coser? 
10. ¿Qué máquinas agrícolas tiene? 
11. ¿Piensa ampliar o mejorar su casa? 
12. ¿Porqué todavía no lo hizo? 
13. ¿Cuántas veces por semana comen carne de vaca? 
14. ¿Si Usted tuviese posibilidad de tener 5 hectáreas más, qué haría con esa 
tierra (si dice 'plantarla', con qué cultivos?)? 
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ANNEX 2 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE 
(in the order of interviewing) 
DEPARTMENT 
District 
Compañía 
Translation: 
Guaraní-English 
Number of interviews: 
CENTRAL 
1. M.R. Alonso: 
Commba Cué 
Rojas Cué 
San Blas 
2. Nueva Italia: 
Pindoty 
Pueblo 
Isla Guavirá 
Yuquity 
ItáBaté 
3. Itaugáu: 
Itaugáu Guazú 
Potrerito 
Mboy-y Cañada 
Aldama Cañada 
Guazú Vira 
Potrero Guazú 
Patino 
57 
z 
3 
1 
3 
S 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
42 
4 
8 
4 
4 
7 
5 
10 
Place of Palms 
Island of fruits 
Place of salt 
Elevated stone 
Made of a large stone 
Place of snakes 
Place of deers 
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CORDILLERA 58 
4. Itacurubí 
de la Cordillera: 
Minas Cué 
Caaguy Cupé 
Tacuara 
Tacuareé Oviedo 
5. Santa Elena: 
Loma Clavel 
Paso traquera 
María Auxiliadora 
San Roque 
6. Caraguatay: 
Teniente González 
Pueblo 
Alfonso Central 
Jhuguá Guazú 
Jhuguá Poi 
7. Primero 
de Marzo: 
Mcal. Estígarribia 
San Isidro 
8. Nueva Colombia: 
Pueblo 
Boquerón 
GUAIRA 
9.Yataity: 
Caagúy Cupé 
Pueblo 
Valle Pytá 
Loma Bárrelo 
13 
4 Used to be mines 
5 Behind the bush 
2 Bamboo 
2 Sugar Cane 
10 
3 
3 
1 
3 
20 
2 
2 
2 
3 Big depth 
11 Fine depth 
12 
5 
7 
I 
1 
2 Bush 
47 
Π 
5 Behind the Bush 
4 
1 Red Valley 
1 Hill 
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10. Colonia 
Independencia: 13 
San Gervasio 1 
Santa Cecilia б 
Potrero del Carmen 6 
ll.Ituibe: 10 
Concepción mi 2 
Costa alegre 8 
12. Tose 
Fassardi: 13 
San Pablo 1 
Santa Rosa 2 
Pueblo 5 
Santo Domingo 1 
San Roque 3 
San Juan 1 
CAAZAPA: 39 
13. Caazapá: 19 
Rosario Guavirá 2 
San Pedro mi 4 
Galeano Cué 6 
Nupuajhú mi 5 
Riachuelo 1 
Cabayú Reta 1 
14. Moïses S. 
Bertoni: g 
Santa Teresa 7 
San Carlos 1 
15. Aba-I: 12 
Aba-I 2 
San Valentín 8 
Corazón de Jesús 2 
PARAGUARI 74 
16: Sapucaí: 
Mbocayá 
Ytoro 
Cerro Verde 
17. Escoban 
Arroyo Pora 
Mbocayaty 
18. Tebicuary-mí: 
Colonia Céspedes 
Jugua-í 
19. Ouyquyho: 
Quyquyho 
Pueblo 
Cerro Vy 
20. Quiindy: 
Toba tinguá 
Costa Goana 
Costa Irala 
Com. Peralta 
Com. Gamarra 
luagua-poí 
SAMPLE TOTAL 
5 
2 
1 
2 
10 
5 
5 
S 
1 
4 
18 
3 
4 
11 
36 
6 
11 
13 
4 
1 
1 
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Coconut tree 
Place of cocoi 
Small hotel 
Fine depth 
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ANNEX 3 
MAPS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CENTRAL REGION 
CENTRAL 
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ANNEX 4 
LIST OF SPANISH EXPRESSIONS AND THEIR ENGLISH MEANING 
Acopiador middleman, often also moneylender. 
Actividades prediales: on-farm activities. 
Administrador administrator, IBR employee responsible for the administration of 
the agricultural colonies. 
Aldea: small village, hamlet. 
Almacén: (general) store. 
Almacenero: store keeper. 
Aopoi: specific kind of wattlework, typical of the department of Guaira. 
Artesanía: trade, (handi)craft. 
Ayudante: helper, e.g. driver's mate or builder's labourer. 
Azucarera (industria..): sugar mill. 
Arroyo: little stream. 
Banco Nacional de Fomento: National Development Bank. 
Bandeirantes: people from Sâo Paulo searching for slaves, gold, or any other 
sources of wealth. 
Calendario: time schedule, e.g. for delivering sugar cane at the sugar mill. 
Campesino: small farmer, peasant. 
Changa: seasonal work in agriculture. 
Chaqueños: inhabitants of the Chaco. In this study also: the war-minded Indians 
living in the Chaco at the time of Spanish colonization. 
Colonia: agricultural colony established or recognized by the IBR, or private 
agricultural colony. 
Colonia agrícola-granjera: colony specializing in farming, animal husbandry and 
horticulture. 
Colonia agrícola-forestal: colony specializing in farming and forest exploitation. 
Colonia ganadera: colony specializing in cattle ranching. 
Comerciante: middleman, see also acopiador. 
Compañía: administrative subdivision of a municipality. 
Eje Este de Colonización: eastern axis of colonization. 
Eje Norte de Colonización: northern axis of colonization 
Eje Sur de Colonización: southern axis of colonization 
Empleado: employee, wage labourer. 
Estatuto Agrario: Agrarian Statute. 
Fundaciones: settlements, more specifically the villages established by the 
Spaniards in colonial times. 
Grandes casas comunales: large community houses. 
Guaraní: the original inhabitants of Paraguay (and their language), and Paraguay's 
national currency (in this study: 1,000 G = 2 US dollars) 
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Herencia: inheritance. 
Ingresos extraprediales: income from off-farm activities. 
Instituto de Bienestar Rural (IBR): Institute of Rural Welfare (1963- ) 
Instituto de Reforma Agraria (IRA): Institute of Agrarian Reform (preceding the 
IBR). 
Jefe de Familia: head of the household. 
Jornalero: day labourer. 
Jornalero agrícola: day labourer in agriculture. 
Latifundio: latifundium, large agricultural holding (according to the Agrarian 
Statute: holding of over 10,000 hectares in eastern Paraguay and over 
20,000 hectares in western Paraguay which is not rationally exploited). 
Latifundista: owner of latifundium. 
Lote: parcel, farm. 
Lote agrícola: parcel or farm used for agriculture. 
Lote colonial: parcel or farm within an agricultural colony. 
Lote ganadero: parcel or farm used for cattle ranching within a 'Colonia 
ganadero'. 
Lote urbano: piece of land to dwell on in the urban centre of a colony. 
Mejoras: improvements, e.g. those made by clearing the land. 
Ministerio de Agricultural y Ganadería: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
Farming. 
Ministerio de Industria y Comercio: Ministry of Industry and Commerce. 
Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones: Ministry of Public Works and 
Communications. 
Minga: system of mutual, unpaid neighbour help. 
Minifundio: minifundium, small agricultural holding (in this study: farm with less 
than 5 hectares of land). 
Minifundista: small farmer (in this study: farmer with less than 5 hectares of 
land). 
Nanduti: Specific kind of wattlework, typical for the departments of Central and 
Cordillera. 
Núcleo urbano: urban centre. 
Ocupante: occupier, e.g. farmer without definitive or provisional property rights, 
nor lease contract. 
Ocupante de hecho: farmer who has been occupying his land for more than 20 
years uninterruptedly and cannot be expelled from it, according to Law 
622. 
Ocupante familiar occupier of land owned by relatives. 
Olería: small brickworks. 
Patrón-cliente: patron-client (in this study: middleman-farmer). 
Plan de loteamiento: plan under to which colonization areas are parcelled out. 
Presión sucesorial: pressure caused by the large number of successors/ inheritors. 
Programa de colonización y migración interna: IBR programme for colonization 
and internai migration. 
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Programa de consolidación: consolidation programme (IBR programme for improving 
the infrastructure in the IBR colonies). 
Programa de titulización: IBR programme for enabling the acquisition of legal 
property rights. 
Programa de promoción: incentive programme (programme of the Ministry of 
Agriculture for encouraging the growing of certain crops and improving 
farming methods. 
Programa de reparcelación: IBR programme of land redistribution. 
Registro Civil: civil registration. 
Registro de Propiedad: landed property register. 
Registro Público: public register. 
Reducciones: Indian settlements established by the Jesuits in colonial times. 
Reductos de subsistencia: remnants of a subsistence economy. 
Ruta: road. 
Solicitante: applicant, e.g. for property titles. 
Tierra de origen: area of origin (area of birth). 
Tierra en descanso: land lying fallow to improve soil fertility. 
Tierra fiscal: state land. 
Titular title holder. 
Título de propiedad: property title. 
Vecindad rural: hamlet. 
Zona Central: Central Region (including the departments of Central, Cordillera, 
Guaira, Paraguarí and Caazapá). 
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RESUMEN EN ESPAÑOL 
El sector agropecuario paraguayo hacia 1960 
A comienzos de la década del '60, el sector agropecuario del Paraguay se 
enfrentaba con varios problemas. Los niveles de productividad eran bajos y había 
poca diversificación, ya que la agricultura se limitaba principalmente a cultivos de 
subsistencia (manioca, maíz) y unos pocos de exportación (como algodón y 
tabaco). La gran mayoría de las familias rurales explotaba minifundios y era pobre, 
mientras que unos pocos latifundios de uso extensivo, propiedad de una pequeña 
elite de terratenientes paraguayos y extranjeros, monopolizaban gran parte del 
total de tierras arables. 
La situación era sumamente alarmante en la Región Central, donde el 57% de la 
población rural del país se encontraba concentrado en un mero 7% del territorio 
nacional. A causa de la alta densidad de la población y la distribución desigual de 
la tierra, la mayoría de los campesinos tenía que arreglárselas con terrenos muy 
pequeños, muchas veces sin siquiera tener la titulación oficial. El crecimiento 
demográfico estimuló la progresiva subdivisión de las tierras, mientras que la 
fertilidad del suelo disminuyó rápidamente debido a la superexplotación y las 
insuficientes medidas de conservación. La mayoría de los campesinos aplicó 
métodos tradicionales de cultivo, y no era capaz de alcanzar el nivel mínimo de 
subsistencia. 
Para estimular la producción agropecuaria y mejorar la situación de los pobres 
en el campo, el gobierno paraguayo partió del supuesto que no solamente debía 
cambiar la distribución geográfica de la población del país, sino también las 
relaciones rurales de tenencia y ocupación. Se asumió que el tamaño insuficiente 
de muchas chacras y la tenencia informal eran los principales obstáculos para un 
uso más racional e intensivo del suelo y de la mano de obra. Por lo tanto, los 
minifundistas debían obtener mayores explotaciones, mientras que los 'ocupantes' 
tenían que legalizar su situación. Estos dos cambios facilitarían la introducción de 
métodos de cultivación modernos, el crecimiento de la producción agropecuaria y 
el aumento de la prosperidad rural. 
La colonización agraria como instrumento para mejorar la situación 
Como el territorio nacional fuera de la Región Central todavía era escasamente 
poblado a comienzos de la década del '60, una política de colonización continuada 
parecía ofrecer las mejores posibilidades para realizar un desarrollo rural. Al 
ocupar las grandes superficies de tierras no explotadas o utilizadas en forma muy 
extensiva, que se encontraban en la parte oriental del Paraguay, los minifundistas 
y ocupantes se distribuirían sobre un área mayor del país, aliviando la presión 
demográfica en la Región Central. Tanto los que preferían quedarse atrás como los 
colonistas que se establecían en las zonas pioneras, tendrían la oportunidad de ser 
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los dueños legales de propiedades mayores. El mejoramiento de la distribución de 
las explotaciones según su tamaño y de la situación de tenencia deberían facilitar 
la introducción de nuevos cultivos y métodos más sofisticados de explotación, que 
a su vez aumentarían la producción agropecuaria nacional y el nivel de bienestar 
de la población rural. Así, la política de colonización continuada era considerada 
la solución más adecuada a los problemas que se presentaban tanto a nivel 
nacional como a nivel de los hogares individuales, evitando la realización de una 
reforma agraria radical que afectaría negativamente los intereses de las clases 
terratenientes. 
La implementación de la política de colonización agraria 
Después de establecer un nuevo Estatuto Agrario en 1963 (Ley 854), el gobierno 
paraguayo comenzó a transformar la estructura agraria del país. El Instituto de 
Bienestar Rural, creado en el mismo año por la Ley 852, fue el encargado de 
realizar la nueva política de desarrollo rural. Como institución autónoma, su tarea 
era la de: 'transformar la estructura agraria del país y la incorporación efectiva 
de la población campesina al desarrollo económico y social de la Nación, mediante 
soluciones legales que permitan eliminar progresivamente el latifundio y el 
minifundio, sustituyéndolos por un sistema justo de propiedad, tenencia y 
explotación de la tierra. Estas soluciones propugnarán la equitativa distribución 
de la misma, una adecuada organización del crédito, de la producción y su 
comercialización, asistiendo integralmente a los productores del campo para lograr 
su estabilidad económica, como garantía de su libertad y dignidad y como 
fundamento del bienestar social' (Ley 852, artículo 2). 
A fin de conseguir una distribución de la población más pareja, el IBR 
comenzó con el establecimiento de colonias agrarias en el oriente Paraguayo, a la 
vez que empezó a realizar un programa de migración (programa de colonización y 
programa de migración interna). En las zonas pioneras distribuyó parcelas, 
principalmente de 20 a 25 hectáreas: el tamaño mínimo necesario para asegurar el 
establecimiento de explotaciones racionales y mejorar la distribución de los predios 
según su tamaño. 
Además de su tarea de organizar la colonización de 'nuevas' tierras, el IBR 
también estaba autorizado a mejorar la situación en las zonas ocupadas de antaño, 
reemplazando a los latifundios y minifundios por un sistema de propiedad más 
justo (programa de reparcelación). De acuerdo al Estatuto Agrario, el IBR podía 
expropiar y redistribuir propiedades de más de 20.000 hectáreas en la Región 
Occidental (el Chaco), y de más de 10.000 hectáreas en la Región Oriental, más 
densamente poblada y más fértil, a condición de que estas latifundios no fuesen 
explotadas racionalmente. Además, el IBR también tenía autoridad para sumar a 
varios minifundios en una sola propiedad más grande. 
Con respecto al objetivo de mejorar la situación de tenencia y la posición de 
los ocupantes, el IBR desarrolló un programa de titulación, que posibilitaría a 
ocupantes informales convertirse en dueños legales llenando una aplicación oficial 
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en la oficina del IBR en Asunción y pagando por su lote en cuotas. Se esperaba 
que sobre todo la migración de ocupantes desde la Región Central hacia las 
colonias agrarias establecidas en las nuevas áreas pioneras mejorara la situación 
de tenencia. Al pagar sus cuotas, los colonistas automáticamente serían los dueños 
de sus tierras. Sin embargo, también los campesinos que se quedaban en las 
regiones densamente pobladas mejorarían su situación al pedir los derechos de 
propiedad para las parcelas que ocupaban o que eran abandonadas por los 
migrantes. Además, el proceso de legalización sería estimulado por las condiciones 
fijadas en la 'Ley 622 de Colonizaciones y Urbanizaciones de Hecho' (1960) y la 
'Ley 854' (artículo 135-136), que decían que los campesinos que habían ocupado el 
suelo 'de buena fe' durante un mínimo de 20 años, tenían derecho a ser 
propietarios legales. 
Finalmente, el IBR también era responsable por el fomento del crecimiento 
agrario y su diversificación, y por proveer a las colonias de la infraestructura 
necesaria para conseguir estos objetivos (programa de consolidación). 
Evaluación de la política de colonización agraria 
a. con respecto a las áreas colonizadas 
De 1963 hasta 1985, el IBR supuestamente ha hecho accesibles más de 7.572.000 
hectáreas en 519 lugares diferentes. Entre 1963 y 1980, hubo 18.667 familias con 
87.950 personas que migraron o se repatriaron gracias al programa de migración 
interna. No obstante, la gran mayoría de colonistas se ha establecido en forma 
espontánea, lo que significa que el IBR reconoció su asentamiento como 'colonia 
oficial' en retrospectiva, o que estos migrantes aún tienen la posición de 
ocupantes ilegales. 
A pesar de que se esperaba que el proceso de colonización mejorara el nivel de 
bienestar de la población rural pobre que había abandonado la superpoblada Región 
Central, en la realidad sus efectos fueron decepcionantes. Algunos de los 
campesinos que habían abandonado la Región Central con la intención de ser 
dueño de una explotación más grande, fueron obligados a entregar su lote porque 
no pudieron conseguir la titulación, lo que se debe, entre otras cosas, a que 
muchos administradores del IBR han desaparecido con el dinero pagado por los 
campesinos para adquirir los documentos respectivos. Sin embargo, un motivo 
mucho más importante es que la mayoría de los colonistas ha llegado sin 
suficientes recursos y conocimientos para explotar plenamente su lote y conseguir 
el capital necesario para pagar por su parcela. En consecuencia, la mayoría 
todavía tiene la posición de ocupante o de dueño provisorio. Muchos colonistas ya 
decidieron vender partes de sus tierras para poder pagar el resto de su lote y 
cultivarlo en forma adecuada. Por otra parte, muchas de estas ventas no fueron 
registradas en el IBR y, por eso, no se incluyen en el registro de propiedades. El 
resultado es que las relaciones de propiedad y la situación de tenencia en muchas 
áreas colonizadas se han vuelto tan caóticas como en la Región Central. 
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Por lo tanto, no es sorprendente que muchos colonistas sigan produciendo 
cultivos de subsistencia en parcelas pequeñas, y que los patrones y métodos de 
cultivo en general siguiran siendo los mismos. 
La producción de cultivos comerciales también fue desalentada por la posición 
relativamente aislada de las áreas de colonización, la red de caminos deficiente y 
las pésimas facilidades de mercadeo. Otro motivo de la dificultad en introducir 
nuevos cultivos y cambiar los métodos de producción es que, en la mayoría de las 
áreas de colonización, los insumes deben ser comprados en grandes cantidades y a 
precios más altos que en la Región Central, donde el sector comercial está mejor 
adaptado a los productores pequeños. 
Sobre todo desde la década del '70, cuando llegaron grandes grupos de 
colonistas europeos y brasileños y se establecieron grandes empresas agrícolas, los 
colonistas paraguayos tuvieron que enfrentarse más y más a la competencia de 
aquellos. Mientras que la mayoría de los paraguayos sigue tratando de explotar sus 
pequeñas explotaciones y de pagar las cuotas, muchas empresas e individuos 
extranjeros con rapidez lograron ser propietario y comenzaron a producir cultivos 
de exportación en propiedades grandes y modernas. 
Los escasos estudios publicados con respecto al éxito o fracaso de la colonización 
agraria, no pasan de un nivel muy general de evaluación, tal como hicimos 
nosotros en lo precedente. Frecuentemente, los resultados de la política se repasan 
sin que se haga una distinción entre los diferentes niveles en que se puede 
concentrar la evaluación, o se tomen en cuenta las posibles diferencias entre 
varias áreas y /o grupos sociales. Además, muchas veces el factor temporal apenas 
es considerado. Sin embargo, va de por sí, que el juicio definitivo depende en 
gran medida del aspecto específico enfocado por los evaluadores. 
Los evaluadores que desean probar el éxito de la política de colonización 
agraria, estarán inclinados a enfatizar, sencillamente, que la colonización ha 
conducido a una mayor integración del territorio nacional, una distribución más 
balanceada de la población, la eliminación parcial o completa del latifundio, un 
aumento en la cantidad de propiedas medianas, la transformación de ocupantes 
informales en dueños legales y un aumento en el volumen de producción 
agropecuaria. 
Los evaluadores que desean criticar la política de colonización agraria, en 
cambio, enfatizarán la reproducción del minifundismo en las áreas pioneras, la 
gran cantidad de campesinos esperando la titulación de su tierra y el hecho de 
que la producción agraria haya seguido siendo tan tradicional y unilateral como 
antes. Además, enfatizarán que el IBR ha desestimado su tarea de consolidar el 
proceso de colonización proveyendo a las colonias de facilidades infraestructurales 
básicas y otras, lo que significa que los campesinos han sido invitados o 
estimulados a migrar sin que se les diera mucha ayuda para cambiar su posición 
económica. 
Los argumentos de los evaluadores críticos parecen ser los más convincentes, 
al menos a nivel de los hogares inividuales. De hecho, la mayoría de los colonistas 
todavía vive en malas condiciones y no fue capaz de mejorar su situación 
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visiblemente. Incluso puede afirmarse que, a pesar de más de 25 años de política 
de colonización, la mayoría de los colonistas vive en condiciones parecidas a las 
que imperan en la Región Central, y a veces su posición es aún peor. 
b. con respecto al antiguo núcleo agropecuario, o sea la Región Central 
Si bien se prestó mucha atención al estudio de la colonización en Paraguay desde 
la década del '60, ciertos aspectos claves, como la cuestión de si los programas de 
asentamiento fueron exitosos con respecto a la decongestión y el desarrollo de la 
Región Central del país, fueron más o menos ignorados como temas de 
investigación. Así pues, el objetivo central de este estudio es analizar en qué 
medida la política de colonización agraria efectivamente ha decongestionado la 
Región Central y mejorado la situación de la población rural pobre. 
Se asumió que la colonización agrícola automáticamente aliviaría la presión 
demográfica, mejoraría el tamaño de las explotaciones, cambiaría las condiciones 
de tenencia y aumentaría el bienestar rural en la Región Central, ya que se 
suponía que las nuevas oportunidades, ofrecidas por la apertura de las zonas 
orientales subexplotadas del país, serían aprovechadas por numerosos campesinos 
que no tenían suficientes tierras ni títulos de propiedad legales. Su salida de la 
Región Central haría disminuir el minifundismo y las relaciones de ocupación 
informales, para que mejorasen las condiciones para un mayor desarrollo en el 
área de emigración. 
A pesar de que el 59% de los colonistas fue recrutado en el marco del 
programa de migración interna, y que también la mayoría de los colonistas 
espontáneos era originaria de la Región Central, la situación en este área ha 
mejorado solo marginalmente. 
Más específicamente, esto significa que el proceso de emigración apenas tuvo 
consecuencias para la estructura de los tamaños de los predios en la Región 
Central, ya que muchos de los pioneros procedían de áreas con densidades de 
población relativamente bajas, y la mayoría de los colonistas dejó parcelas de 
solamente algunas hectáreas. En consecuencia, muchas familias sin tierras siguieron 
en las mismas condiciones, mientras que los hogares que ya poseían algo, a veces 
eran tan numerosos y necesitaban tanto suelo que las pocas hectáreas adicionales 
que les eran entregadas por sus parientes no ayudaban mucho. En cuanto a las 
familias que quedaron atrás y recibieron tierras adicionales, esto no alivió mucho 
sus problemas debido a que el crecimiento natural de la población siguió siendo 
alto. Además, la mayoría de los minifundistas no fue capaz de mejorar su 
situación, ni siquiera si hubieran tenido más tierra, debido a la degradación del 
suelo, la tenencia informal y la falta de capital. El fracaso de la emigración en 
estimular la modernización agrícola y el bienestar en la Región Central también es 
ilustrado por el hecho de que bastantes parcelas abandonadas han pasado a manos 
de especuladores y otras personas que no usan el suelo para la explotación 
agropecuaria. 
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En otras palabras, los efectos de la emigración en términos de la decongestión y 
el desarrollo rural han sido decepcionantes. Después de 25 años de política de 
colonización, la Región Central sigue tan densamente poblada como antes, y 
caracterizada por el minifundismo y la ocupación informal. La modernización 
agraria no ha ocurrido, y apenas han habido cambios en el bienestar de la 
población rural de la región. 
Si bien grandes grupos de campesinos han abandonado la Región Central, la 
mayoría de los pobres rurales decidió quedarse, por ejemplo porque preferían 
aprovechar las facilidades del programa de titulización para convertirse en 
verdaderos propietarios en su región de nacimiento. Apenas necesita mencionarse 
que su decisión tenía una influencia negativa en el esfuerzo del gobierno de 
mejorar la distribución geográfica de la población del país. Ni debe sobreestimarse 
el impacto del programa de colonización con respecto a la estructura de los 
tamaños de las explotaciones y el proceso de modernización agrícola. El 
minifundismo persistió debido a que la mayoría de los migrantes solo tenía lotes 
muy pequeños, y a que no se tomaban medidas radicales de reforma agraria. 
Además, la legalización de las propiedades realmente no ocurrió de acuerdo a los 
criterios establecidos oficialmente (que dicen que uno no puede ser dueño de 
predios extremadamente grandes o pequeños), ni se han considerado debidamente 
las características de los beneficiarios de las titulaciones. Muchos títulos de 
propiedad fueron otorgados a personas que no eran campesinos, y a personas de 
edad relativamente alta (y no muy abiertas a la modernización) o que tenían 
grandes familias mientras que recibieron solamente parcelas pequeñas. Esto explica 
porqué el suministro de títulos de propiedad no causó automáticamente un proceso 
de modernización agropecuaria. 
Motivos para no abandonar la Región Central 
En la medida en que investigaciones anteriores se ocupan de la pregunta porqué la 
mayoría de los habitantes de la Región Central prefirió quedarse en vez de migrar 
a regiones donde podían ser los propietarios legales de porciones mayores de 
tierra, muchos autores enfatizan que a numerosos campesinos les disgusta mucho 
la vida de pioneros, y se quedan en su tierra por motivos de tradición. A fin de 
investigar cuáles son los verdaderos motivos para la decisión de quedarse, hicimos 
un estudio en profundidad de los habitantes que se quedaron y tenían menos de 5 
hectáreas de tierra, y que en su mayoría eran ocupantes. La pregunta central era: 
¿porqué muchos de estos pequeños campesinos decidieron no migrar, a pesar de 
tener la oportunidad de poseer una propiedad más grande en una de las áreas de 
colonización? 
Al diseñar la política de colonización, el IBR implícitamente partió del supuesto 
que el tamaño inadecuado de las explotaciones era el mayor problema de muchos 
minifundistas. Esto implicaba que la apertura de 'regiones vacías' causaría casi 
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automáticamente la migración de aquellos que tenían insuficientes tierras y 
esperaban poder establecer explotaciones más grandes en una de las zonas 
pioneras. En otras palabras, se suponía que las posibilidades de colonización 
agrícola activarían casi inmediatamente un considerable movimiento migratorio de 
los segmentos más pobres de la población. 
Sin embargo, el proceso migratorio a las colonias agrarias ubicadas fuera de la 
Región Central siempre siguió siendo de dimensiones limitadas. En vez de migrar 
hacia las áreas de colonización, la mayoría de los minifundistas que viven en la 
Región Central han preferido contrarrestar la falta de tierra por medio de las 
llamadas 'estrategias de supervivencia diagonales'. Al desarrollar una gran 
variedad de fuentes adicionales de ingresos, que en general no tienen que ver 
directamente con la agricultura, muchos hogares han logrado ingresos más altos de 
los que generaría el trabajo agrario, por lo que prefirieron no establecerse en una 
de las zonas de colonización. Comenzar una nueva vida como colonista en una 
región 'desierta' habría significado que la mayoría de los miembros de la familia 
hubiera sacrificado sus actividades, con la consecuencia de que el ingreso familiar 
dependería casi completamente de la agricultura y ya no de una amplia gama de 
trabajos, lo que significaría una disminución considerable del mismo. En otras 
palabras, muchos pequeños campesinos eran muy conscientes de que en las áreas 
de colonización las oportunidades de encontrar otras fuentes de ingreso serían 
limitadas, no solamente por el carácter menos diversificado de la economía de 
frontera, sino también porque una gran parte de la mano de obra familiar era 
necesaria para preparar el suelo para la cultivación. 
Así, puede decirse que los minifundistas de la Región Central no forman un 
grupo homogéneo de campesinos que, sin excepción, necesitan tierra y están todos 
igualmente interesados en abandonar su actual lugar de residencia para poder 
ocupar un predio mayor en una de las zonas de colonización del país. En efecto, 
la mayoría de los minifundistas consideró que la mejor solución para sus problemas 
no era la adquisición de mayores chacras, ya que ellos no dependen 
exclusivamente de la agricultura sino también de una gran variedad de otras 
fuentes de ingresos. Esto explica en gran parte porqué, a pesar de 25 años de 
política de colonización, la mayoría de los minifundistas no ha optado por la 
posibilidad de asentarse en lotes más grandes fuera de la Región Central. 
El minifundismo como un obstáculo a la modernización y la prosperidad 
A fin de transformar la rezagada economía agropecuaria de la Región Central y 
realizar un desarrollo rural, el IBR asumió que su primer objetivo debía ser 
mejorar las relaciones de propiedad rurales desfavorables. El insuficiente tamaño 
de las explotaciones era considerado uno de los principales obstáculos a la 
modernización agrícola, ya que se suponía que la introducción de nuevos cultivos 
más productivos y de métodos de cultivo modernos en solo unas pocas hectáreas 
no sería lo suficientemente lucrativa. Sin embargo, en cuanto los campesinos 
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tuviesen acceso a superficies mayores, la modernización agrícola y la prosperidad 
rural se realizarían mas o menos automáticamente. 
Sin embargo, aún en los casos donde la fuente principal de ingresos de los 
minifundistas es la agricultura, no es correcto atribuir sus problemas a la 'falta de 
tierra'. Esto implica que no hay una relación directa entre el tamaño de la chacra 
y el bienestar rural. Aún cuando los minifundistas hubieran sido provistos de 
mayores porciones de tierra dentro de la Región Central, esto no necesariamente 
habría llevado a una modernización agrícola y un creciente bienestar rural. Mucho 
depende de la forma en que se va a usar la tierra. Mientras los campesinos 
pequeños no tengan los recursos suficientes como para invertir productivamente en 
su tierra, las facilidades de mercadeo sigan siendo deficientes y los campesinos sin 
título de propiedad no obtengan créditos, cambios en el tamaño de las 
explotaciones casi no resultarán en mejoras en el uso de suelo o en cambios 
fundamentales en la posición económica de las familias rurales en cuestión. 
Mientras sigan trabajando en la agricultura, los minifundistas probablemente 
usarán el suelo adicional de la misma manera que el resto de su predio, o sea 
para cultivar mandioca y maíz, mientras que otros quizás prefieran venderlo en la 
forma de lotes urbanos. 
Si bien parece correcto considerar la distribución sumamente desigual del suelo 
agrario como una de las causas fundamentales de la pobreza rural en la región, 
los actuales problemas no pueden ser eliminados exitosamente ofreciendo 
simplemente lotes mayores en las áreas de colonización o en la Zona Central. La 
medida en que una reforma agraria contribuye realmente al desarrollo rural, en 
última instancia depende de la forma en que la gente puede usar sus nuevas 
tierras. 
La ocupación como un obstáculo a la modernización y el progreso 
Además de asumir que los minifundistas en la Región Central sin excepción serían 
beneficiados con las medidas tendientes a fomentar la emigración y las relaciones 
de propiedad más equilibradas, la política paraguaya de desarrollo rural también 
partió del supuesto que cambios en las condiciones desfavorables de tenencia 
serían un instrumento muy adecuado para mejorar el nivel de subsistencia de los 
ocupantes. Igual que muchos otros partidarios de la regularización de la tenencia, 
el IBR creía que, aparte del insuficiente tamaño de las chacras, la persistencia de 
la agricultura tradicional y la pobreza rural en la Región Central se explicaban en 
primer lugar por la falta de seguridad legal, por lo que los campesinos estaban 
poco motivados para hacer inversiones en la conservación o hasta el mejoramiento 
de la fertilidad del suelo y el aumento de la producción agrícola. En otras 
glabras, se suponía que la seguridad legal, basada en la plena propiedad de la 
tierra, tendría consecuencias positivas para la estabilidad de la actividad agraria y 
el nivel de las inversiones. Una vez adquiridos los títulos de propiedad, el 
desarrollo agrario y el aumento del bienestar no tardarían en llegar. 
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Sin embargo, en la práctica solo una pequeña cantidad de ocupantes en la Región 
Central se convirtió en propietario legal, y en muchos casos la legalización no fue 
seguida por el desarrollo rural. 
Uno de los motivos por que, hasta ahora, solamente unos pocos ocupantes en la 
Región Central han hecho uso de las facilidades de legalización es la complejidad 
del trámite para poder ser pleno propietario, así como sus altos costos, que 
causan que muchos campesinos decidan seguir siendo ocupantes y no gastar mucho 
tiempo y grandes sumas de dinero. Muchos de ellos también saben que los títulos 
de propiedad no pueden ser transferidos muy fácilmente a la siguiente generación 
por medio de una herencia, ya que los herederos también deben pasar por un 
trámite largo y costoso en Asunción para poder obtener los documentos en sus 
nombres. 
Además de estos obstáculos burocráticos, otra causa de la cantidad 
relativamente grande de campesinos sin títulos de propiedad es que muchos de 
ellos simplemente no están lo suficientemente interesados en adquirir los 
documentos. Uno de sus argumentos es que los títulos no son registrados en una 
forma moderna y adecuada, lo que significa que los documentos tienen un valor 
legal limitado. Aún más importante es el hecho de que la gran mayoría de los 
ocupantes en la Región Central vive en tierra que es la propiedad de algún 
pariente. La posición de este grupo de Ocupantes familiares' es bastante segura, o 
sea que los trámites de legalización apenas si mejorarían su situación. Ocupación e 
inseguridad de tenencia no siempre son sinónimos. Además, este grupo de 
ocupantes no tiene posibilidades de convertirse en dueño de los lotes en que está 
viviendo, ya que la tierra le pertenece a otra persona, cuya propiedad no puede 
ser expropiada. En otras palabras, muchos Ocupantes familiares' solamente podrán 
cambiar su condición de ocupante por la de propietario legal si migran a otro 
lugar y ocupan tierras fiscales o suelo privado que forma parte de latifundios 
explotados irracionalmente. Mientras su condición de ocupante no les haga correr 
el riesgo de perder su tierra, muchos minifundistas aducen que la adquisición de 
los títulos de propiedad contribuye no tanto a una mayor seguridad legal, sino mas 
bien causa costos innecesarios. 
Además, un considerable número de ocupantes todavía no aplicó por los títulos 
de propiedad, porque muchos de ellos aún no son conscientes de su condición 
ilegal, o al menos informal: siempre han estado usando el suelo en base a derechos 
tradicionales. 
Un último motivo importante de que muchos ocupantes no estén interesados en 
legalizar su condición es que prefieren usar el suelo sin pagar los impuestos a la 
propiedad. 
Evaluando el programa de titulización, puede decirse que no ha solucionado el 
problema de la ocupación informal en la Región Central. Por una parte, esto debe 
explicarse mencionando la forma pasiva en que el IBR ha tratado de eliminar este 
problema, y los trámites oficiales complicados y costosos que son necesarios para 
pasar a ser propietario legal. Por otra parte, sin embargo, también debe señalarse 
que los ocupantes no forman un grupo totalmente homogéneo, y que, en 
221 
consecuencia, las ventajas y desventajas de su posición informal varían 
considerablemente. Algunos de ellos estaban muy interesados en ser propietarios 
legales, pero otros no. Algunos son Ocupantes de hecho', lo que significa que han 
estado viviendo en su tierra ininterrumpidamente por 20 años o más, y de buena 
fe, mientras otros ocupan la tierra de parientes. La categoría de ocupantes que, 
en efecto, es más amenazada por la posibilidad de expulsión es la de los 
campesinos que se asentaron recientemente en suelo de propietarios particulares 
desconocidos y, en menor medida, los que han ocupado tierras fiscales en las que 
también están interesados los ladrones y especuladores de tierras. 
Sin embargo, el IBR no parece darse suficiente cuenta de estas diferencias, ya 
que no ha practicado una política de otorgar derechos a justamente las categorías 
mencionadas en último término. Tampoco ha tratado de dar títulos de propiedad 
especialmente a aquellos campesinos cuya subsistencia depende principalmente de 
la agricultura, y que disponen solamente de una parcela de tierra ocupada 
informalmente. En efecto, muchos títulos han sido entregados a no-campesinos, o 
sea gente con ingresos relativamente altos que puede permitirse los costos de la 
legalización, y a los que ya eran propietarios plenos de varias otras parcelas. 
Es evidente que el programa de titulización fomentará la modernización agrícola 
solamente si es aplicado a los grupos de campesinos que lo necesitan, y 
combinándolo con medidas como el mejoramiento de la red vial, créditos suaves y 
facilidades de mercadeo. Se pueden sacar conclusiones parecidas con respecto a la 
calidad del suelo. Muchas de las tierras de los ocupantes son de baja calidad o 
tienen mal drenaje, y no son muy adecuadas para cultivar. Y aún si los ocupantes 
se convirtieran en propietarios legales de la tierra e invirtieran más en ella, sería 
improbable que aumentaran los niveles de producción y los ingresos o que tuviese 
lugar una modernización de la agricultura. 
Algunas sugerencias para una política mis específica para la Región Central y las 
zonas pioneras 
Tomando en cuenta la permanencia del minifundismo, las ocupaciones y la 
producción tradicional en la Región Central, y el surgimiento de problemas 
similares en la mayoría de las áreas pioneras, la conclusión es que la política de 
colonización agraria no ha aliviado la situación de la población rural pobre. En 
ambas regiones, la pobreza rural, en efecto, siguió presente e incluso a veces se 
agravó. En cuanto al futuro, no puede esperarse que la continuación de la 
colonización agraria resuelva los problemas rurales. Además, hay otros motivos 
para insistir en que se detenga el proceso de colonización: el creciente déficit de 
tierras en el este del Paraguay y los problemas ecológicos causados por la intensa 
deforestación. Ha llegado el tiempo de reconocer la necesidad de revisar la 
política de desarrollo rural. Una política futura de desarrollo debería concentrarse 
en las áreas que ya son explotadas, prestando atención a sus características y 
potencial específicos. 
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Para resolver más exitosamente los 'viejos' problemas de la Región Central, deben 
diseñarse programas específicos para las diferentes áreas, basadas en la 
comprobación de que la Región Central no es una isla de congestión homogénea 
sino una región espacialmente diferenciada, en la que es necesario distinguir por 
lo menos dos subregiones. Sus características específicas y la política que 
requieren forman el tema de las páginas siguientes. 
a. Zona 1: los alrededores inmediatos de Asunción 
El área directamente alrededor de Asunción (zona 1) es caracterizada por una alta 
densidad de población. La superficie del suelo explotado extensivamente es 
relativamente pequeña, y la proporción de ocupantes es baja si se la compara con 
otras partes de la Región Central. Esto se explica, entre otros factores, por que 
las posibilidades de encontrar empleo adicional son bastante favorables ('respuestas 
diagonales'), con el resultado de que una proporción relativamente alta de la 
población tiene ingresos que les permiten adquirir títulos de propiedad. 
Con respecto a esta zona, una política de continuada colonización y migración 
interna no tendrá muchos efectos positivos. La emigración hacia una de las zonas 
pioneras será muy limitada, ya que solamente una fracción relativamente pequeña 
de la población rural sigue estando seriamente interesada en trabajar en la 
agricultura a tiempo completo. En las áreas donde las posibilidades de empleo no 
agrarias han llegado a ser una fuente de ingreso más importante que la misma 
agricultura, la población sencillamente ya no estará inclinada a migrar hacia zonas 
de colonización. 
También son muy limitadas las posibilidades de llevar a cabo exitosamente el 
programa de redistribución, debido al déficit absoluto del recurso tierra, causado 
por la presión demográfica. Además, debe tenerse en cuenta que, sobre todo en 
esta zona, un tamaño más favorable de la propiedad no resultará automáticamente 
en la modernización agrícola o en ingresos mayores por concepto de agricultura, 
aunque un pequeño grupo de campesinos se ha interesado por la producción 
comercial para proveer al mercado de Asunción. 
Finalmente, tampoco el programa de titulización tendrá poco impacto en el 
desarrollo, no solamente debido al interés limitado en la agricultura y la 
proporción relativamente grande de propietarios en zona 1, sino también porque la 
mayoría de los ocupantes no corre el riesgo de ser expulsados de su parcela. En 
vez de concentrar sus esfuerzos en la legalización de la situación de los 
'ocupantes de hecho', la acción del gobierno debería dirigirse a limitar el proceso 
de especulación de tierras en la zona de transición rural-uibana de Asunción, que 
causa que más y más campesinos decidan vender su tierra para que sea 
fraccionada en lotes urbanos. 
Además, el esfuerzo de la población de diversificar sus fuentes de ingreso 
debería ser reforzado por programas de industrialización rural, destinados a 
mejorar la producción y a aumentar la remuneración de actividades tanto 
agropecuarias como otras. 
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En cuanto se alcancen niveles de ingreso más altos, otras medidas 
gubernamentales podrían intentar 'reanimar' la agricultura comercial, estimulando a 
algunos campesinos a hacer inversiones productivas en sus tierras y facilitando la 
introducción de nuevos cultivos y de métodos más avanzados de producción рот 
medio de asistencia técnica y la oferta de créditos a bajo interés. En el área 
cerca de Asunción, las posibilidades para la horticultura y la producción de otros 
cultivos lucrativos son bastante buenas, gracias a la cercanía de la demanda. AI 
mejorar la productividad por hectárea, a largo plazo los campesinos pueden tener 
éxito en compensar el reducido tamaño de sus explotaciones. Sin embargo, al 
implementar las medidas se debe distinguir entre los que siguen estando 
interesados en volver a dedicarse por completo a la agricultura y los que 
solamente quieren producir algunos cultivos para el autoconsumo. 
b. Zona 2: las áreas más remotas de la Región Central 
Las partes mas bien remotas dentro de la Región Central (zona 2) se caracterizan 
por un nivel de bienestar relativamente bajo, y las condiciones de tenencia 
tampoco son muy favorables. La agricultura sigue siendo la principal fuente de 
ingresos para la mayoría de la población rural, y las fuentes adicionales son 
bastante escasas. El mayor problema de los minifundistas en estas zonas es cómo 
aumentar la productividad por hectárea a fin de compensar el tamaño reducido de 
sus propiedades y la continua fragmentación de la tierra. Los ingresos de los 
agricultores en general son demasiado bajos como para hacer suficientes 
inversiones, y la mayoría de los campesinos es excluida de los créditos oficiales ya 
que no tienen títulos de propiedad legales. Otro factor que desalienta la 
introducción de cultivos más lucrativos y la agricultura comercial es la deficiencia 
de la red vial y del sistema de mercadeo. 
De los minifundistas que han tratado de contrarrestar la falta de tierras, la 
mayoría ha migrado hacia otras áreas menos congestionadas ('respuestas 
horizontales'). Debido a que en la zona 2 una parte relativamente grande de las 
tierras todavía es usada en forma muy extensiva, o incluso no usada en absoluto, 
algunos minifundistas han preferido migrar sobre distancias cortas en vez de 
dirigirse a las áreas de colonización ubicadas en los departamentos en la frontera 
oriental del país. La movilidad de la población de la zona 2 es relativamente alta. 
En contraste con la zona 1, donde la fragmentación del suelo principalmente es el 
resultado de una creciente escasez absoluta de tierra, más que de su distribución 
desigual, el programa de redistribución todavía puede tener efectos positivos en 
las partes remotas de la Región Central, donde sigue habiendo latifundios. 
Las mejoras en el tamaño de las explotaciones pueden conducir a la 
modernización de la agricultura y a ingresos más altos; sin embargo, esto depende 
de la capacidad y voluntad de los campesinos para hacer inversiones en su 
propiedad y llevar sus productos al mercado, lo que implica que las medidas de 
reforma agraria deben ir acompañadas de medidas tales como la provisión de 
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crédite» baratos y el mejoramiento de la infraestructura (caminos, facilidades de 
almacenamiento, etc.). Mientras la adquisición de títulos de propiedad sea cara, no 
se puede esperar de los ocupantes que quieran legalizar su situación sin que 
aumenten sus ingresos. En consecuencia, también los ocupantes deberían poder 
obtener créditos oficiales. 
Al mismo tiempo, los trámites para adquirir derechos de propiedad oficiales 
deben ser simplificados, y, en vez de esperar pasivamente a que los ocupantes 
decidan viajar a Asunción, en las áreas remotas deberían abrirse oficinas locales 
para la legalización de las explotaciones. Por otra parte, esto no quiere decir que 
todos los ocupantes inmediatamente harán uso de este servicio. Mientras la 
'inseguridad' no sea el problema principal de los ocupantes, preferirán hacer 
inversiones productivas en su propiedad en lugar de gastar dinero en la 
adquisición de 'derechos de papel'. 
En cuanto tengan éxito en aumentar la producción agrícola, el siguiente paso 
puede ser la diversificación de sus fuentes de ingreso, desarrollando diversas 
actividades adicionales, como el procesamiento de cultivos y de otros productos. 
También este proceso de diversificación debería ser apoyado por medidas del 
gobierno. 
с las áreas de colonización 
Con respecto a las zonas de colonización, el gobierno debe tratar de prevenir que 
continúen la fragmentación de la tierra y la ocupación espontánea de nuevas 
áreas. Mientras que muchos ocupantes en la Región Central están protegidos por 
derechos y reclamos tradicionales, en las áreas de colonización recientemente 
ocupadas la seguridad de tenencia está basada principalmente en la propiedad legal 
definitiva - y si no, por lo menos provisoria. Esto significa que se debe dar 
prioridad a la implementación del programa de titulación, naturalmente a 
condición que sus trámites sean menos costosos y consuman menos tiempo. Sin 
embargo, igual que en la zona 2, parece ser aún más importante posibilitar a los 
colonistas la plena explotación de sus propiedades. 
Especialmente en las áreas de colonización, la infraestructura necesita ser 
mejorada. Mientras permanezcan deficientes las redes de caminos y de mercadeo y 
estén ausentes las facilidades básicas, el progreso no se materializará, por más 
que los tamaños de las propiedades y las condiciones de tenencia hayan mejorado. 
Los efectos negativos de tamaños inadecuados y ocupación informal pueden ser 
aún más severos en las áreas de asentamiento pionero que en la Región Central. 
En la mayoría de las zonas de frontera, las posibilidades de intensificación de la 
agricultura y de recurrir a otras fuentes de ingreso son relativamente limitadas, 
de manera que no funcionarán realmente como válvulas de seguridad. 
Finalmente, si el objetivo de la política de colonización agraria realmente es 
mejorar la situación de los campesinos pequeños y más pobres, debe restringirse el 
asentamiento libre de colonistas extranjeros y grandes terratenientes paraguayos. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Agrarische kolonisatie is vaak beschouwd als een geschikte strategie ter oplossing 
of vermindering van de problemen van (relatief) overbevolkte landbouwgebieden, 
waar het merendeel van de boeren onvoldoende grond bezit en vaak niet beschikt 
over legale eigendomsbewijzen. Het 'gebrek aan ruimte' en het ontbreken van 
voldoende rechtszekerheid ten aanzien van het geoccupeerde land worden gezien 
als de belangrijkste oorzaken van het uitblijven van agrarische modernisering en 
het voortbestaan van armoede in deze gebieden. Slechts wanneer de minifundisten 
de beschikking krijgen over grotere bedrijven en occupanten de wettige eigenaren 
worden van hun land zouden agrarische modernisering en welvaartsverhoging 
kunnen worden gerealiseerd. 
Een voorbeeld van een gebied dat door minifundisme en informele occupatie 
wordt gekenmerkt is Centraal Paraguay. In deze relatief dichtbevolkte regio bezat 
het grootste deel van de boeren in het begin van de jaren zestig slechts enkele 
hectaren land, terwijl de meesten niet beschikten over officiële 
eigendomsbewijzen. Om de bestaande problemen tot oplossing te brengen besloot 
de Paraguayaanse overheid in 1963 het proces van agrarische kolonisatie te 
stimuleren. Door het in gebruik nemen van nog niet geëxploiteerde 
landbouwgronden in Oost-Paraguay zouden de 'minifundistas' en 'ocupantes' in 
staat worden gesteld het dichtbevolkte centrumgebied te verlaten. Hun vertrek 
werd geacht de ontwikkeling van de agrarische sector in de 'Zona Central' te 
bevorderen en het welvaartspeil te verhogen. 
Het in 1963 opgerichte 'Instituto de Bienestar Rural' (IBR) werd 
verantwoordelijk voor de uitvoering van het beleid, en richtte zijn aandacht 
vooral op de stichting van landbouwkolonies in Oost-Paraguay ('programa de 
colonización'). Daarnaast nam het IBR maatregelen om het vertrek uit de 'Zona 
Central' te stimuleren ('programa de migración'), om te komen tot een 
herverdeling van het grondbezit ('programa de reparcelación') en de boeren te 
voorzien van deugdelijke eigendomsbewijzen ('programa de titulación). 
Na meer dar* 25 jaar ruraal ontwikkelingsbeleid moet echter worden 
geconstateerd dat ten aanzien van Centraal-Paraguay de doelstellingen nauwelijks 
zijn gerealiseerd. Ondanks een indrukwekkende toename van het aantal 
landbouwkolonies in Oost-Paraguay, wordt de 'Zona Central' nog steeds door 
relatieve oveibevolking, minifundisme en informele occupatie gekenmerkt. 
Blijkbaar heeft de agrarische kolonisatie onvoldoende geresulteerd in het vertrek 
van boeren, heeft er binnen de 'Zona Central' nauwelijks een herverdeling van de 
grond plaatsgevonden en heeft slechts een klein deel van de occupanten 
geprofiteerd van het legalisatieprogramma. 
Teneinde inzicht te krijgen in de ooizaken van het voortbestaan van de hieiboven 
genoemde problemen werd in september 1984 door de vakgroep Sociale Geografie 
van de Ontwikkelingsgebieden (KUN) een onderzoek geëntameerd naar 'Rurale 
ontwikkeling in Centraal-Paraguay'. De concrete onderzoeksdoelstelling behelsde 
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'een studie te maken van de rurale problematiek van Paraguay in het algemeen, 
van die in het oude centrale landbouwgebied in het bijzonder, van de recente 
veranderingen die zich hier onder invloed van het overheidsbeleid en andere 
ontwikkelingen hebben voltrokken, van de positie waarin de lage inkomensgroepen 
van dit gebied thans verkeren en van hun toekomstperspectieven'. Gegeven het 
feit dat de doelstellingen ten aanzien van de 'Zona Central' nauwelijks leken te 
zijn bereikt, werden de volgende onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd: 
1. Waarom is de Centrale Regio ondanks de mogelijkheid van agrarische 
kolonisatie nog steeds het concentratiegebied van het grootste deel van de rurale 
bevolking; waarom heeft - met andere woorden - het 'programa de migración' 
slechts een deel van de bevolking tot vertrek aangezet? 
2. Voor zover agrarische kolonisatie wèl heeft geleid tot het vertrek van de 
bevolking, in hoeverre is hierdoor de Centrale Regio Ontlasf, en in welke mate 
hebben kolonisten via het elders verkrijgen van meer land en van eigendomstitels 
hun welvaartspeil kunnen verhogen? 
3. Wat zijn de kenmerken van de minifundisten die in Centraal-Paraguay zijn 
blijven wonen en in hoeverre heeft de herverdeling van land ('programa de 
reparcelación') voor deze groep geresulteerd in agrarische modernisering en 
welvaartsverhoging? 
4. Wat zijn de kenmerken van de occupanten in Centraal-Paraguay en in 
hoeverre heeft de legalisatie van bezitsverhoudingen ('programa de titulización') 
voor deze groep geresulteerd in betere mogelijkheden voor agrarische 
modernisering en welvaartsverhoging? 
Verdeeld over twee perioden werden in Paraguay gedurende 12 maanden gegevens 
verzameld over de leefomstandigheden van kleine boeren in Centraal-Paraguay, de 
specifieke kenmerken van de agrarische kolonisatie (1963-1986) en de gevolgen van 
deze politiek voor de boeren die in het centrumgebied achterbleven, alsook voor 
de kolonisten die wèl naar de nieuwe gebieden zijn vertrokken. 
Hiertoe werd in samenwerking met het Ministerie van Landbouw, verspreid over 
de Centrale Regio, een enquête uitgevoerd onder 275 gezinnen (1483 personen) met 
minder dan 5 hectaren land. De enquête spitste zich inhoudelijk vooral toe op de 
vraag op welke wijze boeren met onvoldoende land en de status van 'ocupante' 
zich in de Centrale Regio een bestaan weten te verschaffen. Om meer inzicht te 
krijgen in de effekten van agrarische kolonisatie en de kenmerken van de door de 
overheidspolitiek begunstigde groep werden in Asunción landbouw- en 
kolonisatiedeskundigen geïnterviewd, gevolgd door een archiefonderzoek bij het 
IBR (steekproef van 1200 eigendomstitels). Tenslotte werd een 20-tal interviews 
afgenomen in één van de in Oost-Paraguay gelegen landbouwkolonies, die 
informatie verschaften over het welvaartsnivo dat de kolonisten, in vergelijking 
met hun sociaal-economische situatie vóór vertrek alsook in vergelijking met die 
van de achtergebleven familieleden, hebben weten te bereiken. 
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De resultaten van het onderzoek kunnen als volgt worden samengevat: 
1. De belangrijkste verklaring voor het feit dat veel minifundisten ondanks 
het gebrek aan voldoende grond niet naar een landbouwkolonie zijn vertrokken is 
dat velen reeds in de jaren zestig, maar vooral in de navolgende periode, voor 
een belangrijk deel de (commerciële) landbouw hebben verlaten. Doordat zij over 
te weinig land beschikten om met landbouw een voldoende inkomen te verdienen, 
ontwikkelden niet alleen de hoofden maar ook de overige leden van de 
huishoudens een breed scala van andere activiteiten, deels in combinatie met de 
landbouw, deels los daarvan in de niet-agrarische sectoren. Geconstateerd moet 
daarom worden dat de overheid zich bij het formuleren van de doelstellingen van 
de kolonisatiepolitiek onvoldoende rekenschap heeft gegeven van het bestaan van 
deze alternatieve bestaansmiddelen. Daar het gezinsinkomen van de meeste 
minifundisten nog maar voor een gering deel uit landbouw afkomstig was, waren 
veel boeren niet bereid hun wankele, maar wèl gediversificeerde bestaansbasis te 
verwisselen voor een veel eenzijdiger landbouwbestaan in de kolonisatiegordel. 
Voor veel minifundisten betekende agrarische kolonisatie geen oplossing voor hun 
problemen, waardoor het proces van vertrek zich minder massaal heeft voltrokken 
dan werd verwacht. 
2. Ondanks het feit dat - op zich bezien - een niet onaanzienlijke groep 
boeren wèl besloot om als kolonist naar de 'frontier' te vertrekken, deed de 
verwachte 'ontlasting' van de Centrale Regio zich slechts in geringe mate voor. 
De meeste boeren die vertrokken bezaten namelijk slechts zeer kleine stukjes 
grond, meestal in eigendom van familieleden, die direkt na vertrek weer werden 
'teruggenomen'. Dit impliceert dat hun vertrek slechts in beperkte mate (en 
tijdelijk) toegangverruimend heeft gewerkt voor de familieleden, terwijl de overige 
boeren er nauwelijks van konden profiteren. 
Terwijl er in het kader van de kolonisatiepolitiek ten aanzien van de mogelijke 
gevolgen voor de Centrale Regio nauwelijks expliciete doelstellingen werden 
geformuleerd, vestigde het IBR zijn hoop meer concreet op de kolonisatiezones, 
waar via de stichting van landbouwkolonies de agrarische vooruitgang moest 
worden gerealiseerd. Hier zou, naar het oordeel van het IBR, een welvarende 
boerenstand ontstaan, die als 'eigenaars' beschikte over bedrijven van voldoende 
omvang om op moderne wijze te kunnen worden geëxploiteerd. De naar deze 
kolonisatiezones vertrokken Paraguayanen blijken in werkelijkheid echter slechts 
in zeer geringe mate van hun nieuwe status te hebben geprofiteerd. De meesten 
zijn na vele jaren nog steeds niet in staat gebleken om hun 'lotes' (20-25 
hectaren) volledig te ontginnen, als gevolg van onvoldoende produktiemiddelen en 
een gebrekkige infrastructuur. Ondanks het feit dat men over voldoende land 
beschikt voor een in principe rendabel en commercieel landbouwbedrijf, wordt 
daardoor slechts een deel van het land benut, voornamelijk voor de verbouw van 
voedselgewassen. Door geldgebrek en het ontbreken van alternatieve 
inkomstenbronnen hebben inmiddels tal van kolonisten gedeelten van hun land 
afgestoten, om uit de opbrengsten van reeds aangebrachte ontginningen in ieder 
geval de resterende percelen te kunnen afbetalen. Veel kolonisten hebben echter 
nog steeds geen eigendomspapieren kunnen bemachtigen. Ze bewerken het land als 
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'ocupante' en kunnen daardoor geen aanspraak maken op officieel krediet. Het 
belangrijkste verschil met de situatie in de 'Zona Central' (zie 4.) is dat de 
zekerheid ten aanzien van de grond in de kolonisatiezones vaak wèl door het 
bezit van eigendomspapieren wordt bepaald. 
3. Het 'programa de redistribución' heeft nauwelijks geresulteerd in een 
betere landverdeling binnen de Centrale Regio, en zelfs al zouden zich wijzigingen 
in grondbezitsverhoudingen hebben voorgedaan dan zouden deze niet noodzakelijk 
tot agrarische modernisering en/of welvaartsverhoging hebben geleid omdat het 
merendeel van de kleine boeren het landbouwbestaan al min of meer heeft 
opgegeven en niet zo zeer in de introductie van nieuwe gewassen of 
produktiemethoden zijn geïnteresseerd. Ondanks de toenemende schaarste 
gebruiken de meeste minifundisten hun land vrij extensief: naast de verbouw van 
voedselgewassen (mais, maniok), ligt een deel van de grond braak om de 
bodemvruchtbaarheid te laten herstellen. Slechts de helft van de ondervraagde 
boeren wijdt zich nog aan de commerciële landbouw, waarbij katoen het vrijwel 
enige aantrekkelijke gewas is, omdat opkopers hiervoor zonder betaling vooraf de 
benodigde 'inputs' verstrekken. De verbouw van meer rendabele gewassen, waarmee 
men het tekort aan land zou kunnen compenseren, of het beplanten van grotere 
arealen, wordt bemoeilijkt doordat men over onvoldoende investerings-
mogelijkheden beschikt. Slechts degenen die inmiddels de landbouw hebben 
verlaten beschikken in principe over voldoende inkomsten voor het doen van 
dergelijke investeringen, maar juist deze groep heeft de belangstelling voor de 
landbouw verloren. De mogelijkheden om de landbouwproduktie op te voeren 
worden bovendien beperkt door externe factoren (geringe nationale vraag en 
exportmogelijkheden, gebrekkige 'marketing7, het ontbreken van voldoende 
kredietfaciliteiten etc). Geconcludeerd mag daarom worden dat het rurale 
ontwikkelingsbeleid onvoldoende rekening heeft gehouden met het feit dat het 
(kunnen) verwerven van meer land niet automatisch tot landbouwontwikkeling of 
welvaartsverhoging leidt. Herverdeling van het land zonder wezenlijke aandacht 
voor het gebruik ervan en zonder tal van ondersteunende maatregelen zal niet 
zonder meer leiden tot welvaartsverhoging van de kleine boeren. 
4. Ook de veronderstelling dat de legalisatie van de bezitsverhoudingen een 
gunstig effect zou hebben op de agrarische modernisering en het levenspeil van 
occupanten, blijkt in de praktijk niet te zijn bevestigd. Men verwachtte namelijk 
dat de uitgifte van eigendomspapieren de rechtszekerheid ten aanzien van de 
grond zou vergroten. Landeigenaren zouden, in tegenstelling tot occupanten, 
geïnteresseerd zijn in het doen van lange termijninvesteringen. Bovendien zouden 
de vroegere occupanten na legalisatie eindelijk in aanmerking komen voor officiële 
kredieten. In de Centrale Regio van Paraguay is echter slechts in beperkte mate 
sprake van onzekerheid en 'illegaliteif. Het merendeel van de occupanten blijkt 
hier grond van familieleden te gebruiken of informele afspraken met de eigenaren 
te hebben gemaakt, hetgeen betekent dat zij vrijwel niet met verdrijving worden 
bedreigd, ook al beschikken zij niet over eigendomsbewijzen. Onder deze 
omstandigheden betekent legalisatie nauwelijks een verbetering in de 
bestaanszekerheid, maar wordt het verwerven van eigendomspapieren eerder als 
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een onnodige kostenfactor beschouwd. Vanwege het relatief hoge bedrag dat men 
voor het verkrijgen van deze eigendomspapieren op tafel moet leggen, zijn in de 
loop van de tijd vooral de niet meer hoofdzakelijk van landbouw levende boeren 
in staat geweest om eigenaar te worden van de grond. Met andere woorden, juist 
degenen wier bestaan nog steeds afhankelijk is van 'toegang tot de grond' bleven 
van eigendomstitels verstoken, terwijl de minifundisten met overwegend niet-
agrarische inkomstenbronnen hun eigendomssituatie desgewenst wisten te 
formaliseren. Ook de gedachte dat legalisatie de landbouwontwikkeling zou 
stimuleren via het ook voor de ex-occupanten toegankelijk worden van officiële 
kredietfacilitieten, bleek in de praktijk slechts ten dele juist. Veel landeigenaren 
komen ondanks de eigendomspapieren nog steeds niet in aanmerking voor officiële 
kredieten, omdat ze nog steeds over onvoldoende grond beschikken om 
kredietwaardig te worden bevonden; anderen hebben hun interesse in commerciële 
landbouw verloren. 
Concluderend kan worden gesteld dat de problematiek van de kleine boeren in de 
Centrale Regio van Paraguay te gemakkelijk is vereenzelvigd met gebrek aan land 
en rechtszekerheid, een probleem dat opgelost zou kunnen worden door het nemen 
van toegangvemiimende maatregelen, zoals kolonisatie (en daarmee gepaard gaand 
vertrek), herverdeling van land en legalisatie van occupatierechten. Gebleken is 
echter dat de overheidspolitiek de problematiek van de Centrale Regio nauwelijks 
heeft verkleind. Gegeven de huidige overlevingsstrategieën van de kleine boeren 
en het specifieke karakter van de 'illegale' occupatie zullen de genoemde 
beleidsmaatregelen hier ook in de toekomst nauwelijks tot verbeteringen leiden. De 
veronderstelling dat 'toegangvemiimende maatregelen' een oplossing vormen voor 
de problematiek van kleine boeren, gaat ook voor wat betreft Centraal-Paraguay 
betreft niet (meer) op. 
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ЕЕ UU 
STELLINGEN 
behorend bij het proefschrift van E.B. Zoemers 
Rural Development and Survival Strategies in Central Paraguay 
1. 
Ervan uitgaande dat agrarische kolonisatie o.a. is bedoeld een 
bijdrage te leveren aan de decongestie van relatief overbevolkte 
landbouwgebieden, zouden niet de landlozen, maar juist de 
allergrootste boeren tot vertrek moeten worden gestimuleerd. 
2. 
Agrarische kolonisatie en landhervormingen leiden niet tot de 
gewenste resultaten zolang er geen directe relatie bestaat tussen 
bedrijfsgrootte, landbouwopbrengsten en levensstandaard. 
3. 
Gezien het belang van semi- en niet-agrarische inkomstenbronnen 
voor het bestaan van kleine boeren, wordt in literatuur vaak ten 
onrechte de term 'nevenactiviteiten' gebruikt. 
4. 
Onderzoek naar mogelijkheden ter verhoging van de levensstandaard 
van kleine boeren, zou minder gericht moeten zijn op 
landbouwlechnische factoren, maar meer aandacht moeten schenken 
aan de rol van semi- en niet-agrarische activiteiten. 
5. 
Bedrijfsgroottestatistieken geven van de grondbezitsverhoudingen in 
Latijns-Amerika een te rooskleurig beeld. 
6. 
Agrarische kolonisatie in ontwikkelingslanden versnelt het 
uitstotingsproces van kleine boeren en bevordert derhalve het 
ontstaan van een 'full-time labour reserve'. 
7. 
Conform de gewijzigde visie op de ontwikkelingspotentie van 
'informele activiteiten' in de stedelijke sfeer ('self-help housing' en 
'informal employment'), zou ook in ruraal onderzoek meer aandacht 
moeten worden besteed aan de mate waarin 'spontane occupatie' 
voordelen kan bieden boven 'officiële' kolonisatie. 
8. 
Het legalisatieprogramma, zoals in Paraguay uitgevoerd door het 
'Instituto de Bienestar Rural', zal de levensstandaard van occupanten 
niet verhogen, zolang vooral niet-agrariërs en grote boeren over 
voldoende middelen beschikken om eigenaar te worden van het land, 
en zij met hun eigendomsbewijzen occupanten (nog) gemakkelijker van 
hun land kunnen verdrijven. 
9. 
Het streven van het 'Instituto de Bienestar Rural' naar tenminste 
1.000.000 officieel geregistreerde eigendomstitels in 1989, is geen 'acto 
de justicia' maar een waarschuwing aan kleine boeren dat ze van hun 
land kunnen worden verdreven. 
10. 
In het kader van de 'kunst tot overleven', zou voor promovendi 
'nieuwe stijl' (aio's en oio's) een BKR moeten worden ingesteld. 
11. 
Het beste moment voor 'neo-positivisten' om marxistisch-
georiënteerde ontwikkelingsgeografen met hun ideeën omtrent 
'uitbuiting' en 'schuld van het kapitaal' te confronteren is als (ook) 
zij bij vertrek uit een ontwikkelingsland staan af te dingen op de 
prijzen van hun souvenirs. 
12. 
De omdoping van de Nijmeegse geografie tot 'beleidswetenschap' is de 
laatste poging van geografen om eindelijk tóch in aanmerking te 
komen voor een gratis abonnement op 'Intermediair'. 
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